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ABSTRACT
AUDIT COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT OF FRAUD RISK
by
Robert M. Wilbanks
This study examines how audit committees (ACs) fulfill their responsibilities for
assessing fraudulent financial reporting (FFR) risk by focusing on the social
influence/risk aversion relationship. Although the AC’s responsibility for assessing FFR
risk is arguably one of its most important roles, ACs lack consensus on how to perform
the task of fraud risk oversight. This study explores this issue at a deeper level by
examining the relationship between the AC’s fraud risk assessment process and the
professional and personal ties that exist between AC members and (a) management (CEO
and CFO), and (b) other corporate governance actors (internal audit, external audit, other
AC members, and other independent directors).
The results of a survey of 136 AC members from mid-sized U.S. public
companies indicate no association between AC members’ personal or professional
relationship ties to management or other corporate governance actors and AC members’
overall reliance on these actors to assess fraud risk. However, I find links between the
AC’s own actions to assess fraud risk and (a) personal ties to the CEO/CFO and
professional ties to other corporate governance actors, and (b) certain control variables
including board of director independence, AC size, and respondent gender. Specifically, I
find that AC members with personal ties to the CEO and other independent directors, and
professional ties to the CEO and the external audit partner, are less likely to engage in
vi

AC actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. On the other hand, I find
that AC members with personal ties to the CFO, and professional ties to other
independent directors and the head of internal audit, are more likely to engage in actions
to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. Further, I find that female AC
members are more likely to report engaging in activities to assess management’s
integrity. I also find that AC size and board independence are positively associated with
AC actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. In addition, the results
provide insights about how AC members delegate their fraud oversight duties, and reveal
that AC members generally perceive that management, and internal and external auditors,
are more responsible for assessing fraud risk than the AC, or other independent directors.
This study should be of interest to regulators, researchers and other groups concerned
with management-director relationship ties, AC composition, director independence, and
AC oversight issues.

Keywords: Audit Committee, Social Ties, Professional Ties, Fraudulent Financial
Reporting
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CHAPTER 1
RESEARCH SUMMARY
The audit committee (AC) plays a key role in protecting investors from fraudulent
financial reporting (FFR), but ACs lack consensus on how to perform the task of fraud
risk oversight (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009). Regulators and other
stakeholders have high expectations of ACs and “the abilities of ACs to meet their
responsibilities” (Bédard & Gendron, 2010, p. 175). However, AC members’ social or
professional connection to management or other directors “raises questions about the
degree of arms-length monitoring that may take place” (Beasley et al., 2009, p. 81). The
extant academic research examining AC relationship ties is very limited and primarily
archival in nature. In light of the regulatory expectations that the AC will provide
substantive fraud oversight, and the risk that relationship ties “may impair the ability of
AC members to be substantively independent of management” (e.g., Cohen, Gaynor,
Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2011, p. 129), and the lack of related academic research
examining AC judgments, my research provides insight into the association between AC
fraud risk oversight and AC relationship ties.
Specifically, I examine variations in the AC’s approach to assessing FFR risk and
how this variation is related to AC members’ personal and professional ties and other
characteristics of the AC and its members. The study complements recent archival and
experimental studies that have examined management-board relationship ties and
corporate governance outputs and investor judgments. The study also addresses (a)
1

2
Beasley et al.’s (2009, p. 114) call for future research examining whether AC members
“view of delegated fraud oversight impacts audit committee effectiveness”; (b)
Bruynseels and Cardinael’s (2012, p. 35) call for future research “examining AC
relationships and AC interactions with other actors who influence the quality of financial
reporting”; and (c) Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy and Wright’s (2011, p. 145) call for
research “examining whether professional or personal ties have the most influence on
potentially compromising the substantive independence of the AC”. As such, the study
begins to shed light on the issue of whether regulators should consider requiring directors
to disclose their personal ties or lack thereof, in addition to the mandated disclosures of
familial and financial interests to the firm or the CEO/CFO (SOX, 2002). This type of
disclosure may be of interest to external parties, such as auditors, regulators, or investors,
who may perceive that the AC is more independent if its members do not have personal
or professional ties to management.
In this study, I administer a survey developed, in part, from the results of Beasley
et al. (2009) to measure the constructs. I capture AC members’ perceptions of their
relationship ties to management and other corporate governance actors and AC members’
reliance on these parties. I also capture how these relationships are associated with the
AC’s own efforts to assess FFR risk and management integrity. Specifically, my
dependent variables are: (a) AC members’ reliance on the CEO and CFO to assess FFR
risk, (b) AC members’ reliance on other corporate governance actors to assess FFR risk,
and (c) AC members’ reliance on their own actions to assess FFR risk. My independent
variables are: (a) AC members’ perceptions of their personal ties to the CEO and CFO,
(b) AC members’ perceptions of their professional ties to the CEO and CFO, (c) AC
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members’ perceptions of their personal ties to other corporate governance actors, and (d)
AC members’ perceptions of their professional ties to other corporate governance actors.
Further, I consider several corporate governance variables that are of interest in studies of
relationship ties including AC expertise, director tenure, CEO power, and AC members’
perceptions of responsibility. I also measure a host of other personal and governance
variables including, but not limited to, AC meeting frequency, AC members’ education
and experience, AC size, board independence, board size, and multiple board positions
(e.g., “busy directors”).
Using agency theory (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976),
institutional theory (e.g., Scott, 1987), managerial hegemony theory (e.g., Kosnik, 1987),
and accountability theory (e.g., Jensen, 2006; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Messier &
Quilliam, 1992; Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock 1985 a, b), I anticipate that variations in AC
members’ strategies to assess FFR risk will reflect how the social influence/risk aversion
dynamic influences members’ sense of accountability and whether that accountability lies
with those who serve as agents of the firm (e.g., management) or those who work on
behalf of external stakeholders (e.g., internal audit, external audit, other AC members,
other independent board members). Consistent with the managerial hegemony
perspective and institutional theory and the findings in several archival studies that
concluded that social ties are corrosive and diminish the quality of corporate governance
(e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran, Kedia, & Prabhala, 2012; Dey &
Liu, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012), I expect to find that stronger personal ties
between management (e.g., CEO and CFO) and AC members will lead to greater AC
reliance on the CEO and CFO to assess FFR risks and less AC reliance on its own actions
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to assess FFR risk. However, consistent with agency theory and the “collaborative board”
model (e.g., Westphal, 1999) and the findings of other recent archival studies by
Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2012) and Chidambaran, et al. (2012) that differentiated
between personal and professional ties and found that professional ties were associated
with good corporate governance outcomes, I expect that this relationship will be less
strong for AC members with professional ties than those with personal ties. On the other
hand, consistent with accountability theory, I expect that AC members’ perceptions of
their personal and professional ties to other corporate governance actors (e.g., internal
audit, external audit, other AC members, and other independent directors) can lead to
either greater or lesser reliance on other corporate governance actors, the CEO/CFO, and
the AC members’ own efforts, as there are competing arguments based on the concepts of
inter-rater reliability and self-insight.
The relationships between the AC and the other corporate actors in the corporate
governance mosaic (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004) who directly influence the
quality of corporate governance (e.g., management, internal audit, external audit, board
of directors) are complex, and AC members’ abilities to carry out their duties depend on
AC members’ access to information, as well as AC members’ capabilities and
motivations, and the capabilities and motivations of management and the other corporate
governance actors. Accountability theory suggests that AC members should be more
highly motivated in the presence of other corporate governance actors to assess FFR risk
because assessing FFR risk is a difficult task and stakeholders or those who collectively
work on behalf of the stakeholders have high expectations of the AC. However, AC
members bring different skill sets to the board, and their concerns for maintaining their
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reputation and social capital could lead to widely varying strategies for assessing FFR
risk. As such, I expect that AC members’ relationship ties to management or other
corporate governance actors directly responsible for the quality of corporate governance
may help foster mutual trust and advice giving, but can also lead to more self-reliant
behavior depending upon the nature of the relationship ties.
Overall, I find no association between AC members’ personal or professional
relationship ties to management or other corporate governance actors and AC members’
overall reliance on these actors to assess fraud risk. However, I do find links between the
AC’s own actions to assess fraud risk and (a) personal ties to the CEO/CFO and
professional ties to other corporate governance actors, and (b) certain control variables
including board of director independence, AC size, and respondent gender. These
findings suggest that some AC members, regardless of relationship type, may serve in
largely ceremonial roles and/or serve as passive directors who derive their information
from management, consistent with institutional theory and managerial hegemony theory.
On the other hand, I find evidence that some AC members are more likely to take an
agency approach to AC fraud oversight. Some of these AC members appear to engage in
non-confrontational strategies for assessing FFR risk, possibly to protect their personal
status, or to adhere to communal board norms, yet still carry out their fiduciary
responsibilities, consistent with accountability theory.
This study contributes to the growing body of research examining AC relationship
ties. First, this study provides additional insight into how AC members delegate their
fraud oversight responsibilities. Second, unlike prior archival research, this study
attempts to directly look at how AC members’ personal and professional relationship ties

6
drive AC judgments rather than indirectly examining how relationship ties are associated
with AC outputs (e.g., financial reporting quality and corporate governance outcomes).
Third, the study provides a broader, network view of relationship ties than found in
previous archival studies by examining not only AC relationship ties to CEOs and CFOs,
but other corporate actors (e.g., internal audit, external audit, board of directors) directly
involved in corporate governance, as well. Finally, this study contributes to an emerging
line of research that considers different forms of relationship ties (e.g. Bruynseels &
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidbambaran et al., 2012; Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy, &
Wright, 2012a) by examining how such ties influence AC judgments.

7

CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the social influence/risk aversion relationship in a unique
setting by examining how AC members handle their responsibilities for assessing FFR
risk. Using a survey of AC members from U.S. public companies, I take a broader,
network view of the corporate governance process consistent with that of Turley and
Zaman (2007) by examining how personal and professional ties between the AC and the
full network of actors in the corporate governance mosaic (Cohen et al., 2004) are
associated with variations in AC members’ approaches to fraud oversight. Specifically, I
examine how AC members’ perceptions of their personal and professional ties to the
CEO, the CFO, the head of internal audit, the external audit partner in charge of the
engagement, and other independent directors are associated with AC members’
perceptions of reliance when assessing FFR risk and the AC’s own actions to assess fraud
risk.
In this study, I have also broadened the definitions of personal and professional
ties to capture ties that have not been included in previous archival studies. Specifically, I
define personal ties as “instances where you and another individual have non-business
affiliations or interactions.” I include relationships commonly found in prior studies of
“social” or “personal” ties including military service, mutual alma mater, and
memberships in social clubs and charitable organizations (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels,
2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009,
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2012; Krishnan et al., 2011). However, I also include personal friendships, neighborhood
friendships, church memberships, and a catchall category. I have also broadened the
definition of “professional ties” which I define as “instances where individuals interact in
a business capacity in a meaningful way separate from board and AC service.” I include
relationship ties included in prior studies of “professional” ties including past
employment (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012) and shared
board responsibilities (Cohen et al., 2012a). However, I also include supplier-customer
relationships, common membership in professional organizations, and service on not-forprofit boards, consistent with Beasley et al. (2009) and Lisic, Neal, and Zhang (2012). I
also allow the study’s participants to describe their relationship ties as a catchall
provision.
I also examine the influence of a host of other AC, governance, personal, and
company characteristics in my analysis that are pertinent to studies of relationship ties
including: (1) AC expertise (e.g., Cohen et al., 2012b; Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy,
& Wright, 2008a; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2002, 2010; Dhaliwal, Naiker, &
Navissi, 2010), (2) director tenure (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Sharma & Iselin, 2012;
Vafeas, 2003), (3) CEO power (e.g., Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2011;
Lisic et al., 2012, Stevenson & Radin, 2009), and (4) AC members’ perceptions of their
responsibilities (e.g., Abdolmohammadi & Levy, 1992; DeZoort, 1997; Wolnizer, 1995).
For the dependent variables of AC members’ reliance on management and other
corporate actors and AC reliance on its own efforts to assess FFR risk, I adapt results
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from Beasley et al. (2009) and measures from Bierstaker, Cohen, DeZoort, and
Hermanson (2012) and Cohen et al. (2012a). My conceptual model is shown in Figure
1.1.

Figure 1.1 Conceptual Research Model
Audit committees are charged with overseeing financial reporting and audit
processes in U.S. public companies (e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), 1999; New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 2004; Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 2002). Scandals in the
pre-SOX era (e.g., Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco International, and WorldCom)
demonstrated that corporate governance could be compromised, resulting in FFR. Among
the provisions of SOX (2002), section 407 required companies to disclose that all
members of the AC are independent and that at least one member of the AC meets the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) definition of a “financial expert”, and if
not, why not (SOX, 2002). Differences in the SOX (2002) and SEC definitions of
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“financial expertise” led to an ongoing controversy as to the appropriate mix of director
expertise on the AC. However, the clear intent of both SOX (2002) and the SEC was to
improve AC oversight.
In response to the regulatory changes, firms sought out potential AC members
who could not only enhance the quality of “human capital” (e.g., Stevenson & Radin,
2009) on the board, but could also cope with heightened scrutiny by the public and
regulators, large workload demands, and reputation and liability risks (Sharma & Iselin,
2012). Not surprisingly, management and boards of directors appear to have looked
towards individuals with whom they had existing social or professional affiliations (e.g.,
Beasley et al., 2009; Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran, et al., 2012; Clune,
Hermanson, Tompkins, & Ye, 2013; Dey & Liu, 2011; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang & Kim,
2009, 2012; Krishnan et al., 2011) to improve corporate governance because comfort and
trust are associated with established relationships (Clune, et al., 2013). Beasley et al.
(2009) quote an AC member who described the selection process:
The CFO suggested that I join the board. The CFO is a personal friend.
Long ago I served on the company’s audit engagement (35 years ago). The
CFO wanted my financial expertise. (Quote from a NASDAQ audit
committee chair (joined board post-SOX). (p. 81)
Personal ties between management and the board members can facilitate the due
diligence process (related to joining a board) by providing comfort to prospective
members, as well as to management and existing board members (Beasley et al., 2009;
Clune et al., 2013). Each party has knowledge of the other, which can facilitate
collegiality and trust. Beasley et al. (2009) documented that prospective AC members
demonstrate skepticism and risk aversion when considering board service and are “more
likely to decline to serve on the board or AC or are more likely to leave the board if they
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have concerns about management credibility and/or integrity or have witnessed fraud,
illegal acts, or unethical conduct” (Beasley et al., 2009, p. 80). Research has also
confirmed that relationship ties can lead to more frequent and higher quality advice
giving between CEOs and outside directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Westphal, 1999),
enhanced board involvement and firm performance (Westphal, 1999), less earnings
management (Krishnan et al., 2011), and improved financial reporting quality, “but only
if social ties include members of the AC” (Hoitash, 2011, p. 399). This concept, referred
to as the “collaborative board” model (Westphal, 1999), suggests that board members are
capable of being both monitors of, and advice givers to, management.
On the other hand, the appointment of socially connected directors to the board
potentially has a downside risk. Academic research has documented that social ties
between managers and directors are associated with adverse accounting or governance
outcomes (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey and Liu,
2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012). Further, research has found that powerful CEOs can
undermine AC expertise (Lisic et al., 2012); trump the addition of AC members that
bring additional “human capital” to the board (Stevenson & Radin, 2009); and weaken
the intensity of board monitoring (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). However, more recent studies
have found that management-director professional ties are positively associated with
good corporate governance outcomes (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012) and lower fraud
probability (Chidambaran et al., 2012). In addition, a recent experiment with nonprofessional investors found that investors perceived that ACs with members with
professional ties to management were more effective than ACs with members with social
ties to management (Cohen et al., 2012a). However, investors perceived that ACs with
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members with no ties to management were more independent than either ACs with
members with personal or professional ties. These findings suggest that ACs with no ties,
or professional ties to management, may be associated with more effective AC oversight
than ACs with social ties.
The central issue associated with management-director relationship ties is whether
management has sought to place technically independent, yet socially compromised
individuals on the board of directors as a way of controlling the board and circumventing
the intent of stricter governance regulations. By controlling socially dependent directors,
management may be capable of more easily perpetrating FFR. This scenario is potentially
problematic as Beasley, Carcello, & Hermanson (1999) and Beasley, Carcello,
Hermanson & Neal (2010) found that CEOs and CFOs are named for some level of
involvement in the vast majority of FFR cases. The importance of understanding the link
between management-director relationship ties and the AC’s assessment of FFR risk is
underscored by a finding that the costs associated with incidences of FFR have increased
rapidly in recent years (Beasley et al., 2010).
Another key issue is whether AC members are capable of effectively assessing
FFR risk. Beasley et al. (2009, p. 98) documented that “many AC members simply did
not want to be responsible for detecting fraud” and “lacked consensus” as how to best
assess FFR risk. Further, Beasley et al. (2009) found that some AC members perceived
that internal and external auditors were primarily responsible for fraud risk oversight. As
such, these findings raised questions about AC accountability. Although, the BRC’s
(1999) “guiding principles” for ACs encouraged collaborations between the AC and
management, internal auditors, and external auditors to assess FFR risks, over-delegation

13
of duties by AC members can potentially be problematic if management is capable of
influencing either AC members or the other corporate governance monitors (e.g., internal
audit, external audit, other board members). This is an important issue because regulators
and other stakeholders have high expectations of ACs and “the abilities of ACs to meet
their responsibilities” (Bédard & Gendron, 2010, p. 175).
The present study is primarily motivated by (1) Beasley et al.’s (2009) findings
that AC members generally lacked a recognized responsibility for fraud risk oversight,
yet AC members play a key role as monitors of the firm (e.g., Krishnan et al., 2011); (2)
prior research finding that board oversight is weakened in the presence of “social ties”
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi &
Tate, 2012; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012) despite regulatory independence rules; (3) recent
research findings that the appointment of directors with “professional” ties (Bruynseels &
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012), especially those serving on the AC
(Hoitash, 2011), can lead to effective corporate governance or offset the corrosive
influence of “social ties” (Krishnan et al., 2011), but there is limited research addressing
this issue; and (4) AC “black box” studies (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron & Bédard,
2006; Gendron, Bédard & Gosselin, 2004) that document the presence of managementdirector relationship ties, but have not specifically examined the association between
these ties and AC judgments. By using a survey, rather than an archival approach, I am
able to more directly examine these issues by examining the relationship between the
AC’s fraud risk assessment process and the professional and personal ties that exist
between AC members and (a) management (CEO and CFO) and (b) other corporate
governance actors (e.g., internal audit, external audit, other independent directors).
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This study also complements recent archival and experimental studies that have
examined management-board relationship ties and corporate governance outputs
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran, et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Hoitash,
2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan, et al., 2011) and investor judgments (Cohen,
et al., 2012a). Further, the study addresses (a) Beasley et al.’s (2009, p. 114) call for
future research whether AC members “view of delegated fraud oversight impacts audit
committee effectiveness”; (b) Bruynseels & Cardinael’s (2012, p. 35) call for future
research “examining AC relationships and AC interactions with other actors who
influence the quality of financial reporting”; and (c) Cohen et al.’s (2011, p. 145) call for
research “examining whether professional or personal ties have the most influence on
potentially compromising the substantive independence of the AC”. As such, this study
begins to shed light on the issue of whether regulators should consider requiring directors
to disclose their personal ties or lack thereof, in addition to the mandated disclosures of
familial and financial interests to the firm or the CEO/CFO (SOX, 2002). This type of
disclosure may be of interest to external parties, such as auditors, regulators, or investors,
who may perceive that the AC is more independent if its members have no personal or
professional ties to management.
Because of the complex interactions among the actors in the corporate governance
mosaic, I follow calls by Carcello, et al. (2011a), Clune et al. (2013), Cohen, Gaynor,
Krishnamoorthy, & Wright (2008b), Bédard & Gendron (2010), and Radcliffe (2010),
among others, and use multiple theoretical lenses to explain behavior that none of the
four major governance theories (e.g., agency, resource dependence, institutional,
managerial hegemony) (Cohen et al., 2008b) alone can fully describe. Specifically, I
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incorporate elements of agency theory, managerial hegemony, institutional theory, and
accountability theory to explain why AC members may provide substantive monitoring
or instead serve in largely ceremonial roles. Agency theory views the AC as an
independent monitor of management (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling,
1976); however, the managerial hegemony perspective suggests that director
independence may be compromised by social influences and that CEO influence over the
selection of board members may render the board passive by the appointment of friends
and individuals with whom management shares personal ties. Thus, independent directors
may serve in largely ceremonial roles (e.g., institutional theory). On the other hand, the
“collaborative board” model (e.g., Westphal, 1999) suggests that management-director
relationship ties may enhance advice seeking and advice giving behavior. Westphal
(1999, p. 9) noted that the larger literature on advice-seeking has found that advice
seekers’ concern for their status is “a primary inhibitor to seeking advice”. As such,
social ties and arguably professional ties help to alleviate management, as well as
directors’, concerns about status by facilitating trust (Hoitash, 2011; Westphal, 1999).
Accountability theory suggests that people are more likely to account for (or
justify) their actions to themselves or others (Tetlock, 1985a) when held accountable by
external audiences. In order for directors to provide effective monitoring and to be
perceived as effective, they need to have an adequate understanding of the company on
whose board they serve. Roberts, McNulty, & Styles (2005, p. S6) posit that directors
create accountability on the board “through a series of different behaviors including
challenging, questioning, testing, probing, debating, advising, and informing and that
these are central to how non-executives come to be effective”. In the context of the board
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of directors, Jensen (2006) posits that directors’ concern for their status is driven by their
sense of accountability. Thus, AC members may develop different strategies for assessing
FFR risk depending on AC members’ perceptions of the strength of their own abilities
(self-insight) and the abilities of other corporate governance actors (inter-rater reliability)
in order to perceive that they are accountable and to maintain their status on the board.
Given the use of multiple theoretical lenses in this study and the wide array of
relationships that I examine, I anticipate that survey participants’ perceptions of the
strength of their personal and professional relationships to the CEO/CFO and other
corporate governance actors will be associated with widely varying levels of reliance on
these actors and the AC members’ own efforts to assess FFR risk. And, I expect that the
results of the study will provide deeper insight into the relative strength of monitor-agent
and monitor-monitor relationships.
The next sections provide a review of the pertinent literature and develop the
hypotheses. Subsequent sections will describe the methodology, results, and conclusions.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
Audit Committee Fraud Oversight
Legal Environment and Audit Committee Risk
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was implemented in response to massive
accounting scandals at companies such as Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco International,
and WorldCom. SOX (2002) increased the AC’s responsibilities and authority (Section
301), raised AC independence and expertise requirements (Section 407) and provided
legal protection to “whistleblowers” of publicly traded companies who provided evidence
of fraud. The stock exchanges (e.g., New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASDAQ) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) also implemented a host of regulatory reforms. Although many in the
business community argued that the costs associated with implementing SOX have
outweighed the benefits (Wade, 2007), the findings in the academic literature have
generally found that SOX led to improved corporate governance (see Carcello et al.,
2011a). Further, the global meltdown of the financial markets in late 2008 that
necessitated governmental bailouts of failing companies (e.g., General Motors and
Chrysler) and financial institutions (e.g., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG) indicated that
additional regulations or refinements to existing regulations were perhaps warranted.
In reaction to the high profile firm failures of late 2008, the U.S. Congress implemented
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank
Act). The Dodd-Frank Act included extensive changes to U.S. financial regulations
including reforms aimed at preventing management, who is most likely to be associated
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with incidences of FFR (Beasley et al., 2010), from benefiting financially from its actions
and provided incentives to whistleblowers, who are more likely to discover fraudulent
activity (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010). Among the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act,
Section 954 implemented a “claw back” provision that allowed firms to recoup
compensation from executives in cases where it was later determined that accounting
issues led to financial restatements (SEC, 2010). Further, Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank
Act strengthened whistleblower rules to provide monetary compensation between 10%
and 30% of any monetary sanctions above $1 million to employees who voluntarily
provided original information about violations of securities or commodities laws (SEC,
2010). The Dodd-Frank Act also enhanced protection to whistleblowers and implemented
anti-retaliation rights (SEC, 2010).
In addition, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) reacted
by issuing a new standard that recognized the AC is a key communications hub among
parties responsible for overseeing FFR risk. PCAOB Standard No. 16 “Communications
with Audit Committees,” which is effective for public company audits of fiscal periods
beginning after Dec. 15, 2012, formalizes and documents communications between ACs
and external auditors (PCAOB, 2012). In general, the standard encourages more timely
dialogue between external auditors and ACs regarding pertinent audit issues rather than
waiting until the issuance of a financial report (PCAOB, 2012). Although PCAOB No. 16
primarily emphasized communications between external auditors and ACs, it can be
inferred that timely AC communication with other actors in the financial reporting chain
and with external actors, including whistleblowers, is being encouraged as well.
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The costs to AC members for not providing proper fraud oversight can be
significant. Directors are “now held more accountable than ever before and face legal
liability, reputational risk, and possible SEC enforcement actions when FFR occurs”
(Boyle, Wilbanks, & Hermanson, 2012, p. 4). For example, Cowen and Marcel (2011, p.
524) found that board members identified with FFR are “subject to higher rates of
dismissal from not only the boards where the improprieties occurred, but from other
boards as well”. Srinivasan (2005) also found that director turnover of AC members is
more likely as the severity of financial misstatements increases. Consistent with
Srinivasan (2005), Fich and Shivdasani (2007, p. 335) found that the outside directors are
“more likely to lose other board appointments when the severity of the fraud allegation is
high, and when the outside director sits on the AC of an interlocked firm”. Further, there
are spillover effects to other firms. Kang (2008) found that firm value decreases not only
with a fraud firm, but also in other firms on whose board an interlocked director serves.
The effect is even more pronounced when interlocking directors hold audit or governance
chair positions in both firms (Kang, 2008).
Collectively, these studies documented that AC members are under heightened
scrutiny to assess FFR risk and are accountable to a large network of individuals and
groups, not only in the immediate financial reporting chain in any one firm on whose
board the member serves, but also to a wider network of external stakeholders as well.
As such, AC members must take into account “the expectations of these groups and the
potential damage to their own personal and professional status when faced with uncertain
situations,” such as assessing FFR risk where “directors are accountable to internal
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audiences for their behavior” (Jensen, 2006, p. 122). Thus, it is important for “board
members to better understand FFR and its likely perpetrators” (Boyle et al., 2012, p. 4).
The Audit Committee and Accountability
The AC plays a pivotal role in providing good corporate governance, but does not
act alone in achieving this goal. Management, internal audit, external audit, and the board
of directors also play direct roles in maintaining the quality of corporate governance.
Other corporate governance actors and mechanisms (e.g., courts and the legal system,
regulators, financial analysts, stock exchanges) who help to safeguard stakeholder
interests, also play a prominent, yet less direct role, in shaping and influencing the
behavior of those actors who are more directly associated with corporate governance
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2004). Collectively, Cohen et al. (2004, p. 90) described this
assortment of actors as a “corporate governance mosaic”. Kalbers (2009) also suggested
that other parties, whose losses associated with incidences of FFR are less easy to
quantify, have a vested interest in good corporate governance as well. These parties
include “employees, certain classes of stockholders and creditors, and smaller
competitors” (p. 197).
Beasley et al. (2009) documented that AC members generally approached AC
service with a serious intent of providing effective oversight, consistent with agency
theory. Likewise, Lorsch and MacIver (1989), in a pre-SOX study, documented that
directors approached board service more seriously than in the past. However, Lorsch and
MacIver (1989) also documented that directors lacked a strong consensus about
accountabilities to various constituencies and avoided talking about the matter. In the
post-SOX AC setting, it is not readily apparent if AC members’ fraud risk assessments
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are driven by a sense of accountability to any one corporate governance actor or other
stakeholders. However, it is clear that AC members are faced with a challenge of
balancing their need to follow communal board norms by not openly challenging
management on difficult issues (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) and/or sense of obligation to
support a CEO who may have favored their appointment to the board (Johnson,
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1993; Wade, O’Reilly & Chandratat, 1990), against the high
expectations of regulators and other stakeholders (Bédard & Gendron, 2010). Lorsch and
MacIver (1989) perhaps best describe this predicament:
Modern directors face a different reality - one in which the ability to carry
out their legally defined responsibilities is often impeded: one shaped not
only by the directors’ psychological reasons for serving [on the board], but
by limits on their time, by their understanding and their accountabilities,
and by relationships among themselves and the CEO-chairman. (p. 6)

Audit Committee Authority and Responsibilities

The scope of the AC’s role in the firm is generally dictated by a formal written
charter; however, SOX (2002) dictated AC composition and AC regulatory duties.
Among the provisions of SOX (2002), section 301 specifically required that ACs be
composed of independent directors and be responsible for appointing (and firing) external
auditors, setting external auditor compensation, overseeing the work of external auditors,
engaging special counsel or experts as necessary, and resolving financial reporting
disagreements between management and the external auditor (SOX, 2002). Collectively,
Bédard and Gendron (2010, p. 193) group these responsibilities into “three categories: (1)
oversight of external communications, (2) monitoring of the internal control system, and
(3) oversight of the external auditor”. As such, ACs have substantial responsibilities and
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are subject to the scrutiny of many stakeholders. A line of research examining AC
members and their responsibilities (e.g., Abdolmohammadi & Levy, 1992; DeZoort,
1997; Rittenberg & Nair, 1993a; Rupley, Almer, & Philbrick, 2011; Wolnizer, 1995), as
well as a line of literature examining AC resolutions of management-auditor disputes
(Cohen et al., 2007; DeZoort, Hermanson, & Houston, 2003a, 2003b, 2008; DeZoort &
Salterio, 2001), provides valuable insights into how AC members deal with difficult tasks
and why AC members may lack consensus as to how to assess FFR risk (Beasley et al.,
2009).
The pre-SOX studies of AC responsibilities focused on AC directors’ expertise
and perceptions of their abilities to carry out their responsibilities, finding a gap between
members’ perceptions of their responsibilities and their assigned responsibilities.
Specifically, DeZoort (1997) found that some members acknowledged that they did not
possess adequate expertise in many oversight areas related to accounting, auditing, and
the law. However, in the post-SOX era, AC members appeared to be more confident and
largely perceived that elements of AC effectiveness were present in their firms (Rupley et
al., 2011). External corporate governance monitors have a similar perception. Cohen et
al. (2010) found that auditors perceived that ACs had become more effective in
monitoring the financial reporting process in the post-SOX era. On the other hand,
studies of AC resolutions of auditor-management disagreements have revealed mixed
findings. Cohen et al. (2010) found that external auditors perceived that ACs still play a
passive role in resolving disputes or are ineffective in resolving disputes. However,
DeZoort et al. (2008, p. 85) found that AC support for an auditor‐proposed adjustment “is
significantly higher in the post‐SOX period than in the pre-SOX era and that CPAs on the
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AC had become much more conservative post-SOX”. As such, the findings in these two
lines of literature suggest that AC members employ different strategies to handle their
responsibilities when faced with difficult or ambiguous tasks.
Still, there appears to be a consensus that ACs generally seek to provide quality
corporate governance. For example, Gendron et al. (2004, p. 153) found that the ACs in
their study “are generally perceived as effective by individuals who attend AC meetings”
and that “key matters that AC members emphasize during meetings include financial
statement accuracy and appropriate wording in financial reports, internal controls, and
audit quality, and asks challenging questions of management and auditors”. Likewise,
auditors perceived that “AC members are more likely to ask challenging questions of
management in the post-SOX era” (Cohen et al. 2010, p. 768). However, AC members
may or may not be willing to become involved in auditor-management disputes or are
less likely to accept an auditor’s restatement recommendation than audit adjustment
recommendation presumably because they are concerned about a loss of standing
(Hunton & Rose, 2008).
Audit Committee Strategies for Assessing Risk and Reputation risks
Hunton and Rose (2008) may help to explain why AC members have been found
to be both active and passive in carrying out their responsibilities. The authors suggested
that AC members may carry out their duties in a non-confrontational manner or act as a
facilitator between management and auditors in order to maintain harmony on the board.
This approach is consistent with the concept of a “collaborative board” (Adams &
Ferreira, 2007; Westphal, 1999) whereby directors are an advice giver to, and monitor of,
management. By using others to handle more difficult tasks, AC members can avoid
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losing personal and professional capital by avoiding confrontation that could impair their
status (Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Janis, 1982; Jensen, 2006; Johnson, Schnatternly,
Bolton, & Tuggle, 2011) and lead to potentially being marginalized or ostracized by
either management or other board members (Westphal & Khanna, 2003). On the other
hand, AC members’ concern for reputation and litigation risks may result in enhanced
monitoring. For example, Abbott, Park, and Parker (2000, p. 56) noted that although AC
service can enhance directors’ reputation capital, it can exacerbate reputation damages if
a financial restatement occurs while a director serves on an AC. Thus, AC members
should be motivated to minimize this risk. Further, AC members may also be motivated
by concerns about non-AC directors. Abbott et al. (2000) documented that in shareholder
lawsuits alleging FFR, non-AC members could potentially seek to subrogate their
liability to AC members by claiming reliance on the AC and thus, protect their own
reputation capital. As such, the AC must take into account perceptions of both external
stakeholders as well as the motivations of other corporate governance monitors.
FFR and the Role of Monitors and Agents of the Firm
Fraudulent financial reporting is defined “as the intentional material misstatement
of financial statements or financial disclosures or the perpetration of an illegal act that has
a material direct effect on the financial statements or financial disclosures” (Beasley et
al., 1999, p. 11). Fraudulent financial reporting represents an extreme case of earnings
management (Kalbers, 2009) where there is an intent to deceive (Dechow & Skinner,
2000). Although FFR is the least prevalent of all types of fraud, the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners “Report to the Nations: 2010 Global Fraud Study” found a
median loss of $1.7 million per incident (ACFE, 2010). The task of detecting FFR is not
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only difficult for the AC but other corporate governance monitors as well. Beasley et al.
(2010, p. 6) documented that Big Six/Four external auditing firms, who arguably were
best equipped to detect cases of FFR, audited 79% of the fraud companies in their study,
but nearly all of the companies received unqualified or “clean” opinions. Although
auditors were more likely to include additional explanatory language in opinions for
fraud than for no-fraud firms, their inability to detect FFR reflected the challenge of
detecting FFR.
The fraud literature reflects that corporate governance mechanisms have changed
over time, yet some problems remain. In the pre-SOX era, academic research revealed
that cases of FFR were often associated with (1) the lack of an AC prior to the fraud
(Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; McMullen, 1996), (2) lower percentages of outside
directors on the board of directors (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996), (3) shorter
tenures of outside directors on the board and directors who served on other boards
(Beasley, 1996), and (4) CEOs simultaneously serving as Chairman of the Board or
CEOs being a firm’s founder (Dechow et al., 1996). Further, the Treadway Commission
study (NCFFR, 1987), which examined cases of FFR for the five-year period ending
August 1986, found that nearly two-thirds of fraud cases involved top management
(NCFFR, 1987, p. 112). The ability of external auditors was also called into question as
the Commission found that incidences of FFR were often linked “to the failure of
external auditors to follow up on “red flags” during the audit process” (NCFFR, 1987, p.
25).
A subsequent 1999 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) sponsored
study, “Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987–1997” (Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson
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1999), examined SEC enforcement actions against 200 companies and concluded that
firms committing FFR often had weak boards of directors and ACs, and that top
management was frequently involved with the fraud. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and
Lapides (2000), in a related study of fraud and no-fraud companies in three key
industries, also found that FFR was more prevalent in firms with very weak governance
mechanisms, less independent ACs, and less independent boards. Further, the authors
found that FFR was industry specific, with FFR being most common in the technology,
healthcare, and financial services industries and that the methods for committing FFR
differed by industry. Revenue recognition issues were more common in technology
companies, whereas asset overstatements were more common in the financial services
industry. This study also confirmed that there were significant differences between fraud
and no-fraud firms in the pre-SOX era. Collectively, these studies painted a picture of
fraud firms as being impaired by issues of management influence, a lack of director
independence, weak ACs, little evidence of an internal audit function, and a challenging
audit environment.
On the other hand, the more recent fraud literature suggested that improved
corporate governance had led to better fraud oversight; however, management influence
remained an issue. In a follow-up 2010 COSO-sponsored study, “Fraudulent Financial
Reporting 1998-2007”; Beasley, et al. (2010) found that differences in board governance
characteristics between fraud and no-fraud firms had been reduced or largely eliminated
because of regulatory focus on governance and FFR. Further, companies appeared to
place a greater emphasis on establishing additional monitoring mechanisms including the
establishment of an internal audit function. In fact, voluntary company disclosures of an
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internal audit function increased from “20% of firms in the period of 1991-1999 to 50%
of firms in a 2001-2004 sub period” (Beasley et al., 2010, p. 25).
However, Beasley et al. (2010) documented that many of the perpetrators of FFR,
their methods for carrying out FFR, and the industries in which fraud occurred, had not
changed despite increased regulatory focus on FFR. Further, the magnitude of losses
associated with cases of FFR actually increased. Beasley et al. (2010) found that
management was found to be increasingly associated with incidences of FFR, with CEOs
and/or CFOs being named in 89% of the alleged cases of FFR in the 2010 COSO study as
opposed to 83% in the 1999 COSO study. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
enforcement actions against CFOs also rose dramatically to 65% in the 2010 COSO
study, as opposed to 43% in the 1999 COSO study, suggesting that CEOs might be
pressuring more CFOs into committing FFR (see Feng, Ge, Luo, & Shevlin, 2011).
Revenue recognition issues and the overstatement of asset valuations continued to be the
most prevalent means of perpetrating FFR. And, cases of FFR continued to be industry
focused, with approximately 63% of the cases of FFR being in the computer/hardware,
other manufacturing, healthcare and health products, retailer/wholesaler, and financial
services industries. These findings were similar to those found in Beasley et al. (1999),
except that alleged cases of FFR in the computer and software and other manufacturing
industries increased significantly from 24% to 40% in total. Perhaps the most disturbing
finding was that the magnitude of the frauds increased from a mean fraud of $25 million
per case in the 1999 study to $400 million per case in the 2010 study; however, the
number of cases of FFR rose only marginally during the same time period.
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Collectively, these findings are problematic when considered in the context of the
AC’s assessment of FFR risk. Although regulators have focused on FFR and the fraud
literature suggested that board governance characteristics have improved as a result, AC
members still rely to an extent on the integrity of CEOs and CFOs (Beasley et al., 2009).
However, CEOs and CFOs are the most likely perpetrators of FFR. Further, AC members
are often identified for board service because of existing relationships with the CEO,
CFO, or other board members (Beasley et al., 2009; Clune et al., 2013). As such, AC
members may rely on individuals who are most likely to perpetrate FFR and may feel
obligated to those individuals because of mutual relationship ties or a sense of obligation
for their appointment to the board. As Ramamoorti (2008, p. 529) notes, “board culture is
an important component of board failure...but it is easy to fault boards of directors for
weak oversight, but we should also recognize that many of them may owe their position
on the board to the CEO”.
AC members’ abilities to assess FFR risk are also potentially associated with
management influence over other corporate governance actors upon whom the AC relies
(e.g., external and internal audit). For example, Cohen et al. (2011), in an experimental
study, documented that external auditors were less likely to insist on proposed audit
adjustments if they perceived that CEO influence over the AC was high and management
had a high level of incentive to manage earnings. And, external auditors’ strategies for
negotiating audit adjustments were based, in part, on their perceptions of managementAC connectedness (Cohen et al., 2011).
Further, reporting issues can influence internal auditors. The effectiveness of the
internal audit function has often been dependent upon its reporting channels. Beasley et
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al. (2009) documented that internal audit may report to both management and the AC and
that “these reporting channels often lack substantial clarity” (Beasley et al., 2009, p. 102).
The authors also noted that “in some firms, internal audit departments technically
reported to the AC, but in reality, reported to the CEO” (p. 101). Further, CEO or CFO
control over the internal audit function’s budget or providing input into the internal audit
plan can potentially impair independence (Christopher, Sarens & Leung, 2009). As such,
Boyle (2012) emphasized the need for strong internal audit-AC relationships, finding that
internal audit fraud risk and control risk assessments are likely to be higher if internal
audit reports directly to the AC chair. Thus, the AC’s ability to use the internal audit
function as an ally depends not only on the AC’s ability to assess FFR risk, but its
relationship to the internal audit function as well.
Clearly, the ability of the AC to carry out its duties is associated with not only
AC-management relationship ties, but also by complex interactions between the AC and
other corporate governance actors. How these relationships are associated with the AC’s
oversight of FFR risk is at the core of this study. To provide additional insight into this
issue, I next examine the extant literature that has focused on AC processes and then
examine studies of management-director relationship ties.
The Audit Committee and the FFR Oversight Process
Many corporate governance studies in accounting and auditing have focused on
governance variables associated with the AC oversight, including “AC composition,
independence, knowledge and expertise, effectiveness, power, duties, and
responsibilities; and earnings manipulation and fraud” (see Cohen et al., 2004, p. 91), or
have examined ACs in terms of “information quality, audit quality, internal control
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effectiveness or investor perceptions of these dimensions” (Bédard & Gendron, 2010,
p.176). However, Cohen et al. (2004) noted that:
The issue of how management interacts with the other players in the
corporate governance mosaic to potentially affect financial reporting
quality is ripe for further exploration. To date, there has been almost no
research that has directly looked at how management affects the corporate
governance mosaic. (p. 142)
As such, I examine more recent qualitative or “black box” studies of ACs (Beasley et al.,
2009; Gendron & Bédard, 2006; Gendron et al., 2004) that offer insight into how ACs
operate and handle their responsibilities, including their oversight of FFR risk and how
other actors in the corporate governance mosaic influence the AC’s judgments.
The more recent “black box” studies of ACs portray the AC as being more
actively engaged in carrying out its responsibilities (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron et
al., 2004; Gendron & Bédard, 2006), but there is some evidence that ACs still serve in
ceremonial roles (Beasley et al., 2009). Gendron et al. (2004) interviewed AC members
in three Canadian public corporations, finding that AC members placed a great deal of
emphasis on the accuracy of financial statements and the quality of the work of the
external auditors, but relied heavily on both internal and external auditors. AC members
gained “comfort” with management assertions and the quality of financial statements and
the work of the auditors by asking probing questions. The goal of this process was to
assess the trustworthiness of management and auditors through the degree of consistency
of their responses. These findings were consistent with the agency theory perspective of
corporate governance that portrays directors as independent monitors of management.
However, Gendron et al. (2004) did not specifically address the issue of the AC’s
assessment of FFR risk or examine management-director connectedness.
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In a subsequent study, Gendron and Bédard (2006, p. 211) examined AC meeting
attendees’ perceptions of AC effectiveness in three Canadian public corporations. One of
the primary findings of this study was that AC members’ perceptions of the AC’s abilities
to carry out its duties ranged from “confidence to hopefulness to anxiety”. A more
problematic finding was that AC members were less confident about auditors’ and AC
members’ abilities to detect fraud. AC members were characterized as being “hopeful”
that their actions would reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud and that by focusing on
whistle blowing channels and the AC’s assessment of management integrity, they could
“hopefully” manage this task. Other findings in this study suggested that AC members
looked into member backgrounds, features of AC meetings, and informal activities
outside of AC meetings to develop their sense of AC effectiveness. Further, AC members
relied, to a great extent, on internal and external auditors to carry out their duties.
Collectively, several general themes emerged from these two studies: 1) AC
members appeared to strive to carry out their responsibilities; 2) AC members relied upon
external actors in corporate governance, as well as their own efforts, to assess FFR risk;
3) AC members recognized the importance of maintaining communication channels to
parties outside of the corporate mosaic including whistleblowers; and 4) AC members
were not comfortable with assessing FFR risk. Still, AC members agreed to board service
although they were “hopeful” at best that they could assess FFR risk, yet they potentially
risked legal, regulatory, and reputational risks if FFR were to occur. Why then do AC
members agree to board service given these risks? The qualitative study of Beasley et al.
(2009) offered possible explanations for this phenomenon and confirmed that AC
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members in U.S. firms were equally as uncomfortable with assessing FFR risk as their
counterparts in Canadian firms.
Beasley et al. (2009) interviewed 42 AC members from U.S. public company
audit committees, and documented various AC processes. Comparable to the studies of
Gendron et al. (2004) and Gendron and Bédard (2006), Beasley et al. (2009) also found
evidence that AC members of U.S. public companies relied on their own actions, as well
as the actions of external and internal auditors to assess FFR risk, but some AC members
perceived that external and internal auditors were primarily responsible for fraud
prevention and detection. Further, AC members did not place as great an emphasis on
maintaining the whistleblower hotline as the AC members in the studies of Gendron et al.
(2004) and Gendron and Bédard (2006). However, AC members in the U.S. did rely
heavily on internal and external auditors, as well as management, to better understand
key financial reporting risks. Beasley et al. (2009) also found that many AC members
were uncomfortable with their responsibility for assessing FFR risk and lacked consensus
as how to carry out this task. In many instances, AC members stated that they did not
want to be responsible for assessing FFR risk or simply did not have the wherewithal to
find fraud.
These findings are odd given that many of the directors in the study were selected
for board service because they were more likely to have professional experience in
finance or accounting as a CFO, or possessed public accounting experience, or
experience in general management (Beasley et al., 2009). Although the appointment of
AC members to the board because of their accounting or financial expertise reflected an
agency approach (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), a finding that
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audit chairs were reluctant to say that their AC relied partly on its own actions to assess
FFR risk may reflect an institutional perspective (Scott, 1987). This finding suggested
that some ACs “are more symbolic (meeting regulatory requirements) rather than
substance (a tool to effect organizational change or provide substantive oversight of
management)” (Cohen et al., 2008b, p.186).
Beasley et al. (2009, p. 81) also found that AC members were often “identified for
board service because of personal ties to management or board members or significant
previous contact with executive management before being approached to serve on the
board”. However, prospective AC members tended to be cautious and generally
performed significant due diligence before accepting a board/AC position, including
reading and reviewing SEC filings (including financial statements); meeting with or
talking to existing board members, the CEO, CFO, and the external auditor; and talking
to colleagues. AC members also assessed the reputation of the company and management
before agreeing to board service. In many respects, AC members approached board
service similar to how nominating committees approach the director nomination process
by focusing on chemistry and comfort (Clune et al., 2013).
After agreeing to board service, AC members stated that they maintained comfort
by continuously evaluating management integrity and evaluating whether they perceived
that they were contributing to the board (Beasley et al., 2009). Participants in the study
also stated that they were more likely to decline board service or to leave their position on
the board or AC if they had concerns about management credibility and/or integrity or
have witnessed fraud, illegal acts, or unethical behavior (Beasley et al., 2009). What is
less clear is whether AC members’ actions were either subconsciously or consciously
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associated with their perceptions of “comfort” with the quality of board governance and
management integrity. As such, I look to the academic literature examining boardmanagement connectedness and financial reporting quality to provide insight into the
association between relationship ties and the quality of corporate governance.
Personal and Professional Ties
Studies examining director-management personal and professional ties and other
board characteristics have been much more common in the management field (see
comprehensive literature review by Johnson Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013) than in the
accounting/auditing field. The extant research on relationship ties in the
accounting/auditing field has largely been archival and has produced contradictory
findings (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu,
2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Hoitash, 2011; and Krishnan et al., 2011). Further,
there is a dearth of studies examining the association between relationship ties and AC
judgments.
The studies of board ties initially focused on the association between “social” or
“personal” ties between the board and management and financial reporting outcomes
(e.g., earnings management, executive compensation, firm performance), but little
attention was paid to AC-management ties. However, more recent studies have begun to
focus on AC-management ties (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a;
Hwang & Kim 2012) and have examined the association between personal and
professional ties and corporate governance outputs (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012;
Chidambaran et al., 2012) and investors’ judgments (Cohen et al., 2012a). Still, I have
found no studies that have considered how AC personal and professional ties are
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associated with AC interactions with management and other corporate governance actors
to assess FFR risk. To provide a more expansive view of relationship ties, I first examine
the overall conceptual nature of relationship ties and the concepts of “independent” and
“collaborative” boards. Then, I discuss the progression of relevant research findings in
the accounting/auditing literature.
In the management literature, relationship ties have been linked to maintaining
social capital. Johnson et al. (2013, p. 244) concluded that “Social capital in the form of
personal or loyalty relationships has been argued to affect the incentives of directors
(Adler & Kwon, 2002; Westphal, 1999) and group dynamics (Forbes & Milliken, 1999)
and may compromise director independence, but also may facilitate more open
communications”. These relationships may include “a business tie (e.g., a buyer or
supplier, consultant, or lawyer), often called “affiliated directors” or more broad
“personal” relationships such as “being friends or family members of the CEO””
(Johnson et al., 2013, p. 244). How these relationship ties are associated with directors’
abilities to carry out their fiduciary responsibilities underlies the tension between the
independent and collaborative board models.
The concept of the independent board is based on agency theory (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976) that focuses on the board of directors’ efforts to minimize agency costs
associated with the delegation of decision controls to management. From this perspective,
“outside directors are considered to be less likely to collude with management” (Fama &
Jensen, 1983, p. 315). Under agency theory, the primary attributes for a board member
are independence from management and expertise in monitoring and control. Although
the regulatory changes associated with SOX (2002) focused heavily on director
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independence as a means of enhancing corporate governance quality, several studies of
relationship ties found that directors may be formally independent yet compromised by
social ties (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu,
2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012).
Westphal (1999, p. 8) explained this phenomenon, suggesting that CEOs use
social and psychological factors that “compromise the willingness and ability of directors
to monitor management through the appointment of board members who are personal
friends or whom they share close social ties” (also see Finklestein & Hambrick, 2006;
Johnson et al., 1993; Kimberly & Zajac, 1988). As such, AC members may seek to
follow “communal norms” established by the board as a whole because “board
appointments confer prestige and status as well as financial rewards and perquisites”
(Westphal, 1999, p. 8). Directors may also feel “socially obligated to support CEOs that
favored their appointment” (Westphal, 1999, p. 10). CEO appointment of friends to the
board is consistent with the managerial hegemony perspective (e.g., Kosnik, 1987), as
well as institutional theory (Scott, 1987). Overall, the “independent board model”
suggests that boards may strive to provide effective oversight but management-director
social ties can potentially impair directors’ ability to monitor and control management
decision-making and performance (Westphal, 1999).
On the other hand, the “collaborative board” model suggests that directors are
capable of both providing advice and counsel and exercising oversight and control
(Westphal, 1999). Adams and Ferreira (2007) suggested that management may attempt to
strike a balance between controlling the board and receiving beneficial advice from board
members concluding that information sharing between management and independent
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directors can improve a director’s ability and effectiveness in governing the company.
Likewise, Westphal (1999, p. 7) concluded that “a lack of social independence can
increase board involvement and firm performance”. Further, Westphal (1998, 1999)
found that directors without social ties to the CEO are not necessarily more likely to
scrutinize management by challenging top managers on strategic issues. Collectively,
these findings suggested that there is a benefit to appointing board members despite the
presence of relationship ties because directors feel accountable to external parties and a
desire to protect their status (Jensen, 2006).
Previous studies of relationship ties have primarily been survey-based (Uzzi,
1996, 1997, 1999; Westphal, 1999; Ingram & Roberts, 2000; McDonald & Westphal,
2003; and Westphal, Boivie, & Chng, 2006) or archival (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012;
Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Hoitash, 2011;
and Krishnan et al., 2011), although a recent study by Cohen et al. (2012a) is
experimental. The survey-based studies dealt with “social embeddedness” issues,
whereas the archival and experimental studies operationalized the concept of
“homophily”. Embeddedness is defined as “the process by which social relationships
shape economic action in ways that some mainstream economic schemes overlook or
misspecify when they assume that social ties affect economic behavior only minimally
or, in some stringent accounts, reduce the efficiency of the price system” (Uzzi, 1996, p.
674). Embeddedness studies focused on establishing if explicit social relationships
existed between individuals or actors. Researchers using the survey method asked
participants to assess whether they have a relationship with other actors and the nature of
those relationships (Hwang & Kim, 2009). On the other hand, “homophily” suggests that
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“contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people”
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001, p. 416), which facilitates mutual
understanding and comfort (Hwang & Kim, 2009). Researchers who operationalized
relationship ties through homophily used archival data and various index measures to
quantify mutual qualities and experiences such as a mutual alma mater, military service,
regional origin, industry, etc.
The archival approach did offer the advantage of capturing broadly observable
measures of relationship ties and can arguably capture unconscious ties that may not be
captured by the survey approach. However, the archival approach cannot capture
directors’ perceptions of their relationships and board duties. As such, the survey
approach is necessary for the present study and offers the advantage of directly
measuring the perceived strength of social ties (Westphal & Khanna, 2003).
The findings in the extant accounting/auditing literature examining the association
between relationship ties and accounting outcomes reflected the tension between the
independent board and collaborative board perspectives. Consistent with institutional
theory, Hwang and Kim (2009) found that social ties between board members and
management were linked to higher levels of compensation, weaker pay-performance
sensitivity, and weaker turnover sensitivity. In a subsequent study, the authors also found
that social ties between the CEO and members of the AC were associated with higher
levels of earnings management, suggesting that social ties impaired the AC’s execution
of its oversight responsibilities (Hwang & Kim, 2012). Likewise, Dey and Liu (2011)
documented that social ties and professional similarities, measured by whether a director
is also a C-level executive at another company, were associated with poorer financial
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reports and operating performance. Further, Fracassi and Tate (2011) found an
association between CEO-director ties and reduced firm value and value destroying
acquisitions.
Hoitash (2011) also found that social ties between management and independent
board directors were corrosive and were associated with higher management
compensation, but this relationship was primarily driven by compensation committee
members. On the other hand, Hoitash (2011, p. 399) found that “financial reporting
quality was improved only when social ties included members of the AC”, suggesting the
AC was either more capable of monitoring and providing advice to management or that
social ties between management and the AC fostered more frequent and quality advice
giving consistent with the “collaborative board” model.
The apparent contradictions in the findings in the Hoitash study are perhaps best
explained by Krishnan et al. (2011), who examined CEO/CFO-board ties and earnings
management in the pre- and post-SOX eras. Although the authors found that CEOs/CFOs
picked more socially connected directors in the post-SOX era, the corrosive effects of
social ties were negated because of greater management/board risk aversion in the postSOX era. Subsequent studies supported this point of view and contradicted the findings
of Hwang and Kim (2009, 2012) and Dey and Liu (2011), finding that directors with
professional ties are more risk averse than those with personal ties.
For example, Chidambaran et al. (2012, p. 12) found that CEO-board professional
connections formed due to common prior employment decreased the probability of fraud,
while non-professional ties “due to shared educational and non-business antecedents”
(e.g., personal ties) increased fraud probability. Likewise, Bruynseels and Cardinaels
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(2012, p. 3) found that companies whose ACs have “friendship” (e.g., personal) ties to
the CEO “purchased less audit services and engaged more in earnings management but
directors with social ties formed through advice networks (e.g., professional ties) did not
hamper the quality of AC oversight”. An experimental study by Cohen et al. (2012a) also
indicated that investors perceived that AC members with professional ties to the CEO
were more effective than those with personal ties, but investors perceived that AC
members with no personal or professional ties to management were even more effective.
As such, Cohen et al. (2012a, p. 23) suggested “the SEC may wish to consider building
upon current disclosures and have companies state whether there are social connections
or no connections between management and AC members”.
Collectively, the academic literature suggests that the association between
personal and professional ties and how AC members carry out their duties may depend
upon a combination of factors. The independent and collaborative board models suggest
that director-management relationship ties can affect financial reporting quality
differently. As such, I develop competing hypotheses in the following section and expand
on the previous academic research by including both personal and professional ties in my
analysis and including relationship ties to other corporate governance actors.
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CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESES
Research Questions
In this study, I bring together the issue of relationship ties and AC oversight of
FFR risk to examine the association between AC relationship ties and the process of
overseeing FFR risk. This is the first study of corporate governance relationship ties to
examine AC relationship ties and the full network of corporate governance actors using a
monitor-agent and monitor-monitor perspective to examine how networks of AC
participants and relationship ties are associated with AC fraud oversight judgments. This
approach recognizes that AC members’ relationship ties to management, as well as to
other corporate governance actors, can impact whether AC members employ an
individual focus by relying on either the CEO or CFO or instead employ a “team focus”
and rely on other corporate governance actors, or instead depend on their own efforts, to
deal with FFR risks.
Cohen et al. (2004) best summarize this perspective:
For the audit to play an important role in the financial reporting process,
the audit committee must be vested by the greater board with real power
and sufficient expertise to serve as an effective monitor over
management’s actions.
The audit committee should be viewed as an ally to auditors in being
steadfast in the goal of having a high quality financial reporting process
and in the prevention of fraud. (p.102)
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As such, I propose two separate research questions to reflect the monitor-agent and
monitor-monitor relationship ties. I then use the managerial hegemony perspective and
institutional theory to develop hypotheses that reflect largely ceremonial AC oversight. I
then use agency theory to reflect more substantive monitoring consistent with the
independent board and collaborative board perspectives. I also use accountability theory
to suggest how AC members’ perceptions of their relationship ties to other corporate
governance actors (monitor-monitor relationships) can lead to potentially conflicting
strategies for assessing FFR risk. My research questions as formally stated are:
RQ 1: Are audit committee members’ perceptions of their personal and
professional ties to the CEO and CFO associated with AC members’
reliance on CEOs and CFOs and other corporate governance actors (e.g.,
other AC members, other independent directors, the head of internal audit,
and the external audit partner in charge of the company’s audit) to assess
FFR risk and how the AC relies on its own efforts to assess FFR risk and
management’s integrity?
RQ 2: Are audit committee members’ perceptions of their personal and
professional ties to the other corporate governance actors (e.g., other AC
members, other independent directors, the head of internal audit, and the
external audit partner in charge of the company’s audit) associated with
AC members’ reliance on CEOs and CFOs and other corporate
governance actors to assess FFR risk and how the AC relies on its own
efforts to assess FFR risk and management’s integrity?
In the following section, I develop the hypotheses. In the subsequent figures,
(Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4), I focus on describing the dependent variables and the
predicted associations with the independent variables.
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Figure 1.2 Conceptual Research Model: DV 1a.
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Figure 1.3 Conceptual Research Model: DV 1b.
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Figure 1.4 Conceptual Research Model: DV 2

Monitor-Agent Relationship Hypotheses
In this section, I examine the expected effects of relationship ties between the AC
members and management. I first develop the hypotheses related to personal ties. I then
focus on professional ties. Overall, I expect the effects of personal ties to be more
pronounced than those of professional ties.
Personal Ties
The vast majority of studies of personal relationship ties have supported the
managerial hegemony and institutional theory perspectives. In the AC setting, the
managerial hegemony perspective suggests that director independence may be
compromised by social influences and CEO influence over the selection of board
members “that render the board passive by the appointment of friends and individuals
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with whom they share social ties” (Westphal, 1999, p. 8) and that board committees
merely exist to fulfill regulatory requirements (Kosnik, 1987). Institutional theory posits
that ACs serve in largely ceremonial roles but do not necessarily provide vigilant
monitoring (Cohen et al., 2008b). As such, these theories suggest that management is
concerned with giving the appearance of effective monitoring, although the reality of the
situation may be that management is capable of influencing AC members either directly
or through networks of relationships among AC participants that Spira (1999, p. 256)
noted “in practice subvert regulatory intentions”.
Under the managerial hegemony and institutional theory perspectives, I would
expect that management and the board would emphasize directors’ personal ties to
management and the need for directors to follow the boards’ communal norms (Segal,
1979) or to reciprocate benefits in exchange for the benefits and status associated with
appointment to the board (e.g., Mills & Clark, 1982; Jehn & Shah, 1997). Further, I
would expect the CEO to have significant influence over the director nomination process
(e.g., Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Clune et al., 2013; Fracassi & Tate, 2011).
There is a great deal of support for the managerial hegemony/institutional theory
perspective in the management and auditing/accounting literature that has found that
management may seek to appoint members of the board who are personal friends or with
whom they share close social ties (Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2011; Hwang &
Kim, 2009, 2012). This may be done to impress external constituents (Westphal &
Graebner, 2010) and to create a more management friendly board that is under the control
of management (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012). These findings are supported by studies
of relationship ties that have found that the presence of social or “personal” ties between
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AC members and management has, with certain exceptions (Bruynseels & Cardinaels,
2012), been associated with poorer corporate governance (e.g., Bruyneseels &
Cardinaels, 2011; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2011;
Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012) or less favorable investor perceptions of AC effectiveness
(Cohen et al., 2012a).
The findings in the research examining AC processes (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009;
Gendron et al., 2004; Gendron & Bédard, 2006) did not specifically address the issue of
personal relationships and AC fraud risk assessments, but did document that ACs appear
to seek to be vigilant monitors, either “hopeful” at best that they can assess fraud risks
(Gendron & Bédard, 2006) or lacking consensus as to how to handle this responsibility
(Beasley et al., 2009). Although each study found that AC members enlisted the aid of
internal and external auditors to help them to carry out their responsibilities, there is some
evidence that AC members relied on management (Beasley et al., 2009). However,
Beasley et al. (2009) does offer insight into the steps taken by AC members before
agreeing to board service that potentially provides explanations as to why directors with
friendship ties to management may be more predisposed to rely more heavily on
management than other corporate governance actors.
Beasley et al. (2009) documented that AC members were often identified for
board service because of their previous contact with management and other board
members; however, they performed significant due diligence before agreeing to board
service include assessing management’s integrity and taking other steps to gain comfort.
Likewise, Clune et al. (2013) documented that management and directors placed a great
deal of emphasis on chemistry and comfort in the director nomination process. Thus,
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there is a large degree of mutual comfort and chemistry that can lead to trust (Stevenson
& Radin, 2009). Indeed, Stevenson and Radin (2009) documented that prior ties are a
strong indicator of current ties.
The degree of trust between AC members and management can also be associated
with the strength of directors’ ties to the CEO. CEOs can be very powerful. Research has
found that CEOs still influence the board nomination process, although the level of
influence may vary widely by company (Clune et al., 2013). In addition, Stevenson and
Radin (2009) documented that CEO power trumps the influence of being an independent
director when the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Directors with friendship ties to
the CEO may also feel an allegiance to management (Cohen et al. 2012a; Fredrickson,
Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988), and research has documented that friendship ties are more
likely to encourage closer bonding than professional ties (Cohen et al., 2012) which can
lead to reciprocity (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012). Hoitash (2011, p. 404) also noted
that board members often do not have time to gain sufficient knowledge of a company
and thus, “depend on information received from management”. In addition, Bruynseels
and Cardinaels (2012) found that companies with ACs that have “friendship ties” to the
CEO are less likely to purchase audit services suggesting less reliance on other corporate
governance monitors.
Collectively, these findings lead me to expect that AC members with personal ties
to management are not only more comfortable with relying on management to assess
FFR risk, but also are less likely to rely on other corporate governance actors or their own
efforts to assess FFR risk and that the strength of the relationships will be strong because
AC members already trust management or because CEO influence is high. Further, the

49
association is likely to be strong because friendship ties are characterized as being
governed by “communal norms” (Westphal, 1999) and directors “that do not maintain
social relationships outside of board meetings can be perceived as behaving irrationally if
they bring up controversial issues” (Stevenson & Radin, 2009, p. 34). Consistent with the
managerial hegemony perspective and institutional theory, I expect that AC members
with greater personal ties to the CEO/CFO will rely more strongly on the CEO/CFO to
assess FFR risk and will rely significantly less on other corporate governance actors and
the AC’s own efforts to assess FFR risk. The hypotheses stated formally in alternative,
rather than in null form, are:
H1a: There is a positive association between AC members’ perceptions of
their personal ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on the
CEO/CFO to assess FFR risk.
H2a: There is a negative association between AC members’ perceptions of
their personal ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on other
corporate governance actors to assess FFR risk.
H3a: There is a negative association between AC members’ perceptions of
their personal ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on their
own efforts to assess FFR risk and management’s integrity.

Professional Ties
More recent academic studies of relationship ties have begun to differentiate
between personal and professional ties. The basic argument put forth in these studies is
that directors with professional ties bring enhanced industry and business knowledge of
business risks and accounting issues (Cohen et al., 2012a), enhance the development of
business relationships that can lead to trust and confidence and a good working rapport
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Hoitash, 2011), and promote work-related information
sharing that benefits the performance of the firm (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012). On
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the other hand, professional ties are less likely to create close friendships (Bruynseels &
Cardinaels, 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a) than social ties, and more controversial
information is less likely to flow through professional networks (Gibbons, 2004). This
suggests that those with professional ties are less likely to be influenced by management
than those with personal ties that may have been developed over long periods of time
(Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012). Further, it suggests that professional and social ties
operate through different channels and lead to different types of monitoring and advising
(Chidambaran et al., 2012). These differences are reflected in and supported by recent
findings in the auditing/accounting academic literature.
The findings in the studies of relationship ties that have differentiated between
personal and professional ties have also found that professional ties between directors
and management are associated with good corporate governance outcomes. For example,
two archival studies found that social ties formed through advice networks do not appear
to hamper the quality of AC oversight (Bruyneseels & Cardinaels, 2011) and that
professional connections formed due to common prior employment decreased fraud
probability when individuals share service as executives (Chidambaran et al., 2012). In
an experimental study, Cohen et al. (2012a) also found that investors perceive that ACs
with professional ties are more effective than those with social ties, but not more
effective than ACs with no ties. These findings are consistent with agency theory (e.g.,
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) that hold that the board is an
independent monitor of management.
Two additional studies also reflected the agency perspective, but do not attribute
improved governance to professional ties per se but rather to other influences. On one
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hand, Hoitash (2011) found that management-director social ties could enhance financial
reporting, but only if social ties included members of the AC. This finding suggested that
social ties facilitated information sharing between management and AC members and
that relationship ties were “important only for board members having direct responsibility
over a particular task” (Hoitash, 2011, p. 401). On the other hand, Kirshnan et al. (2011)
found that CFO/CEO-board social ties were positively related to earnings management,
but management/board risk aversion negated the corrosive effects of social ties in the
post-SOX era and led to less earnings management.
Collectively, these findings, as well as those of the studies that differentiated
between personal and professional ties, suggest that director-AC interactions are complex
and are associated with multiple factors including types of relationship ties, director
responsibilities, and the regulatory environment. However, the studies appear to suggest
that AC members with professional ties are more risk averse and thus, are more capable
of both providing better corporate governance oversight and collaborating with
management, as posited by Bruynseels & Cardinaels (2012), Chidambaran et al. (2012),
and Cohen et al. (2012a). This perspective is consistent the “collaborative board” model.
The “collaborative board” model suggests that social ties enhance advice giving
and information sharing (e.g., Westphal, 1999; Adams & Ferreira, 2007). Westphal
(1999, p. 9) noted that the literature on advice giving has found that individuals may be
reluctant to seek advice because they may perceive that “asking for advice would reflect
uncertainty or dependence or would disclose the existence of a problem or that the
individual may not have the ability to solve the problem”. As such, advice seeking
behavior may be associated with an individual’s perception of their status. Thus, the
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comfort and trust associated with management-director ties can influence managers to
seek advice on strategic issues and enhance the propensity for outside directors to offer
such advice (Westphal, 1999; Hoitash, 2011).
The findings of the studies of professional ties and AC outcomes consistently
suggest that management-director professional ties lead to better corporate governance
outcomes than management-director personal ties. This is consistent with findings that
social ties are more likely to result in closer friendships than professional ties (Bruynseels
& Cardinaels, 2012) and thus, management influence. However, professional
relationships can breed friendship and trust and encourage board involvement and board
effectiveness (Hoitash, 2011). Beasley et al. (2009) indirectly confirmed this finding that
AC members identified for AC service had prior relationships with management and the
board but generally sought to provide substantive monitoring. Consistent with agency
theory, I hypothesize that AC members with professional ties to the CEO/CFO will still
rely on management to some extent to assess FFR risk and will still rely less on other
corporate governance actors as well as the AC’s own efforts to assess FFR risk because
of the inherent comfort and trust derived from management-director professional
relationships. However, the associations will be less strong than for personal ties above.
Stated formally:
H1b: Relative to AC members’ perceptions of their personal ties, there is a
less positive association between AC members’ perceptions of their
professional ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on the
CEO/CFO to assess FFR risk.
H2b: Relative to AC members’ perceptions of their personal ties, there is a
less negative association between AC members’ perceptions of their
professional ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on other
corporate governance actors to assess FFR risk.
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H3b: Relative to AC members’ perceptions of their personal ties, there is a
less negative association between AC members’ perceptions of their
professional ties to the CEO/CFO and AC members’ reliance on their
own efforts to assess FFR risk and management’s integrity.

Monitor-Monitor Hypotheses
Personal and Professional Ties
In this section, I do not differentiate between my hypotheses for personal and
professional ties and AC reliance because similar arguments can be made for each tie.
Further, researchers have not addressed how different relationship ties between AC
members and other corporate governance actors (e.g., other AC members, other
independent directors, the head of internal audit, and the external audit partner in charge
of company’s audit) are associated with AC members’ fraud risk assessments. Thus, there
are no comparative studies. As such, I primarily develop my hypotheses based on general
guidelines for ACs (e.g., NYSE, 1999), studies of accountability (e.g., Jensen, 2006;
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Messier & Quilliam, 1992; Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock, 1985a,
1985b) and the judgment and decision making (JDM) literature (e.g., Arnold & Sutton,
1997).
The “Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit
Committees” (NYSE, 1999, p. 37) recognized that AC practices vary “by industry,
competitive environment, stage in the business cycle, and business risks” and as such, set
forth “guiding principles” for best practices that could be applied regardless of firm
differences. These principles focused on interactions between the AC and other actors
responsible for financial reporting quality including management, internal audit, and
external audit, and stressed the need for the AC to promote accountability among these
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actors. This sentiment is echoed in numerous other AC “best practice” guides as well.
Collectively, the BRC’s (1999) recommendations stressed the need for the AC to
understand each actor’s role and responsibilities and for the AC to use internal and
external auditors “to verify management compliance with process and procedures and to
seek additional input on any significant judgments made” (NYSE, 1999, p. 42).
Service on the AC is a difficult and demanding task that requires diligent and
knowledgeable members who are dedicated and interested in the job and are willing to
make large time commitments in addition to their other board responsibilities (NYSE,
1999). The BRC’s “guiding principles” recommend that members have proper
backgrounds and knowledge and that training and education programs be used to fill in
“knowledge gaps” or “know-how” (NYSE, 1999, p. 44). The importance of experience
and knowledge is also echoed in the academic literature. For example, Roberts, et al.
(2005, p. S6), in a qualitative study of non-executive directors in the U.K., noted that
“accountability is created through a wide range of behaviors including challenging,
questioning, testing, probing, debating, advising, and informing- that are central to how
non-executives come to be effective”. AC members who do not acquire an adequate
understanding of the company on the boards on which they serve risk being perceived as
less credible and providing less value to the firm (Roberts et al., 2005). This perspective
is corroborated by Gendron et al. (2004), who found that AC members asked diligent
questions to establish their perceived effectiveness and found that some AC members
“probe and push” external auditors to “convince external auditors that the AC, and not
the CEO, drives external auditing” (p. 166). Collectively, these findings suggest that AC
members may have different motivations for relying on other corporate actors. On one
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hand, AC members may rely on other corporate actors to give a ceremonial appearance of
effective oversight. On the other hand, AC members may rely on other corporate
governance actors to enhance the quality of AC oversight and accountability between
corporate governance actors, or to alleviate time constraints that otherwise might impair
the AC members’ ability to provide adequate oversight, or to address directors’
“knowledge-gaps”.
Ultimately, AC members’ motivations for relying on other corporate governance
actors are tied to their propensity to seek advice. As posited by the “collaborative board”
model, relationship ties can facilitate mutual trust and collaboration between AC
members and management. Likewise, the same concept applies to AC members’
relationships with other corporate governance actors, except that the structural nature of
the relationship is closer to that of allies, although arguably external auditors and
management have built up relationships over time and internal audit may ultimately be
responsible to management (NYSE, 1999). The AC is responsible for “holding
management accountable to the board and the board accountable to shareholders”
(NYSE, 1999, p. 20), but is also responsible for holding internal and external auditors
accountable as well. Thus, I posit that the extent to which AC members choose to rely on
other corporate governance actors is, in part, a function of AC members’ efforts to be
accountable as well as the degree to which they hold other corporate governance
monitors accountable. How AC members use their relationship ties with other corporate
governance monitors to facilitate accountability and to enhance FFR risk assessments is
unknown, but accountability theory provides a framework to explain possible motives.
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Accountability “refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be
called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999,
p. 255). Accountability “also usually implies that people who do not provide a
satisfactory justification for their actions will suffer negative consequences” (Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999, p. 255). Thus, individuals are expected to make better decisions if they
perceive that they are being held accountable. There is also a social aspect of
accountability, as Tetlock (1985a, p. 307) posits there are “critical rule and norm
enforcement mechanisms associated with individual decision makers on one hand and the
social systems to which they belong on the other”. Individuals who fail to provide proper
accounts for their behavior risk censure depending upon the severity of their offense and
organizational norms (Tetlock, 1985a). As such, this perspective recognizes that
individual accountability to others influences actions, and individuals can take numerous
strategies to justify their actions (see Messier & Quilliam, 1992).
FFR represents a predicament for AC members because it represents a potential or
an actual negative situation that can affect the individual (Messier & Quilliam, 1992).
When an individual is caught in a predicament, their actions may not meet the normative
expectations of an evaluative audience and, therefore, the individual may be punished.
For example, in companies experiencing financial restatements, the likelihood of board
departure increases with the severity of the restatement and even more so for AC
members (Srinivasan, 2005). As such, the severity of a predicament is associated with the
undesirability of an event, the individual’s responsibility for the event, and the
individual’s need to maintain his or her image (Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock, 1985b).
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Accountability suggests that AC members may be motivated by different strategies by
relying on other corporate actors to assess FFR risk. On one hand, AC members could
rely less on others as a means of disassociating themselves from an incidence of fraud
and minimizing personal responsibility (Messier & Quilliam, 1992). On the other hand,
AC members may recognize the value of soliciting input from other corporate
governance actors, as accountability “can lead to greater depth of processing and
consistency in judgment policy and increase consensus” (Messier & Quilliam, 1992, p.
133).
Whether AC members are more motivated by strategies to protect their status or
instead are motivated by a commitment to substantive monitoring likely varies by
individual. What is clear is that accountability is important for AC members and that AC
members can either rely on their own efforts and/or the efforts of other corporate
governance actors to assess FFR risk (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron & Bédard,
2006; Gendron et al., 2004) as a means of maintaining both their accountability and
reputation status, consistent with advice seeking behavior as posited by Westphal (1999)
and Jensen (2006). The issue is, how does AC reliance improve accountability, and what
motivates AC members to act on their own or to enlist the aid of others? Given the dearth
of research linking relationship ties to AC members’ reliance, I look to the JDM literature
to explain two different strategies that are the basis of my hypotheses.
In the JDM literature, consensus is “one of the most widely used surrogate
performance measures in accounting and auditing” (Arnold & Sutton, 1997, p. 99).
Consensus is also known as inter-rater reliability and is based “on the assumption that
true experts should agree with each other” (p. 99). From an inter-rater reliability point-of-
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view, the AC member may view that other corporate governance actors demonstrate
stable judgment over time. Reliability is a key component of expert performance but “the
level of reliability does not appear to be a valid measure of the level of expertise” (Arnold
& Sutton, 1997, p. 101). Rather, reliability suggests that the AC members will rely more
on those individuals whose judgments they trust. Further, the relationship ties can
enhance the propensity to seek advice from those one trusts (e.g., Westphal, 1999).
The studies of AC processes (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron & Bédard, 2006;
Gendron et al., 2004) documented that AC members rely on internal and external auditors
to some extent. The comments of the AC members in these studies indicated both the
need for input from others as well as motivations to delegate fraud oversight duties.
However, the presence of relationship ties would suggest that there is an element of trust
underlying these relationships that could encourage AC members to rely more heavily on
other corporate governance monitors. Further, AC members might rely on other corporate
governance actors as a means of developing a network to “strengthen the AC as a
network itself” (Spira, 1999, p. 240), which would be consistent with Stevenson &
Radin’s (2009, p. 16) finding that “developing a strong network of ties among those who
meet outside of board meetings is a more important predictor of social influence than
human capital or ties across boards”. AC members may also seek to develop networks as
the board’s power to govern is posited to be associated with “strong consensus and shared
purposes” (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989, p. 38). As such, I would anticipate that the strength
of AC members’ relationship ties with other corporate governance actors would be
positively associated with AC members’ reliance on other corporate governance actors
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which in turn, would lead AC members to rely less on the CEO/CFO and the AC
members’ own efforts to assess FFR risk.
On the other hand, the JDM literature suggests another strategy. AC members
may choose to rely more on their own efforts because of self-insight. Self-insight refers to
“a decision maker’s understanding of his or her own decision-making process” (Arnold &
Sutton, p. 101). Arnold and Sutton (1997, p. 101) state that there is no evidence that
experts have a better understanding of their decision-making processes than non-experts.
However, this perspective does not preclude the possibility that AC members will
perceive that they are more capable of relying on their own efforts. Beasley et al.’s (2009,
p. 98) findings that AC members relied “at least partly on their own efforts” to assess
FFR risk provided some indirect, anecdotal evidence that AC members’ self-reliance may
be tied to self-perceptions of expertise. As such, I posit that AC members may, via their
relationship ties, perceive that the inter-rater reliability of certain other corporate
governance actors is low, which in turn leads the AC member to be more self-reliant
because the AC member perceives that his/her self-insight allows him/her to better assess
FFR risk. As such, I would expect that these individuals would rely less on other
corporate governance actors and more on the CEO/CFO and their own efforts to assess
FFR risk.
Because there are competing arguments, I make no directional predictions about
the relationship between AC members’ perceptions of their personal or professional ties
to other corporate governance actors and AC members’ reliance on the CEO/CFO, or
other corporate governance actors, or AC members’ reliance on their own efforts to
assess FFR risk. Stated formally:
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H1c: There is no association between AC members’ perceptions of their
personal or professional ties to other corporate governance actors and AC
members’ reliance on the CEO/CFO to assess FFR risk.
H2c: There is no association between AC members’ perceptions of their
personal or professional ties to other corporate governance actors and AC
members’ reliance on other corporate governance actors to assess FFR
risk.
H3c: There is no association between AC members’ perceptions of their
personal or professional ties to other corporate governance actors and AC
members’ reliance on their own efforts to assess FFR risk and
management’s integrity.1

1

As discussed later, I test H3a, H3b, and H3c two different ways. First, I use the reliance questions as the
dependent variable (i.e., reliance on yourself and on other AC members). Second, I use measures of the
AC’s actions to assess fraud risk and management integrity as dependent variables. These action measures
provide more specific insight into the AC’s actual activities, as opposed to focusing on a broader reliance
question.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY
The more recent archival studies of personal and professional ties obtain
biographical and other personal information of directors to develop measures of
relationship ties. Although this approach allows the researcher to differentiate between
types of relationship ties, it assumes that the strength of relationship ties is associated
with the number of common ties between individuals or groups, when in fact this may not
be the case. For example, many individuals sharing the same alma mater do not actually
know each other or may have been informal acquaintances, as opposed to developing
deeper friendship bonds.
Although Hwang and Kim (2009) asserted that perceptions of relationship ties
include only the conscious tie (and excludes any potential subconscious tie), the survey
approach I use provides a direct measure that may more accurately reflect the reality of
the connection between two individuals. Further, I have to use a survey approach to
capture AC members’ perceptions of their personal and professional ties and their
strategies for assessing FFR risk, as these perceptions cannot be captured by archival
data. I operationalize the conceptualized research model as indicated in Figure 1.5 below.
I subsequently describe how I developed the research instrument and how I administer
the survey.
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Figure 1.5 Conceptual Research Model Operationalized
Research Instrument
The survey instrument measures (a) the extent to which AC members rely on the
CEO and CFO, other corporate governance actors, and the AC itself to assess FFR risk,
(b) AC members’ perceptions of the responsibility of management, other corporate
governance actors, and the AC itself for assessing FFR risk, (c) AC actions to assess FFR
risk and management’s integrity, and (d) AC members’ perceptions of their personal and
professional relationship ties to the CEO and CFO and other corporate governance actors.
I also examine other pertinent corporate governance variables.
The survey is based in part on Beasley et al.’s (2009) interview results, using
scales similar to those found in Bierstaker, Cohen, DeZoort, & Hermanson (2012). I use
metric scales rather than nonmetric scales to capture the intensity of AC members’
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personal and professional relationships and the degree to which AC members are selfreliant or rely on others to assess FFR risk. I use 100-point numerical interval scales that
are common in the accounting literature to attempt to precisely measure AC members’
perceptions. In developing the survey, I followed Hair et al.’s (2011) guidelines for scale
development (pp. 209-246) and relied heavily upon content validation (p. 238) by
submitting the survey for a series of reviews by researchers and others with accounting
backgrounds that are knowledgeable about ACs and the subject matter of this study.2 The
following sections describe the consideration given to the development of each construct.
Independent Measures: Personal and Professional Ties
The independent variables are broken into two subsets to reflect personal and
professional relationship ties between (a) monitors (e.g., AC members) and agents of
corporate governance (e.g., CEO/CFO), and (b) monitors (e.g., AC members) and other
monitors of corporate governance (e.g., other AC members, other independent directors,
the head of internal audit, and the external audit partner in charge of the firm’s
engagement). In the academic literature, measures of personal and professional ties differ
across studies. Because the focus of this study is not to glean the relative strength of
every individual relationship tie that is included in my definitions of personal and
professional ties, but rather to accurately capture the strength of personal or professional
ties between individuals, I take a more inclusive approach by including measures from
multiple studies.
2

For the instrument’s 100-point graphic rating scales, participants were asked to indicate their responses
by placing a slash on a ruled line with labeled anchors. Their slash-mark responses were then converted to
the 0-100 scale based on where the slash crossed the line (Bierstaker et al., 2012). However, some
respondents indicated their answers with a circle or a horizontal line. These responses were converted to a
0-100 scale based on the center point of the circle or line.
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Personal or “social ties” have been measured using a variety of index measures
that have generally included the following “nonfamilial, informal connections” (Krishnan
et al., 2011, p. 537): mutual alma mater, military service, regional origin, academic
discipline and industry, and third party connections (Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012;
Krishnan et al., 2011); friendship ties formed through non-professional networks (e.g.,
sharing a past or present membership in the same charity, leisure club, or other nonprofessional associations) (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012); mutual alma mater, overlap
in military service, and shared past employment (Dey & Liu, 2011); past employment,
education, and other activities between outside directors and the CFO/CEO (Krishnan et
al., 2011); shared service between a manager and an independent director in the present
or past on boards of at least one additional company (Hoitash, 2011); graduating from the
same university and remaining in contact as friends in the years since graduation (Cohen
et al., 2012a); and common service at not-for-profit institutions (Chidambaran et al.,
2012).
There is some overlap between measures of personal and professional ties in the
academic literature, as some studies consider a CEO and a director with service as a Clevel executive in his primary employment as a personal tie rather than a professional tie
(Dey & Liu, 2011). The rationale behind this classification is that directors who are
themselves executives might identify and empathize with the CEO of the firm on whose
board they serve (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). As such, there is some inconsistency across
studies. However, I have developed definitions of personal and professional ties based on
the general consensus of the literature taken as a whole to help survey respondents to
more clearly differentiate between the different types of relationship ties. Specifically, I
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define “personal ties” as being instances where AC members and other individuals have
non-business affiliations or interactions. I operationalize “personal ties” by including
several measures used in the aforementioned studies (e.g., mutual alma mater,
membership in social clubs and other organizations, military service), but expand the
measures to include additional ties (e.g., family friends, family relationships, neighbors)
patterned after Clune et al.’s (2013) study of board nominating committees. I also include
a catchall category to capture all other common personal ties.
I operationalize “professional ties” in much the same manner as I have done with
“personal ties”, but I primarily pattern my measures after the more recent studies that
have specifically differentiated between personal and professional ties (e.g., Bruynseels
& Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a). Bruynseels &
Cardinaels (2012) define professional or “advice network ties” as ties based on past or
present employment or education ties. Chidambaran et al. (2012) more narrowly define
professional ties as common employment antecedents, while Cohen et al. (2012a, p. 17)
differentiated between industry specific and other professional ties defining industry
specific ties as a “board member and a CEO sharing board responsibilities at two
companies in the same industry” and other professional ties “if a board member and a
CEO sat on the same boards but on two boards in different industries than the one within
which the company is operating as the company in question”.
In this study, I define “professional ties” as instances where the AC member and
another individual have interacted in a business capacity in a meaningful way, separate
from service on the focal company’s board and AC. I operationalize “professional ties”
by including several measures used in the aforementioned studies (e.g., served on another
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company’s board, past employment and shared responsibilities) but expand the measures
to include mutual service on not-for-profit boards, working together at another company
or organization in a board member-executive capacity, maintaining supplier-customer
relationships or a service provider-client relationship (external auditor, outside counsel,
consultant, etc.), and knowing each other well through professional organizations. To
provide further clarity to survey respondents and to capture some of the nuances of the
personal and professional relationship ties, I use branching questions asking respondents
to first indicate if a relationship tie exists and if so, to please explain and rate their
perception of the strength of the tie. The advantage of this format is twofold. First, it
allows me to determine if a respondent has incorrectly identified a personal tie as a
professional tie and vice versa, and second, it may capture relationship ties that I have not
included in my definitions.
Dependent Measures: Audit Committee Strategies for Assessing FFR Risk
I operationalize the AC’s strategies for assessing FFR risk by first measuring the
AC members’ reliance on actors in the corporate governance mosaic: management (e.g.,
the CEO/CFO) and other corporate governance actors (e.g., other AC members, other
independent directors not on the AC, the head of internal audit, and the external audit
partner in charge of the firm’s engagement), and I also measure participants’ reliance
upon themselves. Conceptually, these measures reflect two ends of a continuum with
relying on others at one end and self-reliance on the other. Next, I measure the AC’s own
actions to assess FFR risk and to assess and monitor management integrity, based on the
results of Beasley et al. (2009, p. 94).
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In the first section focusing on AC members’ reliance on others, I ask respondents to rate
their reliance on specific actors. To provide further insight into the issue of AC reliance, I
also include additional questions asking participants to rate their perceptions of each
actor’s responsibility for assessing FFR risk. I also pose open-ended questions asking
respondents to describe the reason for their reliance on others and their reason for
assigning responsibility to actors whom they perceive as having a high degree of
responsibility for this task. Asking open-ended questions offers the advantage of placing
no constraints on respondents (Hair et al. 2011, p. 255) and may provide insight into AC
members’ motivations for relying upon others. In the second section, I describe specific
actions that ACs might take to assess FFR risk and ask respondents to indicate the extent
to which each action is applicable to their AC. Then, at the end of each section, I once
again include an open-ended question that allows respondents to indicate any other means
that they use to assess FFR risk or to assess and monitor management’s integrity.
Development of Scales
I have created a 100-point interval scale that I use throughout the survey
instrument to measure the independent and dependent variables. The use of 100-point
scales is common in the accounting literature and allows me to capture a continuous
measure of the intensity of AC members’ judgments. Similar-type 100-point interval
scales have also been used in experimental studies to measure AC judgments in
accounting disagreements (Bierstaker et al., 2012; DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2008)
and investors’ judgments of the association between CEO-AC personal and professional
ties and AC effectiveness (Cohen et al., 2012a).

68
The individual sections of my survey instrument dealing with how the AC
assesses FFR risk are primarily based on Beasley et al.’s (2009) interview results.
Beasley et al. (2009) divided the issue of assessing FFR risk into three categories: (1) AC
involvement in assessing financial statement fraud risks, (2) the AC’s own actions in
assessing FFR, and (3) how the AC assesses and monitors management’s integrity. The
first category considers AC reliance upon others to assess FFR risk, while the other two
categories reflect what the AC actually does to assess FFR risk. To measure AC reliance
upon others to assess FFR risk, I include the parties identified in Beasley et al. (2009) and
expand the choices to include other actors in the corporate governance mosaic (e.g.,
Cohen et al., 2004). I also ask participants to indicate their perceptions of each party’s
responsibility for assessing FFR risk, as the concepts of reliance and responsibility are
intertwined. To measure what the AC actually does to assess FFR risk, I took the results
of Beasley et al. (2009) and created appropriate questions. For example, Beasley et al.
(2009, p. 94) reported that “ACs evaluate management’s body language”. In the survey
instrument, I ask the participant to indicate the extent to which the AC assesses and
monitors management’s integrity and include a question that says “Assesses
management’s body language?” followed by a 100-point scale with endpoints labeled “0
– Not at All” and “100 – A Great Deal”.
To measure AC members’ perceptions of their personal and professional
relationships, I expand on the format used to measure AC reliance and perceptions of
responsibility to measure the strength of relationships consistent with previous survey
studies of social embeddedness (e.g., Uzzi, 1996, 1997, 1999; Westphal, 1999; Ingram &
Roberts, 2000; McDonald & Westphal, 2003; Westphal, Boivie, & Chng, 2006). I capture
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this information by determining if a relationship tie exists, and if so, the nature of the tie
and the participant’s perception of the strength of the tie. By offering participants the
opportunity to briefly describe the nature of their relationship, I can document if
participants incorrectly identify their ties. I can also determine if there are ties that are
outside of my already broad definitions or ties that have not been considered in prior
academic research.
The following summary describes the content and measures that I use in each
section of the survey:
In section I, part A, I measure AC members’ FFR risk reliance on management
(e.g., CEO/CFO) and other corporate governance actors (e.g., other AC members, other
independent directors, the head of internal audit, and the external audit partner in charge
of the company’s engagement), as well as AC members’ self-reliance. For the scale, I use
100-point scales with endpoints labeled “0 – No Reliance” and “100 – Total Reliance”. In
section I, part B, I measure AC members’ perceptions of each parties’ responsibility for
assessing FFR using the same 100-point scales, but I change the endpoint labels to “0 –
No Responsibility” and “100 – Total Responsibility”. I also measure AC members’
perceptions of their own responsibility for assessing FFR risk.
In sections II and III, I measure the AC’s own efforts to assess FFR risk and
management’s integrity. In section II, I include a series of questions that describe actions
that the AC of the company can take to assess FFR risk and ask participants to rate the
extent to which the AC engages in these actions. I capture the extent to which ACs
engage in these actions using 100-point scales with endpoints labeled “0 – Not at All”
and “100 – A Great Deal”. In section III, I include another series of questions that
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describe actions that the AC of the company can take to assess and monitor management
integrity. To measure the extent to which the AC engages in these actions, I also use 100point scales with endpoints labeled “0 – Not at All” and “100 – A Great Deal”.
In sections IV and V, I measure AC members’ perceptions of their professional
and personal relationships with management (e.g., CEO/CFO) and other corporate
governance actors (e.g., other AC members, other independent directors, the head of
internal audit, and the external audit partner in charge of the company’s engagement). For
each relationship tie, I ask a Yes/No question to establish if a relationship tie exists, and if
so, I provide a discussion box where participants can briefly describe the nature of the
relationship. If a relationship tie does exist, I then ask the participant to indicate the
strength of the tie. To measure the relationship strength, I use 100-point scales with
endpoints labeled “0 – Very Weak” and “100 – Very Strong”.
Other Measures
In section VI of the survey instrument, I ask demographic, AC, and governance
questions. In section A, I capture demographic control variables that are common in the
auditing/accounting literature, including gender, age, employment status, job title (if
applicable), professional certifications, professional experience, and education. In section
B, I capture company characteristics that are also common in the auditing/accounting
literature, including the company’s size based on revenue, the company’s industry group,
the company’s accounting firm, whether the company’s internal audit function is
primarily “in-house” or outsourced, and to whom the internal audit function reports.
In section C, I ask a series of questions regarding the AC members' service. First,
I establish AC members’ types of expertise following Cohen et al.’s (2012b)
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methodology to establish if AC members are accounting financial experts (AFE),
supervisory financial experts (SFE), industry experts, industry and accounting experts, or
industry and supervisory experts. Although financial expertise is generally associated
with good corporate governance outcomes (Carcello et al., 2011b), research has found
that accounting expertise specifically drives financial expertise (e.g., Dhaliwal et al.,
2010; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008) and is associated with litigation risks (Krishnan &
Lee, 2009). Further, Cohen et al. (2012b) found that AC members with industry expertise
are more highly associated with financial reporting quality than AC members with
financial expertise alone and that AC members with combinations of industry and
accounting expertise curtail income-increasing discretionary accruals to a greater extent
than AC members with accounting expertise alone. Further, AC members with industry
and supervisory expertise reduce the likelihood of a financial restatement compared to
AC members with supervisory expertise alone.
Second, I focus on director tenure by asking what year AC members joined the
board. Directors with longer tenure “have been linked to cronyism with the CEO and,
consequently, ineffective monitoring” (Sharma & Iselin, 2012, p. 150). On the other
hand, Vafeas (2003) suggested that longer director tenure improves directors’ knowledge
of a firm leading to better oversight. This perspective has been supported in the pre- and
post-SOX literature. Beasley (1996, p. 443), in a pre-SOX study, found that “as outside
director’s ownership in the firm and outside director tenure on the board increases, and as
the number of outside directorships in other firms held by outside directors decreases, the
likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases”. Beasley et al. (2010), in a post-SOX
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study also found that director tenure in fraud firms was less than in no-fraud firms, and
the difference was statistically significant.
In section D, I address AC composition and meeting process issues by asking
participants to indicate AC size, number of financial experts on the AC, the tenure of the
AC chair, and the frequency of AC meetings. AC size and meeting frequency have been
widely studied in the prior literature; however, Bédard and Gendron (2010), in a
comprehensive review of literature on ACs, found that AC size and the frequency of AC
meetings are not frequently positively associated with AC effectiveness. On the other
hand, these variables may potentially provide important insights into how AC members
perceive their responsibilities for assessing FFR risk and how diligently they carry out
their duties. There are two alternative views of AC size. On one hand, a larger AC may
bring additional director expertise and knowledge to the board (Krishnan et al., 2011;
Sharma & Iselin, 2012). On the other hand, larger boards and ACs may be more
susceptible to managerial control (see Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) and have “free-riding”
problems (Krishnan et al., 2011) whereby board and AC members may pass on their
responsibilities to others. In the fraud literature, Beasley et al. (2010) found that the
average AC size for fraud and no-fraud firms was about three members, but the number
of ACs with at least three AC members was statistically higher for no-fraud companies
(79%) than fraud companies (70%). Thus, members of very small ACs may arguably
perceive their responsibilities differently than AC members on larger ACs because
smaller ACs may have to rely on others because they lack needed experience and/or
expertise to assess FFR risk.

73
AC meeting frequency is posited to be associated with the quality of financial
reporting (Sharma & Iselin, 2012) and decreased likelihood of both fraudulent and nonfraudulent financial misstatements (Abbott et al., 2000). However, Beasley et al. (2010)
in their COSO sponsored study, found that the frequency of meetings was statistically
higher for fraud firms than for no-fraud firms in the period of 2001-2004. Beasley et al.
(2010) posited that fraud firms were more prone to experiencing financial distress which
precipitated the need for additional meetings. Given the global meltdown of financial
markets that began in late 2008 and the subsequent economic slowdown in the United
States, AC members should arguably be formally meeting more often given a higher risk
economic environment. By capturing AC meeting frequency, I potentially provide insight
into how AC members are handling this relatively riskier economic environment.
In section E, I ask questions regarding AC members’ other AC experience
including years of service, experience serving on ACs, and the number of ACs on which
the AC members currently serve. By measuring the number of ACs on which an AC
member currently serves, I provide insight into how AC members balance reputation and
litigation risk of being spread too thin by sitting on multiple boards against the benefits of
gaining additional expertise and knowledge by sitting on the additional boards (e.g.,
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hunton & Rose, 2008). The findings of the academic literature
suggest that the influence of multiple board memberships varies.
In a recent study of CEO-director relationship ties and fraud probability,
Chidambaran et al. (2012, p. 4), found that directors with professional ties to CEOs,
especially “those serving on multiple boards, reduced fraud probability consistent with
the idea that busy directors have greater incentive to protect their reputational capital”.
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Beasley et al. (2010), in their COSO sponsored study, found no statistically significant
difference between the average number of director positions held by AC members in
fraud firms and no-fraud firms. On the other hand, Sharma and Iselin (2012) in a study of
AC multiple board memberships, tenure, and financial misstatements, found a significant
positive association between financial misstatements and multiple-directorships in the
post-SOX era. However, this relationship was negative for AC members with accounting
expertise suggesting that AC members with accounting expertise are more aware of
reputation and litigation risks. By capturing multiple board memberships and breaking
out AC members’ expertise into multiple categories, I seek to provide additional insight
into the AC expertise-multiple board membership relationship. I also ask if participants
have ever experienced incidences of FFR while serving as a board or an AC member, as
Fich and Shivdasani (2007, p. 308) found that the presence of sued directors “increases
the probability of a fraud lawsuit”, suggesting that these directors have incurred
reputational damage and have weaker reputations for monitoring. As such, this may be
associated with how they carry out their responsibilities for assessing FFR risk.
In section F, I ask a series of questions regarding general governance
characteristics. I capture director independence and board size information, which is
common in the academic literature, but I also include measures of management power,
including if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and if the CEO is also the founder
of the company (e.g., Beasley, 1996). I also ask respondents to indicate CEO tenure. A
higher percentage of AC members with board tenure less than that of the CEO tenure
suggests higher CEO power (Lisic et al., 2012). I also include CFO tenure because CEOs
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and CFOs are more likely to be associated with cases of alleged FFR (Beasley et al.,
1999, 2010). I also compare AC members’ board tenure against CFO tenure.
The issue of CEO power is important in the academic literature. The concern of
researchers has been that CEO influence over the nomination of directors can
compromise board independence and lead to less substantive oversight (e.g., Dey & Liu,
2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Wade et al., 1990; Westphal &
Zajac, 1995). Further, CEO power has been found to compromise AC members’
expertise when CEO power is high (Lisic et al., 2012); result in more generous CEO
contracts (Westphal, 1998); and influence external auditors’ proposed audit adjustments
based on management incentive and external auditors’ perceptions of CEO influence over
the AC (Cohen et al., 2011). Clune et al. (2013) also documented that CEOs still
influence the director nomination process although the level of influence varies widely by
company. As such, CEO power can manifest itself in many forms.3
Other Issues
Common Method Biases and Other Potential Biases
This study, like many other behavioral studies, is susceptible to common method
biases because the data for the predictor and criterion variables are obtained from the
same participants in the study. Common method biases can arise in situations where there
is a common rater, a common measurement context, a common item context, or
characteristics from the items themselves (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff,

3

I explored the possible role of numerous governance and demographic variables in my analyses for Table
6, Panels A-D. Based on these analyses, I include board independence, AC size, and participant gender in
those analyses. Prior research offers little guidance on potential control variables.
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2003). Two common methods for controlling for method bias are through the (a) design
of the study’s procedures and/or (b) statistical controls (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
I carefully designed the survey instrument and used methods recommended by
Podsakoff et al. (2003) to help minimize the influence of many of the common method
biases including carefully wording the questions and defining ambiguous terms such as
“personal” and “professional” ties and “fraudulent financial reporting”; avoiding doublebarreled questions; protecting respondent anonymity; and assuring participants that there
were no right or wrong answers. I also implemented remedies to address the issues of
item context effects and respondent fatigue.
Item context effects “refer to any influence or interpretation that a subject might
ascribe to an item solely because of its relation to the other items making up an
instrument” (Wainer & Kiely, 1987). In this study, it is feasible that AC members may
perceive an association between relationship ties and their own assessments of FFR risk
leading to responses that reflect a social desirability bias. Social desirability “is generally
viewed as the tendency on the part of individuals to present themselves in a favorable
light, regardless of their true feelings about an issue or topic” (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p.
881). Westphal (1999) documents that individuals may be reluctant to receive advice
because of concerns about status; thus, AC members may understate their dependence on
others because they possibly perceive such dependence as a sign of weakness and/or they
desire to represent themselves as more capable of assessing the risk of FFR than they
truly are. I cannot fully eliminate the possibility of these biases, but I attempted to
minimize them, to an extent, by creating a separation between the predictor and criterion
variables (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Specifically, I measured the dependent variables first,
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and the independent variables last, to minimize the possibility that respondents would
imply causality between the two groups of variables. I also created psychological
separation by placing AC group questions focusing on the AC’s own efforts to assess the
risk of FFR at the end of the dependent variables’ sections. This remedy helped to create
a separation between questions in the dependent and independent variable sections that
focused on the AC members’ individual reliance on others to assess the risk of FFR and
their individual relationships to other corporate governance actors. I assessed the
effectiveness of these strategies through additional pretesting, consistent with Westphal
(1998), finding no significant issues.
Respondent fatigue, which “refers to a respondent getting tired while responding
due to the length or difficulty in completing the questionnaire” (Hair et al., 2011, p. 457),
was also a concern in this study. The survey is lengthy, and as such, I risked a lower
response rate due to respondent fatigue (Hair et al., 2011). To address this issue, I clearly
communicated the purpose of the survey; the estimated time to complete the survey; and
the importance of the survey, consistent with Wilkins (2012). Through additional pretesting, I assessed if there was a need to counterbalance the order of any of the questions
(Podsakoff, et al., 2003) or a need to change the order in which the dependent variable
measures of personal and professional ties were asked so as to ensure that neither set of
measures was consistently the next to last section in the survey. This remedy could not
fully compensate for possible order effects, but could allow me to maintain a
psychological separation between measures of the dependent and independent variables.
In pretesting, participants did not raise issues of respondent fatigue nor did they raise
questions about the order of the questions. Likewise, the participants in the study did not
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raise this issue and nearly all participants fully completed their surveys. The survey
response rate (see below) was also very high suggesting respondent fatigue was not an
issue.
In addition to the aforementioned steps, I also tested for non-response bias by
including first mailing and second mailing respondents in my linear regression models
(Table 6, Panels A-D) and found no significant differences (p > 0.35). I also compared
the demographics of the participants to the total sample population obtained from the
Audit Analytics database, consistent with the methodology of DeZoort & Salterio (2001).
I found the percentage of male (87%) and female participants (13%) to be identical to
that of the sample population. I found a higher percentage of CPAs among the
participants (n = 48, 35.3%) than I found in the sample population (n = 125, 22%). This
may have been attributable to an undercounting of CPAs in the sample population
because of incorrect reporting of AC members’ CPA designations in the Audit Analytics
database, exclusion of the CPA designation in proxy statement materials, and/or a higher
rate of response because of the nature of the study.4 Finally, I used statistical methods to
assess the common method biases. Specifically, I followed the methodology of Podsakoff
et al. (2003) and used Harman’s single-factor test and confirmatory factor analysis (p.
889). The results of Harman’s single-factor test did not indicate a problem resulting from
common method bias. An exploratory factor analysis with the study’s variables revealed
that no single factor accounted for more than 50% of the variance (AC reliance on
CEO/CFO and other corporate governance actors = 31.82%, AC actions to assess fraud
risk = 34.43%). I also assessed whether there was multicollinearity among the measures
4

If CPA is added to the models in Table 6, Panels A – D, using two-tailed tests, it is marginally positive in
two cases, insignificant in one case, and positive and significant (p = 0.048) in Panel D. The other results
are similar. Thus, CPA status does not affect the study’s primary results.
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of the constructs finding that the determinant value for each correlation matrix was above
the acceptable 0.001 threshold (e.g., AC reliance = 0.094, AC actions = 0.005, AC
professional ties = 0.208). Further, the VIF scores on all the variables are 1.87 or below,
indicating multicollinearity was not an issue.
Construct Validity
Construct validity “is the extent to which a set of measured items actually reflects
the theoretical latent construct those items are designed to measure” (Hair et al., 2010, p.
686). All constructs must display adequate construct validity “whether they are new
scales or scales taken from previous research and should be judged both qualitatively and
empirically” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 674). The scales in this study were adapted from
existing studies, but the constructs are somewhat unique, so they were tested for construct
validity.
To assess construct validity, I followed the methodology of Hair et al. (2010) and
performed confirmatory factor analysis. To enhance construct validity, I also conducted
additional pre-testing following the methodology of Westphal (1998) and asked
respondents to identify questions that are unclear, difficult to answer, or potentially
subject to bias. I also asked for feedback from pre-test participants whether the questions
were interpreted as expected to determine if improvements were needed for the format of
the survey or if there was a need to modify the length of the survey.
Initially, I conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on each group of
measures of the independent and dependent variables. The results indicated acceptable
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics for each group of measures above the acceptable
0.60 threshold (Hair et al., 2010) and with the combined measures of each construct
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being significant based on Bartlett’s test for sphericity. I found little evidence of cross
loadings on any of the variables, and the total variances explained on the loaded factors
exceeded the acceptable .60 threshold (Hair et al., 2010). Thus, I proceeded to create
summated variables for the dependent and independent variables, by group, to better
reflect the predicted hypotheses (e.g., management, AC, and other corporate governance
actors). Additional EFA indicated that the lack of reported social ties between AC
members and the head of internal audit and the external audit partner limited further
analysis of the correlation between measures of the strength of each personal tie. Thus, I
created dummy variables to measure the existence of relationship ties for both personal
and professional ties (coded 1 = yes, 0 = no).
I then used Cronbach’s alpha to assess the reliability of all the summated
variables and examined the correlations between/among the measures of the summated
variables. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of the dependent variables of AC actions to
assess FFR risk (0.704) and AC actions to assess management’s integrity (0.729) were
above the recommended level of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2010), and the individual measures of
each construct were highly correlated. Nearly all of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for
the individual measures of the dependent variables of AC reliance on the CEO/CFO and
AC reliance on other corporate governance actors were also above the 0.70 threshold, and
the individual measures were highly correlated, with the exception of the summated
measure for AC reliance on internal and external auditors (CA = 0.434). As such, I
separated the individual measures for AC reliance on the internal and external auditors
for analysis purposes. Among the summated measures of the independent variables, I
found all the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients to be above the 0.70 threshold with the

81
exception of professional ties to other audit committee members and other independent
directors (CA = 0.328), personal ties to the CEO and CFO (CA = 0.271), and personal
ties to the other audit committee members and other independent directors (CA = 0.457).
Thus, I separated the summated variables for each into individual measures for analysis
purposes.
Model
I used multivariate regression and MANOVA to examine the association between
AC relationship ties and AC strategies for assessing FFR risk. Based on the discussion
above, I used the following MANOVA model to test the hypotheses:5
(RELIANCE ON CEO/CFO, RELIANCE ON OTHER CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ACTORS, RELIANCE ON AC’S OWN EFFORTS) = f
(MEASURES OF PERSONAL TIES, MEASURES OF PROFESSIONAL TIES,
and control variables)

Based on the overall results, I used ANOVA and linear regression to conduct additional
analysis.
Pretesting
The original draft of the survey was pretested with a panel of four individuals,
including two laypersons, a community college instructor, and an accounting expert.
Based on their feedback, the content and organization of the survey were revised, and the
survey’s readability, understandability and clarity were improved. The final version of
the survey was submitted again for feedback to academic and accounting professionals
who are knowledgeable about AC oversight duties. Their input helped to provide
additional content validity.
5

For H3a, H3b, and H3c, this is the initial test of the hypotheses. Later, I focus on more specific measures
of AC actions to assess FFR risk and management integrity.
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Participants
One hundred thirty six (136) AC members from mid-sized U.S. public companies
participated in the study. I used the Audit Analytics database to identify AC members
with at least one year of AC service who were appointed or reappointed from 1/1/2008 to
12/31/2011 to serve in companies with revenues greater than $0 but less than $2 billion. I
eliminated 134 AC members with principal addresses in non-English speaking countries
and 52 AC members who I could no longer verify served on the AC because either they
recently resigned or another company acquired the company on whose board they served
and the AC members’ position had been eliminated. Using Internet websites such as
zabasearch.com, whitepages.com, reuters.com, and intellius.com, combined with the
biographical information in the company’s shareholder proxy statement, I located the
primary business or home address of the AC members (e.g., Wilkins, 2012). In those
cases where I could not determine an AC members’ home or business address because (a)
the AC member had recently moved and a new address was not yet available, (b) the AC
had retired, or (c) there was a question as to the accuracy of the address, I sent the survey
directly to the AC company. Following Dillman (2009), I included personalized request
letters from the chair of my dissertation committee as well as my own personal request
using colored letterhead and hand stamped return envelopes. See Appendix A and
Appendix B for the personalized request letters and the complete survey instrument.
I mailed the survey to 542 AC members. Following Dillman (2009), I mailed the
survey using the United States Postal Service (USPS) priority service with delivery
confirmation. A second request using standard USPS mail service was sent
approximately 4 weeks after the first request mailing. Thirty-three (6%) packets were
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returned for incomplete or inaccurate addresses. In these cases, I resent the survey to the
address of the AC company. In total, I received 16 sets of undeliverable materials. As of
August 17, 2013, I received a total of 136 AC member responses with a response rate of
26% 6 based on the adjusted sample size of 526. The 26% response rate is higher than the
expected 20% to 25% response rate for mailed AC surveys (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993).
The response rate compares well to DeZoort and Salterio’s (2001) study of AC
judgments, which reported a 20% response rate, as well more recent studies sponsored by
large accounting firms (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2008) which reported response
rates ranging from 15% to 28%. The response rate is also significantly higher than the
response rates for other unsponsored studies (e.g., Bierstaker et al., 2012; Rupley et al.,
2011) which have reported response rates of 10% or less. The sample size of 136 AC
members is above the minimum ratio of five observations to each independent variable
(Hair et al. 2010, p. 175). Further, the demographic characteristics of the participants
were also generally representative of the sample population as a whole except where
noted.

6

Supplemental analysis revealed no evidence of early/late response differences in the models presented in
Table 6, Panels A-D (p > 0.35).
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CHAPTER 6
DATA ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS7
Demographics
Table 1, Panel A (shown below) presents the demographic information for the
136 participants. Most participants are male (86.8%) and retired (64.7%). Some
participants are currently CEOs (13.2%); CFOs (6.6%); or chairman of a board (2.2%).
Other participants reported some other position title (12.5%) or gave no response (0.8%).
Many (35.3%) of the participants are also certified public accountants. Participants are
more likely to have professional experience in general management (59.6%), or as CFOs
(47.1%), or have professional experience in public accounting (36.8%). Other
participants reported having other professional experience in finance or accounting
(24.3%), or experience as a controller (20.6%), accounting professor (2.2%), or as a
financial/accounting regulator (2.2%). Most participants are also well-educated (masters
degree (47.1%), JD (8.1%), doctorate (4.4%), and/or some other type of advanced degree
(3.7%)). In addition, a majority (58.8%) serve on ACs of companies with under $500
million in annual revenues. Most (75.7%) companies of the participating AC members
operate in non-regulated industries. These companies are primarily audited by Big 4
accounting firms (66.9%) and possess in-house audit functions (55.9%). Internal audit

7

In cases where the participants did not respond to the survey question, or the questions were not
applicable to the AC company, I indicated the number of valid responses.
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TABLE 1. Participant Demographics (n = 136)
Panel A: Percentages
Gender
Male
Female

Number

Percent

118
18

86.8%
13.2%

Current Job Title
Retired
CEO
CFO
Chairman
Other
No response

88
18
9
3
17
1

64.7%
13.2%
6.6%
2.2%
12.5%
0.8%

Professional Certification
Certified public accountant

48

35.3%

Professional Experience in Finance or Accounting
Chief financial officer
Public accounting experience
General management
Accounting professor
Controller
Financial/accounting regulator
Other

64
50
81
3
28
3
33

47.1%
36.8%
59.6%
2.2%
20.6%
2.2%
24.3%

Education
Bachelors
Masters
JD
PhD/DBA
Other

53
64
11
6
5

39.0%
47.1%
8.1%
4.4%
3.7%

80
54
2

58.8%
39.7%
1.5%

Company Characteristics
Revenues of audit committee company
Under $500 million
Over $500 million
No response
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Panel A: Percentages (Continued)

Number

Percent

Industry of audit committee company
Non-regulated industry

103

75.7%

33

24.3%

Big 4 accounting firm

91

66.9%

Internal audit function
In-house
Outsourced
Both in-house and outsourced
No internal audit function

76
21
25
14

55.9%
15.4%
18.4%
10.3%

62
10

45.5%
7.4%

50
14

36.8%
10.3%

Number of participants who are formally
designated as financial experts

98

72.1%

Number of participants who are the
audit committee chair for the audit
committee company

53

39.0%

Number of participants who have
industry expertise in the same industry
as the audit committee company

93

68.4%

8

5.9%

43

31.9%

Regulated industry (Finance/Insurance)

Internal audit reporting responsibility
Primarily to audit committee
Primarily to management
About equally to audit committee
and management
Not applicable
Current Audit Committee Member Service

Number of participants who have served
on an audit committee (public or private)
at the time the company experienced fraud
(n = 135)
Governance Characteristics
Number of audit committee companies
where the CEO is also the chairman of
the board (n = 135)
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Panel A: Percentages (Continued)
Number of audit committee companies where
the CEO is also the founder of the company
(n = 135)

Number

27

Percent

20.0%

Number of audit committee companies where
the CEO was in place when the participant was
appointed to the board (n = 133)
77
57.9%
____________________________________________________________________
reports primarily to the AC (45.5%) or about equally (36.8%) to the AC and
management. Many of the participants bring financial and industry expertise to the AC,
and are likely to serve as the AC chair. Specifically, 72.1% of the participants are
formally designated as financial experts, 39.0% serve as the AC chair, 68.4% have
industry expertise in the same industry as the AC company, and 5.9% have served on an
AC (public or private) of a company that has experienced fraud. About one third (31.9%)
of the respondents serve on the AC of companies where the CEO is also the chairman of
the board, or the CEO is also the founder of the company (20.0%). Further, many
(57.9%) participants were appointed for AC service when the current CEO was in place.
Table 1, Panel B (shown below) presents additional demographic information and
general information about the participants’ cumulative governance experience, current
AC service, and other AC experience. In addition, I present information about
governance processes for the AC company including AC composition and meeting
processes, and general governance characteristics of the AC company. Collectively, these
statistics indicate that the participants bring a great deal of accounting, audit committee,
and governance experience to the board of directors.
The participants in the study are typically older and have many years of
accounting experience. They also have significant years of AC experience and have
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Panel B:

Means

Mean
(Median)

Minimum
(Maximum)

SD

62.2
(62.0)

44
(80)

7.06

27.8
(30.0)

0
(50)

14.15

6.7
(5.0)

<1
(30)

4.50

2.5
(2.0)

1
(10)

1.82

Number of years served on the board of
the audit committee company (n = 135)

5.2
(4.0)

1.5
(17)

3.17

Number of years served on audit committee
of the audit committee company (n = 135)

4.7
(4.0)

1
(17)

2.67

1.5
(1.0)

0
(4)

0.82

Number of members serving on the audit
committee of the audit committee company

4.0
(4.0)

3
(8)

1.17

Number of members on the audit committee
designated as financial experts on the audit
committee company

2.2
(2.0)

0
(6)

1.07

Number of years the chair on the audit
committee has served as chair on the audit
committee company (n = 135)

4.7
(4.0)

1
(20)

3.54

Number of formal audit committee meetings
held each year on the audit committee company
(n = 135)

7.0
(7.0)

1
(16)

2.59

Age (n = 135)

Cumulative Governance Experience
Years of accounting experience (n = 135)

Years of corporate audit committee service

Corporate audit committees served in career

Current Audit Committee Member Service

Other Audit Committee Experience
Number of public company audit committees
on which participant currently serves
Audit Committee Composition and Meeting Processes
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Panel B:

Means (Continued)

Mean
(Median)

Minimum
(Maximum)

SD

Governance Characteristics
Number of directors on the full board of the
audit committee company
(n = 135)

8.5
(8.0)

4
(18)

2.57

Number of independent directors on the full
board of the audit committee company
(n = 135)

6.8
(6.0)

2
(17)

2.82

Number of years the CEO on the audit
committee company has been in office
(n = 134)

7.8
(5.0)

<1
(65)

8.45

Number of years the CFO on the audit
committee company has been in office
(n = 134)

5.1
(4.0)

<1
(26)

4.49

considerable AC service. The age of the participants ranges from 44 (two participants) to
80 (one participant) with a mean of 62.2. Participants also reported total years of
accounting experience ranging from zero (15 participants) to 50 (one participant) with a
mean of 27.8. Participants have corporate AC service ranging from less than one year
(one participant) to 30 years (one participant) with a mean of 6.7, and have served on one
(49 participants) to 10 corporate ACs (one participant) during their careers with a mean
of 2.5. In regard to current AC service, participants have served on the board of the AC
company ranging from 1.5 years (one participant) to 17 years (one participant) with a
mean of 5.2 and have served on the AC ranging from one year (one participant) to 17
years (one participant) with a mean of 4.7. Participants were also asked to indicate if they
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have other AC experience. Participants reported they currently serve on zero ACs (6
participants)8 to four ACs (2 participants) with a mean of 1.5.
The participants’ responses to questions about AC composition and meeting
processes indicate that the participants’ ACs are fairly large and have a relatively high
number of members formally designated as financial experts. In addition, the AC chair
has considerable tenure and the number of AC meetings held annually varies widely.
The number of members on the participants’ ACs range from three (59 participants) to
eight (2 participants) with a mean of 4.0. The number of AC members designated as
financial experts ranges from zero (2 participants) to six (1 participant) with a mean of
2.2. The number of years the chair of the AC has chaired the AC ranges from one (15
participants) to 20 (2 participants) with a mean of 4.7. The number of formal AC
meetings held each year ranges from one (1 participant) to 16 (1 participant) with a mean
of 7.0.
Among the AC company governance characteristics, the participants reported that
their AC companies are typically led by CEOs and CFOs with considerable tenure, but
the boards of directors are largely comprised of directors who are formally independent
of management. The number of directors on the full board ranges from four (2
participants) to 18 (1 participant) with a mean of 8.5. The total number of independent
directors on the full board ranges from two (1 participant) to 17 (1 participant) with a

8

Six participants do not currently serve on an audit committee (apparently had rolled off just prior to the
survey mailing) but have served on several public company audit committees in the recent past (1, 2, 2, 2,
2, and 3 total audit committees ever served, respectively). If these six participants are deleted from the
sample, the results in Table 6, Panels A – D are similar, except that PTCEO is not significant in Panels B
and D, and PTOID is not significant in Panel C.
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mean of 6.8. The tenure of the CEOs of the AC companies ranges from less than one year
(1 participant) to 65 years (1 participant) with a mean tenure of 7.8, and the tenure of the
CFOs is slightly less ranging from less than one year (1 participant) to 26 years (1
participant) with a mean of 5.1.
Table 1, Panel C (shown below), presents the industry distribution of the AC
firms, indicating that participants serve on the ACs of companies in diverse industries.
The industries represented by the participants’ AC company are dominated by the finance
industry followed by healthcare/pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing, and technology
industries. These industries account for 64% of the respondents. The industry distribution
appears reasonably consistent with the fraud company profiles in Beasley et al. (1999,
2000, 2010), which often highlight financial, healthcare, and technology firms.
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Panel C:

Industry Distribution

n

Percent

Finance/Banking
Healthcare/Pharmaceuticals
Manufacturing
Technology
Energy/Utilities
Real Estate
Service Organization
Communications/Media
Retail Trade
Telecommunications
Transportation/Logistics
Insurance
No response
Other

30
20
20
17
11
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
1
10
___
136

22.1%
14.7%
14.7%
12.5%
8.1%
3.7%
3.7%
2.9%
2.9%
2.2%
2.2%
2.2%
0.7%
7.4%
_____
100%

Total

Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the study’s descriptive statistics. Overall, the participants’
responses appear consistent with the findings of Beasley et al. (2009) of delegated fraud
oversight by AC members and lack of consensus on the AC about the AC’s role in
assessing fraud risk. Further, I find that participants’ reliance on each corporate
governance actor largely mirrors participants’ perceptions of each actor’s responsibility
for assessing fraud risk. Surprisingly, AC members do not perceive the other AC
members or themselves to be as responsible for assessing fraud risk as they perceive
management or the internal or external auditors to be. I also find variations in the actual
actions that AC members take to assess fraud risk and management’s integrity.
Table 2, Panel A (shown below), presents the participants’ reliance on
management and other corporate governance actors. The participants rely heaviest on the
external audit partner (mean of RELEAP = 82.3 on a scale of 0 = “no reliance” and 100 =
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TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics (n = 136)

Panel A:

Audit committee reliance on others
when assessing fraud risk

Mean
(Median)

Minimum
(Maximum)

SD

Management
Chief Executive Officer

68.9
(70.0)

10
(100)

19.66

80.3
(82.5)

15
(100)

15.27

56.7
(55.0)

5
(100)

22.15

67.6
(70.0)

10
(100)

19.27

Other independent directors
(not on the audit committee) (n = 135)

42.4
(45.0)

0
(100)

25.13

Head of internal audit (n = 122)

79.2
(80.5)

22
(100)

14.93

82.3
(85.0)

35
(100)

13.09

Chief Financial Officer
Audit Committee
Other audit committee members

Yourself (n = 135)
Other Corporate Governance Actors

External audit partner

Note: Based on paired t-tests, the means are as follows (p < 0.05 for differences): external
audit partner = CFO = head of internal audit > CEO = yourself > other audit committee
members > other independent directors.
“total reliance”; SD = 13.09; range = 35-100), followed by the CFO (mean of RELCFO
= 80.3; SD = 15.27; range = 15-100), and the head of internal audit (mean of RELIA =
79.2; SD = 14.93; range = 22-100). The participants rely less heavily on the CEO (mean
of RELCEO = 68.9; SD =19.66; range = 10-100) and themselves (mean of RELSELF =
67.6; SD = 19.27; range = 10-100) providing some evidence that AC members may not
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over rely on the CEO, but raising questions about AC members’ self-reliance. The
participants rely moderately on other AC members (mean of RELOAC = 56.7; SD =
22.15; range = 5-100) and least heavily on other independent directors (mean of RELOID
= 42.4; SD = 25.13; range = 0-100). The low level of reliance on other independent
directors is consistent with recent findings by the Center for Audit Quality which found
that players in the financial reporting chain (e.g., corporate directors, financial executives,
external auditors, and internal auditors) (CAQ, 2013) have the least amount of confidence
in the board of directors and the AC to identify a potential material misstatement due to
fraud. This finding raises questions about whether AC members can build coalitions
within the AC, and the board as a whole (e.g., Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Stevenson &
Radin, 2009), to combat fraud if AC members do not perceive they can rely heavily on
other AC members or other independent directors to assess fraud risk.
Table 2, Panel B (shown below), presents the participants’ perceptions of
management and other corporate governance actors’ responsibility for assessing fraud
risk. AC members’ perception of others responsibility is an exploratory variable, and I
find that AC members’ perceptions of responsibility are similar to their reliance on others
to assess fraud risks. However, participants place a great deal of responsibility on the
CFO, which is potentially problematic because CFOs, as well as CEOs, are more likely to
be associated with incidences of FFR (Beasley et al., 2010). Overall, participants perceive
that the CFO is most responsible for assessing fraud risk (mean of RESCFO = 91.4 on a
scale of 0 = “no responsibility” and 100 = “total responsibility”; SD = 7.98; range = 55100), followed by the external audit partner (mean of RESEAP = 85.7; SD = 13.46; range
= 25-100), the head of internal audit (mean of RESIA = 85.4; SD = 13.40; range =

95
Panel B:

Audit committee perceptions of
others responsibility for assessing
fraud risk

Mean
(Median)

Minimum
(Maximum)

SD

Management
Chief Executive Officer (n = 134)

83.0
(86.0)

20
(100)

14.86

91.4
(94.0)

55
(100)

7.98

68.3
(70.0)

15
(100)

22.56

72.0
(75.0)

16
(100)

21.57

Other independent directors
(not on the audit committee) (n = 133)

49.4
(50.0)

0
(100)

24.88

Head of internal audit (n = 120)

85.4
(90.0)

35
(100)

13.40

85.7
(90.0)

25
(100)

13.46

Chief Financial Officer (n = 134)

Audit Committee
Other audit committee members (n = 134)

Yourself (n = 134)

Other Corporate Governance Actors

External audit partner (n = 134)

Note: Based on paired t-tests, the means are as follows (p < 0.05 for differences): CFO >
external audit partner = head of internal audit = CEO > yourself > other audit committee
members > other independent directors.

35-100), and the CEO (mean of RESCEO = 83.0; SD =14.86; range = 20-100). The
participants perceived themselves (mean of RESELF = 72.0; SD = 21.57; range = 16100) and the other AC members (mean of RESOAC = 68.3; SD = 22.56; range = 15-100)
as significantly less responsible, and other independent directors not on the AC as the
least responsible (mean of RESOID = 49.4; SD = 24.88; range = 0-100). These findings
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are consistent with the CAQ’s (2013) finding that the players in the financial reporting
chain largely perceive corporate executives have the primary role in deterring and
detecting financial reporting fraud. However, the participants in the CAQ study did not
report as strong a perception that internal and external auditors were as responsible for
detecting financial reporting fraud as the participants in this study perceived them to be.
This highlights the CAQ’s (2013) overall finding that there are expectation gaps among
financial supply chain participants about the role of each participant.
Table 2, Panel C (shown below), presents the specific actions participants’ ACs
take to assess fraud risk. Overall, there is a lack of consensus with a wide variation
between the most common, and least common AC actions to assess fraud risk (medians
range from 52 to 90). Further, AC actions to actively search for fraud risks are among the
least common possibly reflecting delegation of fraud risk oversight by AC members to
other corporate governance actors. The participants reported their most likely action is
having regular interactions with management (mean of ACAINTER = 88.5 on a scale of
0 = “not at all” and 100 = “a great deal”, SD = 10.75, range = 25-100) followed by
assessing the character of management (mean of ACACHAR = 88.3; SD = 10.66; range
= 45-100). The participants are equally likely to actively promote the company’s
whistleblower hotline (mean of ACAWHISTLE = 75.8; SD = 23.57, range = 0-100) and
to closely analyze reserves and other financial statement areas where fraud could occur
(mean of ACAANALYZE = 74.1; SD = 21.66, range = 5-100). AC actions to actively
search for fraud risks are moderately prevalent (mean of ACASEARCH = 65.8; SD =
23.35, range = 0-100), and the least likely action is to review officers’ expenses
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Panel C:

Audit committee actions to assess
fraud risk (n = 135)

Mean
(Median)

Minimum
(Maximum)

SD

Closely analyze reserves and other financial
statement areas where fraud could occur
(ACANALYZE)

74.1
(80.0)

5
(100)

21.66

Assesses the character of management
(ACACHAR)

88.3
(90.0)

45
(100)

10.66

Has regular interactions with management
(ACAINTER)

88.5
(90.0)

25
(100)

10.75

Actively promotes the company’s
whistleblower hotline
(ACAWHISTLE)

75.8
(84.0)

0
(100)

23.57

Actively searches for fraud risks
(ACASEARCH)

65.8
(70.0)

0
(100)

23.35

Reviews officers’ expenses (annually) to
assess financial statement fraud risks
(ACAEXPENSE)

48.2
(52.0)

0
(100)

32.35

Note: Based on paired t-tests, the means are as follows (p < 0.05 for differences):
ACAINTER = ACACHAR > ACAWHISTLE = ACAANALYZE > ACASEARCH >
ACAEXPENSE.

(annually) to assess financial statement fraud risks (mean of ACAEXPENSE = 48.2; SD
= 32.35, range = 0-100).
Table 2, Panel D (shown below), presents actual actions participants’ ACs take to
assess management’s integrity. I find a smaller variation between the most common and
least common actions to assess management’s integrity (medians range from 80 to 90)
than I did with AC actions to assess fraud risk. Thus, the participants’ ACs appear to have
more consensus about how to assess management’s integrity. The participants reported
that they were most likely to observe management’s transparency/openness (mean of
MIOPEN = 88.1 on a scale of 0 = “not at all” and 100 = “a great deal”, SD = 9.76, range
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Panel D:

Audit committee actions to assess
management’s integrity (n = 136)

Mean
(Median)

Minimum
(Maximum)

SD

Assesses management’s body language
(MIBODY)

73.9
(80.0)

5
(100)

20.88

Observes management’s transparency/
openness (MIOPEN)

88.1
(90.0)

50
(100)

9.76

Observes how management reacts in
pressure situations (MIPRESS)

86.6
(90.0)

45
(100)

11.05

Observes whether management is defensive
(MIDEFEN)

84.0
(85.0)

30
(100)

14.26

Monitors the whistleblower hotline
(MIWHISTLE)

76.1
(85.0)

0
(100)

25.39

Note: Based on paired t-tests, the means are as follows (p < 0.05 for differences):
MIOPEN > MIPRESS > MIDEFEN > MIWHISTLE = MIBODY.

50-100); followed by observing how management reacts in pressure situations (mean of
MIPRESS = 86.6; SD = 11.05, range = 45-100); and observing whether management is
defensive (mean of MIDEFEN = 84.0; SD = 14.26, range = 30-100). Participants were
equally likely to monitor the whistleblower hotline (mean of MIWHISTLE = 76.1; SD =
25.39, range = 0-100) and assess management’s body language (mean of MIBODY =
73.9; SD = 20.88, range = 5-100).
Table 2, Panel E (shown below), presents a detail of the nominal measures of the
participants’ personal and professional relationship ties (e.g., each relationship tie was
coded as 1 = yes and 0 = no). Overall, the participants reported a greater number of
professional ties than personal ties. One participant noted that most board members of the
AC company did not live in the same geographic area as the AC firm, thus there was a
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Panel E:

Reported number of audit
committee relationship ties

No. of Ties
(%)

Mean
(Median)

Minimum
(Maximum) SD

Personal ties:
Personal ties to the CEO
(PSCEO) (n = 135)

13
(9.6%)

0.1
(0.0)

0
(1)

Personal ties to the CFO
(PSCFO) (n = 135)

4
(3.0%)

(0.0)

<0.1
(1)

Personal ties to other AC members
(PSOAC) (n = 135)

14
(10.4%)

0.1
(0.0)

0
(1)

0.31

Personal ties to other independent
directors (PSOID) (n = 135)

13
(9.6%)

0.1
(0.0)

0
(1)

0.30

Personal ties to the head of internal
audit (PSIA) (n = 121)

0
(0%)

0.0
(0.0)

0
(0)

0.00

Personal ties to the external audit
partner (PSEAP) (n = 135)

0
(0%)

0.0
(0.0)

0
(0)

0.00

Professional ties to the CEO
(PTCEO) (n = 136)

24
(17.6%)

0.2
(0.0)

0
(1)

0.38

Professional ties to the CFO
(PTCFO) (n = 136)

12
(8.8%)

(0.0)

<0.1
(1)

Professional ties to other AC
members (PTOAC) (n = 135)

31
(23.0%)

(0.0)

0.2
(1)

0
0.42

Professional ties to other independent
directors (PTOID) (n = 136)

33
(24.3%)

0.2
(0.0)

0
(1)

0.43

Professional ties to the head of
internal audit (PTIA) (n = 122)

2
(1.6%)

<0.1
(0.0)

0
(1)

0.13

Professional ties to the external
audit partner (PTEAP) (n = 136)

4
(2.9%)

<0.1
(0.0)

0
(1)

0.17

0.30
0
0.17

Professional ties:

0
0.29
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lesser likelihood of social interaction. This explanation appears to be reasonable, but may
not be representative of all participants in the study.
The participants had nearly identical numbers of personal ties to the CEO (n = 13,
mean of PSCEO = 0.1; SD = 0.30, range = 0-1), other AC members (n = 14, mean of
PSOAC = 0.1 SD = 0.31), and other independent directors (n = 13, mean of PSOID = 0.1;
SD = 0.30). Participants reported relatively fewer personal ties to the CFO (n = 4, mean
of PSCFO < 0.1; SD = 0.17), and no personal ties to the head of internal audit (PSIA) and
the external audit partner (PSEAP). The participants reported a similar number of
professional ties to other AC members (n = 31, mean of PTOAC = 0.2; SD = 0.42) and to
other independent directors (n = 33, mean of PTOID = 0.2; SD = 0.43), but had
somewhat fewer professional ties to the CEO (n = 24, mean of PTCEO = 0.2; SD = 0.38)
and to the CFO (n = 12, mean of PTCFO < 0.1; SD = 0.29). The participants had even
fewer number of professional ties with the external audit partner (n = 4, mean of PTEAP
< 0.1; SD = 0.17) and the least number with the head of internal audit (n = 2, mean of
PTIA < 0.1; SD = 0.13).
Open-ended Responses
Table 3 presents participants’ responses to open-ended questions asking
participants to discuss their reasons for relying heavily on other parties to assess fraud
risk (Panel A); their reasons for assigning the responsibility for detecting fraud to other
parties (Panel B); other means the AC uses to assess fraud risk (Panel C); and other
means the AC uses to assess management’s integrity (Panel D).9 Overall, the responses

9

Two investigators independently coded the questions in this section. These two sets of codes were
compared and any discrepancies were discussed and resolved. There were very few discrepancies noted.
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reflected that participants assign many of the same reasons to reliance and responsibility.
In several instances, participants indicated that they did not perceive a difference between
reliance and responsibility. Further, participants indicated that their ACs employ a wide
variety of strategies to assess fraud risk and management’s integrity, supporting the
finding of Beasley et al. (2009, p. 98) that “there is no consensus activity” that ACs
employ to assess fraud risk.
Table 3, Panel A (shown below), presents participants’ reasons for relying heavily
on other parties to assess FFR risk. Participants reported their reliance is mostly due to
fiduciary responsibility (n = 33) followed by due to general knowledge (n = 28) and
expertise/abilities (n = 27). To a lesser extent, participants rely on others because of their
close proximity to the financial reporting process (n = 17) and because of independence
(n = 17). Taken as a whole, participants appear to be more motivated to rely on others
based on more tangible, rather intangible reasons.
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TABLE 3. Responses to open-ended questions
Panel A:

Primary reasons audit committee members rely heavily
on other parties to assess fraud risk

Fiduciary responsibility
General knowledge
Expertise/abilities
Close proximity to financial reporting process
Independence
Other
Experience
Role in setting “tone at top”
Character/integrity
Knowledge of the company
Access to information
Best position to detect/deter fraud
Liability risk
Trust
Position/authority
Own personal experience

n
33
28
27
17
17
11
10
10
10
10
9
8
8
4
4
3

Table 3, Panel B (shown below), presents participants’ reasons for assigning the
responsibility for detecting fraud to other parties. Overall, participants assigned the same
reasons for assigning the responsibility to other parties as they did for their reasons for
relying heavily on other parties; however, a large number of participants assigned
responsibility due to fiduciary responsibility (n = 52), and to a much lesser extent due to
position/authority (n = 12), expertise/abilities (n = 10), role in setting the “tone at the top”
(n = 9), and liability risk (n = 9). Given there was a wide variation in participants’
perceptions of each corporate actor’s responsibility for assessing fraud risk (Table 2,
Panel B), participants may also hold widely varying perceptions about each actor’s
fiduciary responsibilities. This could be problematic if participants are delegating their
responsibilities to those they believe have the most to lose by incidences of FFR when in
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Panel B:

Primary reasons audit committee members assign the
responsibility for detecting fraud to other parties

Fiduciary responsibility
Position/authority
Expertise/abilities
Role in setting “tone at top”
Liability risk
Close proximity to financial reporting process
Knowledge of the company
General knowledge
Independence
Best positioned to detect fraud
Access to information
Character/integrity
Accountability
General experience
Own personal experience
Other

n
52
12
10
9
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
4
3
2
7

fact, the academic literature has found that AC members are more likely to be severely
penalized by incidences of FFR (Abbott, Park, & Parker, 2000; Srinivasan, 2005).
Table 3, Panel C (shown below), presents other means the AC uses to assess fraud
risk. Overall, participants’ responses reflected many of the BRC’s (1999) “guiding
principles” for best AC practices including independent communication and information
flow between the AC and internal audit (Principle 2), external auditors (Principle 3), and
management (Principle 4). However, there was less emphasis on continuing education
and training (Principle 5). Participants reported that they are more likely to meet with
external audit regularly (n = 25) and internal audit regularly (n = 18), and often these
meetings are without management present (n = 10). Participants also reported regularly
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Panel C:

Other means the audit committee uses to
assess fraud risk

Meet with external audit regularly
Meet with internal audit regularly
Review financial statements or internal controls
Meet without management present
Ask probing questions
Meet with management regularly
Oversee/direct internal audit
Review/assess company risks
Meet with second level staff
Make inquiries regarding fraud risks
Engage outside professionals
Assess fraud hotline
Review company filings/analyst reports
Encourage open communications
Promote compliance programs
Obtain continuing education and training
Other

n
25
18
14
10
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
12

reviewing financial statements or internal controls (n = 14) and asking probing questions
to obtain information (n = 7). These actions are consistent with findings in previous AC
oversight studies (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron et al., 2004; Gendron & Bédard,
2006) and Roberts et al.’s (2005) finding that directors often use probing questions to
establish accountability which can enhance one’s reputation (e.g., Jensen, 2006).
Table 3, Panel D (shown below), presents other means the AC uses to assess
management’s integrity. In general, many participants use similar means to assess fraud
risk and management’s integrity, and overall, there was an emphasis on enhancing
communications and assessing management representations. These actions are consistent
with the consensus view of other players in the financial reporting supply that there is a
need for open and honest communications (CAQ, 2013). Most (n = 22) participants
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Panel D:

Other means the audit committee uses to
assess management’s integrity

Communicate or meet with other corporate governance
actors without management present
Assess clarity and reasonableness of management representations
Communicate or meet with management outside of formal meetings
Observe management’s openness/transparency
Meet with second level staff
Assess management’s ethics
Ask probing questions
Assess company hotline
Assess “tone at top”
Generally observe inside and outside of board meetings
Look for management consistency
Observe how management conducts their personal lives
Examine how management handles situations
Engage in social activities outside of board meetings
Assess management’s reputation
Other

n

22
12
11
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
10

reported their ACs communicated or met with other corporate governance actors without
management present. Further, participants (n = 12) placed importance on the clarity and
reasonableness of management representations and communicated and met with
management outside of formal meetings (n=11).
Results of Hypotheses Testing
The model in this study includes multiple independent variables (MEASURES
OF PROFESSIONAL TIES, MEASURES OF PERSONAL TIES) and dependent
variables (RELIANCE ON CEO/CFO, RELIANCE ON OTHER CORPORATE
GOVRENANCE ACTORS, and RELIANCE ON AC’S OWN EFFORTS). First, I used
multiple regression analysis (Table 4) and MANOVA (Table 5) to examine the
hypothesized relationships between the dependent variables of (RELIANCE ON
CEO/CFO, RELIANCE, RELIANCE ON OTHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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ACTORS, and RELIANCE ON AC’S OWN EFFORTS) and the independent variables
of (MEASURES OF PROFESSIONAL TIES and MEASURES OF PERSONAL TIES),
finding no significant relationship. I then used regression analysis to analyze the
associations between the dependent variables (AC ACTIONS TO ASSESS FFR RISK
AND MANAGEMENT’S INTEGRITY) and the independent variables of (MEASURES
OF PROFESSIONAL TIES and MEASURES OF PERSONAL TIES) (Table 6) taking
into account control variables derived from exploratory analysis. Thus, Table 6 reflects
an alternative method of testing H3a, H3b, and H3c.
Multivariate Regression Results
In Table 4, Panel A (shown below), I examine the association between the
strength of AC members’ personal and professional relationship ties to management and
other corporate governance actors (H1a, H1b, H1c) and AC members’ reliance on the
CEO and CFO to assess fraud risk (calculated as RELCEO+RELCFO). I predicted AC
members’ personal ties to the CEO/CFO (SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH) would be
positively associated with AC members’ reliance on the CEO/CFO (SUMRELMGT) and
there would be a less positive association with AC members’ professional ties
(SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH). I also made no directional prediction about the relationship
between AC members’ personal (SUMPSOGASTRENGTH) and professional
(SUMPTOGASTRENGTH) ties to other corporate governance actors and other AC
members (PSOACSTRENGTH/ PTOACSTRENGTH) and reliance on the CEO/CFO
(SUMRELMGT). I found the overall model was not significant with F = 0.56, p = 0.758,
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Table 4- Panel A
Regression Results
DV = RELIANCE ON MANAGEMENT
(SUMRELMGT)
n = 113
Variable
Predicted Sign Coeff.
t-stat
Intercept
?
150.92
41.19
SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH
+ (H1a)
-0.05
-0.30
SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH
+ (H1b)
0.03
0.37
SUMPSOGASTRENGTH
+/- (H1c)
0.09
0.47
SUMPTOGASTRENGTH
+/- (H1c)
-0.10
-0.86
PSOACSTRENGTH
+/- (H1c)
-0.29
-1.26
PTOACSTRENGTH
+/- (H1c)
0.10
0.74

P-value
0.000
0.765
0.358
0.636
0.394
0.212
0.460

Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise.
R2
F-statistic

3.10%
0.56
p = 0.758

Variable Definitions:
SUMRELMGT =

calculated variable = RELCEO+RELCFO measuring AC
members’ reliance on the CEO and the CFO when
assessing fraud risk with each item measured on a 101
point scale anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total
reliance (possible total score range 0-200);

SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH = calculated variable = PSCEOSTRENGTH+
PSCFOSTRENGTH measuring AC members’ perception
of the strength of their personal ties to the CEO and the
CFO with each item measured on a 101 point scale
anchored 0 = very weak tie and 100 = very strong tie
(possible total score range 0-200);
SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH = calculated variable = PTCEOSTRENGTH+
PTCFOSTRENGTH measuring AC members’ perception
of the strength of their professional ties to the CEO and the
CFO with each item measured on a 101 point scale
anchored 0 = very weak tie and 100 = very strong tie
(possible total score range 0-200);
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Variable Definitions (Continued):
SUMPSOGASTRENGTH = calculated variable = PSOID+PSEAP+PSIA measuring
audit measuring AC members’ perception of the strength of
their personal ties to the other independent directors, the
external audit partner, and the head of internal audit with
each item measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = very
weak tie and 100 = very strong tie (possible total score
range 0-300);
SUMPTOGASTRENGTH = calculated variable = PTOID+PTEAP+PTIA measuring
audit measuring AC members’ perception of the strength of
their professional ties to the other independent directors,
the external audit partner, and the head of internal audit
with each item measured on a 101 point scale anchored
0 = very weak tie and 100 = very strong tie (possible total
score range 0-300);
PSOACSTRENGTH =

AC members’ perception of the strength of their personal
relationship ties to other AC members on a 101 point scale
anchored 0 = very weak tie and 100 = very strong tie;

PTOACSTRENGTH =

AC members’ perception of the strength of their
professional relationship ties to other AC members on a
101 point scale anchored 0 = very weak tie and 100 =
very strong tie.

R2 = 3.10%.10 Thus, hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c were not supported.
In Table 4, Panel B (shown below), I examine the association between the
strength of AC members’ personal and professional relationship ties to management and
other corporate governance actors (H2a, H2b, H2c) and AC members’ reliance on other
corporate governance actors (e.g., other independent directors, external audit partner,
head of internal) (calculated as RELOID+RELEAP+RELIA). I predicted AC members’
personal ties to the CEO/CFO (SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH) would be negatively
associated with AC members’ reliance on other corporate governance actors

10

Given the insignificance of the models in Table 4, I did not pursue adding control variables to these
models.
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Table 4- Panel B
Regression Results
DV = RELIANCE ON OTHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ACTORS
(SUMRELOGA)
n = 113
Variable
Predicted Sign Coeff.
t-stat
P-value
Intercept
?
202.09
46.93
0.000
SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH
- (H2a)
-0.05
-0.22
0.415
SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH
- (H2b)
0.08
0.83
0.406
SUMPSOGASTRENGTH
+/- (H2c)
0.05
0.23
0.818
SUMPTOGASTRENGTH
+/- (H2c)
-0.04
-0.26
0.797
PSOACSTRENGTH
+/- (H2c)
-0.07
-0.26
0.799
PTOACSTRENGTH
+/- (H2c)
0.10
0.61
0.546

Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise.
R2
F-statistic

1.25%
0.22
p = 0.968

Variable Definition:
SUMRELOGA =

calculated variable = RELOID+RELEAP+RELIA measuring AC
members’ reliance on other independent directors not on the AC,
the external audit partner, and the head of internal audit when
assessing fraud risk with each item measured on a 101 point scale
anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total reliance (possible total
score range 0-300).

(SUMRELOGA), and there would be a less negative association for AC members’
professional ties (SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH). I also made no directional prediction
between AC members’ personal (SUMPSOGASTRENGTH) and professional
(SUMPTOGASTRENGTH) ties to other corporate governance actors and other AC
members (PSOACSTRENGTH/ PTOACSTRENGTH) and AC members’ reliance on the
other corporate governance actors (SUMRELOGA). I found the overall model was not
significant with F = 0.22, p = 0.968, R2 = 1.25%. Thus, hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c
were not supported.
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In Table 4, Panel C (shown below), I examine the association between the
strength of AC members’ personal and professional relationship ties to management and
other corporate governance actors, which are included in hypotheses (H3a, H3b, H3c),
and AC members’ reliance on other AC members and themselves (calculated as
RELOAC+ RELSELF). I predicted AC members’ personal ties to the CEO/CFO
(SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH) would be negatively associated with AC members’ reliance
on themselves and other AC members (SUMRELAC), and there would be a less negative
association between AC members’ professional ties to the CEO/CFO
(SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH). I also made no directional prediction about AC members’
personal (SUMPSOGASTRENGTH) and professional (SUMPTOGASTRENGTH) ties
to other corporate governance actors and AC members’ personal (PSOACSTRENGTH)
and professional ties (PTOACSTRENGTH) to other AC members, and AC members’
reliance on themselves and other AC members (SUMRELAC). I found the overall model
was not significant with F = 0.51, p = 0.803, R2 = 2.78%. Thus, hypotheses H3a, H3b,
and H3c were not supported in this initial test, but more specific measures are used later.
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Table 4- Panel C
Regression Results
DV = RELIANCE ON AUDIT COMMITTEE
(SUMRELAC)
n = 113
Variable
Predicted Sign Coeff.
t-stat
Intercept
?
124.37
28.99
SUMPSMGTSTRENGTH
- (H3a)
-0.07
-0.35
SUMPTMGTSTRENGTH
- (H3b)
0.15
1.51
SUMPSOGASTRENGTH
+/- (H3c)
-0.02
-0.10
SUMPTOGASTRENGTH
+/- (H3c)
-0.12
-0.88
PSOACSTRENGTH
+/- (H3c)
0.12
0.46
PTOACSTRENGTH
+/- (H3c)
-0.05
-0.33

P-value
0.000
0.365
0.134
0.924
0.383
0.649
0.740

Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise.
R2

2.78%

F-statistic

0.51
p = 0.803

Variable Definition:
SUMRELAC =

calculated variable = RELOAC+RELSELF measuring AC
members’ reliance on other AC members and AC members’
reliance on themselves when assessing fraud risk with each item
measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = no reliance and
100 = total reliance (possible total score range 0-200).

MANOVAs
In Table 5, I more deeply examine the association between AC members’
personal and professional relationship ties and AC members’ reliance on others to assess
FFR risk by focusing on the existence of relationship ties rather than the strength of
relationship ties. The limited number of participants with relationship ties made the
relationship strength variables less useful than expected. Further, measuring the existence
of the ties is consistent with previous archival and experimental archival studies (e.g.,
Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al. (2012); Cohen et al., 2012a; Dey &
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Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan
et al., 2011).
In Table 5, Panel A (shown below), I examine the association between the
existence of personal and professional ties to the CEO (PSCEO/PTCFO) and CFO
(PSCFO/PTCFO) (measured as 1 = yes, 0 = no), and AC members’ reliance on the CEO
(RELCFO) and CFO (RELCFO). The model was not significant, F = 1.45, p = 0.175.

Table 5 – Panel A
Results of MANOVA
DVs = RELIANCE ON MANAGEMENT
(RELCEO, RELCFO)
n = 135
F-statistic
p-value
MODEL
1.45
0.175
PSCEO
2.62
0.076
PTCEO
PSCFO
PTCFO

0.38
2.81
0.33

0.686
0.064
0.717

Variable Definitions:
RELCEO =

RELCFO =

PSCEO =
PTCEO =
PSCFO =
PTCFO =

AC members’ perception of their reliance on the CEO when
assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = no
reliance and 100 = total reliance;
AC members’ perception of their reliance on the CFO when
assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = no
reliance and 100 = total reliance;
AC members with personal ties to the CEO = 1 if yes, 0 if no;
AC members with professional ties to the CEO = 1 if yes, 0 if no;
AC members with personal ties to the CFO = 1 if yes, 0 if no;
AC members with professional ties to the CFO = 1 if yes, 0 if no.

In Table 5, Panel B (shown below), I expand the model and include other AC
members and other independent directors. Specifically, I examined the association
between the existence of personal and professional relationship ties with the CEO
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Table 5 – Panel B
Results of MANOVA
DVs = RELIANCE ON CEO, CFO, AUDIT COMMITTEE,
AND OTHER INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
(RELCEO, RELCFO, RELOAC, RELOID)
n = 133
F-statistic
p-value
MODEL
1.04
0.409
PSCEO
1.44
0.226
PTCEO
1.34
0.259
PSCFO
2.22
0.071
PTCFO
1.21
0.310
PSOAC
0.75
0.563
PTOAC
0.63
0.644
PSOID
0.72
0.578
PTOID
1.33
0.261

Variable Definitions:
RELOAC =

RELOID =

PSOAC =
PTOAC =
PSOID =
PTOID =

AC members’ perception of their reliance on the other AC members when
assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = no
reliance and 100 = total reliance;
AC members’ perception of their reliance on the other independent
directors not on the AC when assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point
scale anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total reliance;
AC members with personal ties to other audit committee members = 1 if
yes, 0 if no;
AC members with professional ties to other AC members = 1 if yes, 0 if
no;
AC members with personal ties to other independent directors not on the
AC = 1 if yes, 0 if no;
AC members with professional ties to other independent directors not on
the AC = 1 if yes, 0 if no.

(PSCEO/PTCEO), CFO (PSCFO/PTCFO), AC (PSOAC/PTOAC), and other
independent directors (PSOID/PTOID) (measured as 1 = yes, 0 = no), and AC members’
reliance on the CEO (RELCEO), CFO (RELCFO), other AC members (RELOAC), and
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other independent directors (RELOID). The model was not significant, F = 1.04, p =
0.409.11
In Table 5, Panel C (shown below), I further expand the model and include
internal and external auditors. Participants reported no personal ties to the head of
internal audit or the external audit partner; therefore, I only include the reported
professional ties. In this model, I examined the association between the existence of
personal and professional relationship ties with the CEO (PSCEO/PTCEO), CFO
(PSCFO/PTCFO), AC (PSOAC/PTOAC), other independent directors (PSOID/PTOID),
and the professional ties to the head of internal audit (PTIA) and the external audit
partner (PTEAP) (measured as 1 = yes, 0 = no), and AC members’ reliance on the CEO
(RELCEO), CFO (RELCFO), other AC members (RELOAC), other independent
directors (RELOID), head of internal audit (RELIA), and external audit partner
(RELEAP). The model was not significant, F = 1.01, p = 0.467.

11

Given the insignificance of the models in Table 5, I did not pursue adding control variables to these
models.
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Table 5 – Panel C
Results of MANOVA
DVs = RELIANCE ON MANAGEMENT, AUDIT
COMMITTEE, OTHER INDEPENDENT BOARD
DIRECORS, HEAD OF INTERNAL AUDIT AND
EXTERNAL AUDIT PARTNER
(RELCEO, RELCFO, RELOAC, RELOID, RELIA, RELEAP)
n = 119
F-statistic
p-value
MODEL
1.01
0.467
PSCEO
0.98
0.443
PTCEO
0.51
0.810
PSCFO
1.78
0.111
PTCFO
1.10
0.370
PSOAC
0.28
0.945
PTOAC
2.04
0.067
PSOID
0.71
0.643
PTOID
1.01
0.424
PTIA*
2.78
0.015
PTEAP*
1.01
0.420
Variable Definitions:
RELIA =

RELEAP =

PTIA =
PTEAP =

AC members’ perception of their reliance on the head of internal
audit when assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale
anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total reliance;
AC members’ perception of their reliance on the external audit
partner when assessing fraud risk measured on a 101 point scale
anchored 0 = no reliance and 100 = total reliance;
AC members with professional ties to other the head of internal
audit = 1 if yes, 0 if no;
AC members with professional ties to the external audit partner = 1
if yes, 0 if no.

* Participants reported professional, but no personal ties to the head of internal audit and
the external audit partner.

Overall, the results of the MANOVAs indicated no significant relations between
social ties between AC members and the CEO/CFO and other corporate governance
actors and AC members’ reliance on others or themselves to assess FFR risk. These
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results, as well as those of the regression models, differ from the results of the previous
archival studies; however, the scope of this study and that of the archival studies
significantly differ. This study focuses on a specific AC process and relationships among
multiple corporate actors, whereas the previous archival studies (e.g., Bruynseels &
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al. 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a; Dey & Liu, 2011;
Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan et al., 2011)
focus on more tangible accounting outcomes (e.g., earnings management, management
compensation, turnover-performance sensitivity) and management-director relationship
ties. Questions about “AC reliance” are less specific and tangible than established
measures of accounting outcomes. Thus, there are issues of comparability. In addition,
this study uses the survey approach, which is dependent on generating sufficient
responses to establish significant relationships among the variables of interest. The
archival approach offers the advantage of ease of access to publicly available data for a
large number of companies that can be used to establish relationship ties and to measure
established corporate governance variables. As such, the previous archival studies may
have been better able to establish significant relationship ties. On the other hand, this
study is limited by the number of self-reported relationship ties and the more general, less
tangible measures of “AC reliance”. As such, I included additional analysis that focused
more on more specific AC actions to assess FFR risk and management integrity.
Specifically, I performed additional analyses including examining associations between
measures of relationship ties and tangible AC actions to assess FFR risk and
management’s integrity, providing an alternative analysis of the issues in H3a, H3b, and
H3c.
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Alternative Testing of H3a, H3b, and H3c
In Table 6, I provide another analysis of the issues in H3a, H3b, and H3c
regarding AC members’ personal and professional relationships and specific actions the
AC takes to assess FFR risk and management’s integrity. I ran regression models for the
dependent variable of AC reliance on its own actions12 and examined the influence of a
variety of potential demographic/governance control variables, finding three notable
variables: percentage of independent board members (BODPCTIND), the natural log of
audit committee size (LOGACSIZE), and gender (GENDER).13 I examined models that
included or excluded professional ties to the internal and external auditors to assess if the
presence, or lack thereof, of these ties impacts any of the associations between
relationship ties and the corporate governance variables, and AC actions to assess FFR
risk and management’s integrity.
In Table 6, Panel A (shown below), I examine the relationship between the AC’s
own actions to assess FFR risk (SUMMACATIONS) and the existence of personal and
professional ties to the CEO/CFO, and the other corporate governance actors, excluding
the internal and external auditors, controlling for board independence, the natural log of
AC size, and gender. Specifically, I use the following model:
SUMACACTIONS =

.
12

AC reliance on its own efforts to assess fraud risk includes two separate summated measures: AC actions
to assess fraud risk (SUMACACTIONS) and AC actions to assess management’s integrity
(SUMMIACTIONS).
13

The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity in each of the
regression models). As such, I used robust standard errors for each model.
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Table 6- Panel A
Regression Results
DV = AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS FRAUD RISK
(SUMACACTIONS)**
EXCLUDING AUDITORS
n = 132
Variable14
Predicted Sign
Coeff.
t-stat
P-value
Intercept
?
311.01
6.61
0.000*
PSCEO
- (H3a)
-91.56
-2.98
0.002*
PTCEO
- (H3b)
20.04
1.04
0.302
PSCFO
- (H3a)
41.45
1.20
0.232
PTCFO
- (H3b)
8.30
0.26
0.797
PSOAC
+/- (H3c)
-6.03
-0.21
0.836
PTOAC
+/- (H3c)
-18.47
-0.96
0.339
PSOID
+/- (H3c)
-46.51
-1.44
0.153
PTOID
+/- (H3c)
44.12
2.57
0.011*
BODPCTIND
?
92.07
1.63
0.106
LOGACSIZE
?
123.24
2.26
0.026*
GENDER
?
-14.46
-0.72
0.475

Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise.
R2
F-statistic

20.52%
2.39
p = 0.010

* Significant p-values.
Variable Definitions:
SUMACACTIONS =

calculated variable = ACAANALYZE+ACACHAR+
ACAINTER+ACAWHISTLE+ACASEARCH+
ACAEXPENSE measuring the sum of specific audit
committee actions performed to assess fraud risk with each
item measured on a 101 point scale anchored 0 = not at all
and 100 = a great deal (possible total score range 0-600);

Variable Definitions:
BODPCTIND =
LOGACSIZE =

14

percentage of independent directors on the board of
directors;
natural logarithm of number of members on the audit
committee;

The VIF scores for all the variables are 1.77 or below, mean VIF = 1.34, indicating multicollinearity is
not an issue.
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Variable Definitions (Continued):
GENDER =

1 if male, 0 if female.

** See questionnaire in APPENDIX B for descriptions of each AC action to assess fraud
risk.

The model is significant (F = 2.39, p = 0.010), and the R2 is 20.5 percent. The coefficient
of PSCEO (p = 0.002) is significant and negative, and the coefficients of PTOID (p =
0.011) and LOGACSIZE (p = 0.026) are significant and positive. Thus, the existence of a
personal tie between the AC member and the CEO, reduces the AC’s tendency to engage
in activities to assess FFR risk. On the other hand, the existence of an AC member’s
professional tie to other independent directors, and the larger the size of the AC, the more
likely the AC is to engage in AC activities to assess FFR risk. The findings for the
relationship ties (e.g., PSCEO and PTOID) are consistent with the literature which has
found that personal ties are corrosive to good corporate governance (e.g., Bruynseels &
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2011;
Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012), but professional ties are not (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels,
2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012). The finding that larger ACs are associated with greater
AC actions to assess fraud risk supports the argument that a larger AC may bring
additional director expertise and knowledge to the board (Krishnan et al., 2011; Sharma
& Iselin, 2012) and also indicates an absence of AC members “freeriding” (e.g., Krisnhan
et al., 2011).
In Table 6, Panel B (shown below), I examine the relationship between the AC’s
own actions to assess management’s integrity (SUMMIACTIONS) and the existence of
personal and professional ties to the CEO/CFO, and the other corporate governance
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Table 6- Panel B
Regression Results
DV = AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS MANAGEMENT’S INTEGRITY
(SUMMIACTIONS)**
EXCLUDING AUDITORS
n = 133
Variable15
Predicted Sign
Coeff.
t-stat
P-value
Intercept
?
324.55
8.26
0.000*
PSCEO
- (H3a)
-37.50
-2.09
0.020*
PTCEO
- (H3b)
-23.64
-1.36
0.088*
PSCFO
- (H3a)
36.96
2.53
0.013*
PTCFO
- (H3b)
-2.67
-0.17
0.433
PSOAC
+/- (H3c)
-22.13
-1.06
0.290
PTOAC
+/- (H3c)
5.61
0.34
0.734
PSOID
+/- (H3c)
-43.55
-1.67
0.098*
PTOID
+/- (H3c)
24.74
2.13
0.035*
BODPCTIND
?
122.47
2.74
0.007*
LOGACSIZE
?
33.68
0.83
0.410
GENDER
?
-29.12
-2.51
0.013*

Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise.
R2
F-statistic

24.29%
3.28
p < 0.001

* Significant p-values.
Variable Definition:
SUMMIACTIONS =

calculated variable = MIBODY+MIOPEN+MIPRESS+
MIDEFEN+MIWHISTLE measuring the sum of specific
AC actions performed to assess management’s integrity
with each item measured on a 101 point scale anchored
0 = not at all and 100 = a great deal (possible total score
range 0-500).

** See questionnaire in APPENDIX for descriptions of each AC action to
monitor management’s integrity.

15

The VIF scores for all the variables are 1.77 or below, mean VIF = 1.34, indicating multicollinearity is
not an issue.
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actors, excluding the internal and external auditors, controlling for board independence,
the natural log of audit committee size and gender. Specifically, I use the following
model:

SUMMIACTIONS =

.

The model is significant (F = 3.28, p < 0.001), and the

is 24.3 percent. The

coefficients of PSCEO (p = 0.020) and GENDER (p = 0.013) are significant and
negative, and the coefficients of PTCEO (p = 0.088) and PSOID (p = 0.098) are
marginally significant and negative. The coefficients of PSCFO (p = 0.013), PTOID (p =
0.035), and BODPCTIND (p = 0.007) are significant and positive. Thus, the existence of
AC member personal and professional ties to the CEO, and personal ties to other
independent directors, is associated with the AC being less likely to engage in activities
to assess management’s integrity. However, the existence of AC members’ personal ties
to the CFO and professional ties to other independent directors, female AC members, and
AC members serving on boards with a higher percentage of independent directors are
associated with the AC being more likely to take actions to assess management’s
integrity.
These findings provide significant, new insights into the academic literature
examining relationship ties. First, studies of relationship ties have primarily focused on
director-CEO ties. I find only one study (e.g., Krishnan et al., 2011) that includes
relationship ties to the CFO in the analysis. Krishnan et al. (2011) found that personal ties
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to both the CEO and CFO were corrosive to corporate oversight and associated with
earnings management. The findings of the current study suggest that both AC personal
and professional ties to the CEO are corrosive to AC oversight, and that the existence of
AC personal ties to the CFO actually improve AC oversight. AC members with
relationship ties to the CEO may ultimately feel beholden to the CEO for their
appointment to the board (e.g., Ramamoorti, 2008; Westphal, 1999). Further, AC
members may be influenced by high CEO power, which can decrease AC effectiveness
(e.g., Lisic et al., 2012). Additional analysis revealed no association between the proxy
variables for CEO power and AC actions to assess fraud or management’s integrity.16 As
such, the most plausible explanation for corrosive personal and professional AC ties to
the CEO may be that AC members reciprocate to the CEO for appointment to the board
of directors, regardless of relationship type.
Second, the finding that AC members’ with personal ties to the CFO are
associated with greater AC oversight runs counter to the findings of previous studies that
have differentiated between personal and professional ties (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels,
2012, Chidambaran et al., 2012). These studies have found a negative association
between personal ties and corporate governance quality, whereas my finding for ties to
the CFO is in the opposite direction. This finding suggests that there are factors that
influence AC members with personal ties to the CFO take more of an agency approach to
AC oversight. A deeper examination of the association between the existence of AC
personal ties to the CFO and components of AC actions to assess fraud and
16

I examined whether proxies for CEO power (e.g., the CEO is also the chairman of the board, the CEO is
also the founder of the AC firm, and the participant’s board tenure is shorter than the CEO tenure) (e.g.,
Lisic et al., 2012) are significant in the models shown in Panels A and B of Table 6. None of these
variables are significant (p > 0.25).
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management’s integrity (Table 6, Panels E-F) reveals that AC members with personal ties
to the CFO take a non-confrontational approach to fraud oversight by primarily
monitoring the whistleblower hotline. The academic literature has documented that AC
members may carry out their duties in a non-confrontational manner, or act as a
facilitator between management and auditors, in order to maintain harmony on the board
(Hunton & Rose, 2008). By actively monitoring the whistleblower hotline and allowing
others to bring forth controversial information, AC members with personal ties to the
CFO can possibly avoid risking their own personal or professional capital, or that of the
CFO, with whom they are associated (e.g., Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Janis, 1982; Jensen,
2006; Johnson, et al., 2011).
Third, AC personal and professional ties to other independent directors have not
been included in the recent studies of relationship ties which have differentiated between
personal and professional ties (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al.,
2012). The finding of this study that the existence of personal ties between AC members
and other independent directors, but not professional ties, are corrosive to AC oversight is
consistent with the previous literature and extends the literature to include AC-board
relationship ties. This finding may also indicate that AC members build social capital
through their personal ties which allows them to gain more influence (e.g., Stevenson &
Radin, 2009). Thus, these AC members may engage in fewer AC actions to assess
management’s integrity by enlisting the support or assistance of the other independent
directors with whom they are personally connected. On the other hand, AC members with
professional networks within the board are less likely to have bonds that are as deep as
those formed through personal connections (e.g., Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012;
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Chidambaran et al. (2012). As such, these AC members may be less able to enlist other
directors to assist with the task of FFR oversight, or may choose not to do so, because of
the AC members’ concern for their personal or professional reputation (e.g., Westphal,
1999; Jensen, 2006) or to avoid jeopardizing their board seats. This explanation would be
supported by the finding in this study that AC members rely least on other independent
directors to assess fraud risk (Table 2, Panel A). A deeper examination into the factors
that drive AC members with personal and professional ties to act as they do may provide
greater insight into the social capital/ human capital dynamic between board members.
Fourth, the finding that more independent boards are associated with greater AC
actions to assess management’s integrity is consistent with previous literature linking AC
independence to a lower likelihood of FFR (Beasley, 1996) and earnings manipulation
(Dechow, 1996). However, previous studies of relationship ties argue that formally
independent directors are not actually independent-minded and are ultimately beholden to
management (e.g., Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hwang and Kim, 2009,
2012; Krishnan et al., 2011). The results of this study indicate that formal (regulatory)
independence is associated with greater AC actions to assess management’s integrity, but
likewise, the study also finds that AC members with personal ties to the CEO are less
likely to engage in actions to assess management’s integrity.
Finally, the finding that female AC members are more likely to report engaging in
AC actions to assess management’s integrity is a potentially important finding in the
study of AC oversight. This finding suggests that the inclusion of additional, qualified
females on ACs may lead to better corporate governance. This sentiment is echoed by
findings in a recent literature review (Man & Wong, 2013) that female directors are
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“more likely to be risk averse to frauds and opportunistic earning management” (p. 409).
This issue of the gender composition of the AC should be of interest to other researchers,
and those concerned with the quality of corporate governance.
In Table 6, Panel C (shown below), I examine the relationship between the AC’s
own actions to assess FFR risk (SUMACACTIONS) and the existence of personal and
professional ties to the CEO/CFO and the other corporate governance actors, including
the internal and external auditors, controlling for board independence, the natural log of
AC size and gender. Specifically, I use the following model:
SUMACACTIONS =

.
The model is significant (F = 5.82, p< 0.001), and the

is 17.7 percent. The coefficient

of PSCEO (p = 0.038) remains significant and negative, and the coefficient of PTOID (p
= 0.088) remains marginally significant and positive. The coefficient of PTIA (p = 0.023)
emerges as significant and positive, but LOGACSIZE (p = 0.158) is no longer
significant. The emergence of professional ties to the head of internal audit as a
significant relationship suggests these ties may possibly be associated with coalition
building by the AC (e.g., Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Stevenson & Radin, 2009).
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Table 6- Panel C
Regression Results
DV = AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS FRAUD RISK
(SUMACACTIONS)
INCLUDING AUDITORS
n = 118
Variable17
Predicted Sign
Coeff.
t-stat
P-value
Intercept
?
346.18
6.48
0.000*
PSCEO
- (H3a)
-66.62
-1.80
0.038*
PTCEO
- (H3b)
6.90
0.31
0.753
PSCFO
- (H3a)
28.80
0.85
0.399
PTCFO
- (H3b)
-9.62
-0.27
0.394
PSOAC
+/- (H3c)
-13.88
-0.42
0.673
PTOAC
+/- (H3c)
-23.11
-1.05
0.295
PSOID
+/- (H3c)
-46.66
-1.37
0.173
PTOID
+/- (H3c)
32.78
1.72
0.088*
PTIA
+/- (H3c)
89.98
2.31
0.023*
PTEAP
+/- (H3c)
17.97
0.77
0.442
BODPCTIND
?
82.70
1.28
0.205
LOGACSIZE
?
82.56
1.42
0.158
GENDER
?
-7.52
-0.38
0.702

Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise.
R2

17.67%

F-statistic

5.82
p < 0.001

* Significant p-values.
In Table 6, Panel D (shown below), I examine the relationship between the AC’s
own actions to assess management’s integrity (SUMMIACTIONS) and the existence of
personal and professional ties to the CEO/CFO and the other corporate governance
actors, including the internal and external auditors, and controlling for board
independence, the natural log of AC size and gender. Specifically, I use the following
model:

17

The VIF scores for all the variables are 1.87 or below, mean VIF = 1.43, indicating multicollinearity is
not an issue.

127
Table 6- Panel D
Regression Results
DV = AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS MANAGEMENT’S INTEGRITY
(SUMMIACTIONS)
INCLUDING AUDITORS
n = 119
Variable18
Predicted Sign
Coeff.
t-stat
P-value
Intercept
?
315.41
6.75
0.000*
PSCEO
- (H3a)
-28.14
-1.16
0.126
PTCEO
- (H3b)
-26.42
-1.37
0.087*
PSCFO
- (H3a)
39.23
2.19
0.031*
PTCFO
- (H3b)
-6.66
-0.40
0.343
PSOAC
+/- (H3c)
-32.02
-1.32
0.189
PTOAC
+/- (H3c)
15.56
0.90
0.371
PSOID
+/- (H3c)
-40.73
-1.56
0.121
PTOID
+/- (H3c)
17.11
1.33
0.186
PTIA
+/- (H3c)
8.49
0.25
0.806
PTEAP
+/- (H3c)
-54.09
-3.33
0.001*
BODPCTIND
?
143.75
2.75
0.007*
LOGACSIZE
?
21.63
0.51
0.613
GENDER
?
-28.67
-2.33
0.022*

Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise.
R2

28.35%

F-statistic

3.21
p < 0.001

* Significant p-values.

SUMMIACTIONS =

.

18

The VIF scores for all the variables are 1.87 or below, mean VIF=1.43, indicating multicollinearity is not
an issue.
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The model is significant (F = 3.21, p < 0.001), and the

is 28.4 percent. The

coefficients of PSCEO (p = 0.126), PSOID (p = 0.121) and PTOID (p = 0.186) are no
longer significant, but PTCEO (p = 0.087) remains marginally significant and GENDER
(p = 0.022) remains significant and negative. The coefficient of PTEAP (p = 0.001)
emerges as significant and negative, and the coefficients of PSCFO (p = 0.031), and
BODPCTIND (p = 0.007) remain significant and positive. These findings, as well as the
emergence of a negative association between the existence of professional ties to the
external audit partner, suggest that the AC defers to the external audit partner to assess
management’s integrity. Plausible explanations for this phenomenon may be that AC
members perceive that the external audit partner is more capable of assessing
management’s integrity, consistent with the concept of inter-rater reliability (e.g., Arnold
& Sutton, 1997). In addition, AC members perceive that the external audit partner would
normally perform this task as part of the external audit, which is consistent with AC
members views that the audit partner has a fiduciary responsibility to carry out this task
(see Table 3, Panel A). However, female AC members, AC members with personal ties to
the CFO, and AC members with a higher percentage of independent directors on the
board, appear to be committed to the task of AC actions to assess management’s integrity
regardless of the presence of professional ties to the external audit partner or the head of
internal audit.
Specific AC Actions
In Table 6, Panel E (shown below), I include a summary of additional
associations found between test and control variables and individual measures of AC
actions to assess fraud risk (components of SUMACACTIONS). These findings provide
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Table 6- Panel E
Regression Results
DV = SPECIFIC AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS FRAUD RISK
(COMPONENTS OF SUMACACTIONS)
EXCLUDING AUDITORS
n = 132
Variable**
ACAANALYZE:
PSCEO
PTOID
ACACHAR:
GENDER
ACAWHISTLE:
PSCEO
PSCFO
PTOAC
PTOID
LOGACSIZE
ACASEARCH:
PTCEO
PSCEO
LOGACSIZE
GENDER

Predicted Sign

Coeff.

t-stat

P-value

- (H3a)
+/- (H3c)

-20.02
12.44

-2.81
2.55

0.003*
0.012*

?

-5.36

-3.09

0.002*

- (H3a)
- (H3a)
+/- (H3c)
+/- (H3c)
?

-20.87
22.62
-12.33
13.36
37.70

-2.05
3.20
-2.11
3.69
2.18

0.021*
0.002*
0.037*
0.000*
0.031*

- (H3b)
- (H3a)
?
?

7.88
-23.77
50.08
-9.84

1.70
-2.93
3.14
-2.01

0.093*
0.002*
0.002*
0.046*

Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise.
* Significant p-values.
** All regression models presented in this table were significant at p < 0.05.

a more micro view of which test or control variable(s) is (are) driving specific AC actions
to assess fraud risk. The results indicate several interesting patterns.
First, I find that overall, AC members with personal ties to the CEO (PSCEO has
a negative and significant coefficient) are less likely to engage in actions that are directly
associated with detecting FFR (e.g., closely analyzing reserves, actively promoting the
company’s whistleblower hotline, and actively searching for fraud risk). This finding
suggests that these AC members may serve in a largely ceremonial roles, consistent with
institutional theory (e.g., Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2007b), or may serve as
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passive directors, who are reliant on information from the CEO, consistent with
managerial hegemony theory (e.g., Cohen et al., 2007b).
Second, I find that female AC members are more likely to report assessing fraud
risk through two specific avenues: assessing the character of management (GENDER,
coefficient = -5.36, p = 0.002) and actively searching for fraud risks (GENDER,
coefficient = -9.84, p = 0.046). This is an important finding as CEOs and CFOs are more
likely to be associated with incidences of FFR (Beasley et al., 1999, 2010). From a
theoretical perspective, female AC members may be more capable of subjectively
assessing management’s character than male AC members, because female AC members
may be less likely to be of the same gender as management, given the small percentage of
females on ACs, and the assumption that the CEO and/or the CFO is (are) more likely to
be male(s). This explanation would be consistent with the premise of homophily
(McPherson et al., 2001), by suggesting that a lack of homophily, or similarities between
female AC members and management, is associated with greater arms-length monitoring.
This explanation would also be consistent with the underlying theoretical framework of
previous archival and experimental studies of relationship ties (e.g., Bruynseels &
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a; Dey & Liu, 2011;
Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang and Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan et al.,
2011). I did not specifically ask respondents to indicate the gender of the CEO or CFO,
but future research could include these variables.
Third, I find that AC members with personal ties to the CFO (PSCFO, coefficient
= 22.62, p = 0.002) take an arguably unique approach to assessing fraud risk by primarily
monitoring the whistleblower hotline, but not engaging significantly in other AC actions
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to assess FFR risk. This strategy may allow these AC members to avoid losing personal
and professional capital by avoiding confrontation that could impair their status (Bédard
& Gendron, 2010; Janis, 1982; Jensen, 2006; Johnson, et al., 2011) or lead to potentially
being marginalized or ostracized by either management or other board members
(Westphal & Khanna, 2003). By primarily promoting the whistleblower hotline, AC
members with personal ties to the CFO may not only adhere to communal norms of the
board (e.g., Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), but also may protect their own personal status, as
well as that of the CFO, with whom they are associated. In addition, these AC members
may actually enhance fraud oversight as whistleblowers often are likely to discover
fraudulent activity (Dyck, et al., 2010). Whether AC members with personal ties to the
CFO are more motivated to promote the whistleblower hotline because of adherence to
board communal norms, concerns about personal status, or because of other motivations
is a question that should be of interest to researchers.
Finally, among the other significant variables presented , I find that although the
existence of AC professional ties to the CEO (PTCEO) are not significantly associated
with overall AC actions to assess fraud risk (p > 0.05), there is a marginally positive
association (coefficient = 7.88, p = 0.093) between these ties and the AC actively
searching for fraud risk. This association may suggest that these AC members are
concerned, to an extent, about their reputational capital, and are not entirely passive.
Likewise, AC members with professional ties to other independent directors (PTOID)
may have similar reputational concerns, but these directors engage in more specific
actions to assess FFR risk by either analyzing reserves and financial statements
(coefficient = 12.44, p = 0.012) or monitoring the whistleblower hotline (coefficient =
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13.36, p = 0.000). On the other hand, AC members with professional ties to other audit
committee members (PTOAC) do not act in a similar manner, and actually are less likely
to engage in specific AC actions to monitor the whistleblower hotline (coefficient = 12.33, p = 0.037). This finding may suggest that these AC members defer to others on the
AC who they believe are more capable of carrying out this task. Finally, larger ACs are
positively associated with specific AC actions to monitor the whistleblower hotline
(LOGACSIZE, coefficient = 37.70, p = 0.031) and to actively search for fraud risk
(LOGACSIZE, coefficient = 50.08, p = 0.002). Larger ACs may bring additional director
expertise and knowledge to the board (e.g., Krishnan et al., 2011; Sharma & Iselin,
2012). As such, these ACs may be more capable of carrying out these tasks than smaller
ACs.
In Table 6, Panel F (shown below), I include a summary of additional associations
found between test and control variables and individual measures of AC actions to assess
management’s integrity (components of SUMMIACTIONS). These findings provide a
more micro view of which test or control variable(s) is (are) driving specific AC actions
to assess management’s integrity. These results also indicate several interesting patterns.
First, the corrosive influence of AC personal or professional ties to the CEO is
fairly pervasive across the AC actions to assess management’s integrity (PSCEO or
PTCEO is negative and significant). AC members with these ties are less likely to assess
management’s body language (coefficient = -6.88, p = 0.075), less likely to observe
management’s openness/transparency (coefficient = -3.68, p = 0.092), and less likely to
monitor the whistleblower hotline (coefficient = -26.56, p = 0.005). Thus, these AC
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Table 6- Panel F
Regression Results
DV = SPECIFIC AUDIT COMMITTEE ACTIONS TO ASSESS MANAGEMENT’S
INTEGRITY
(COMPONENTS OF SUMMIACTIONS)
EXCLUDING AUDITORS
n = 133
Variable**
MIBODY:
PTCEO
PSOAC
BODPCTIND
GENDER
MIOPEN:
PTCEO
BODPCTIND
GENDER
MIPRESS:
PSOID
GENDER
MIDEFEN:
PSCFO
GENDER
MIWHISTLE:
PSCEO
PSCFO
PTOID
BODPCTIND

Predicted Sign

Coeff.

t-stat

P-value

- (H3b)
+/- (H3c)
?
?

-6.88
-10.79
44.23
-13.80

-1.45
-1.89
2.87
-3.80

0.075*
0.061*
0.005*
0.000*

- (H3b)
?
?

-3.68
15.45
-5.25

-1.34
2.22
-3.01

0.092*
0.028*
0.003*

+/- (H3c)
?

-8.53
-5.72

-1.68
-2.80

0.095*
0.006*

- (H3a)
?

10.78
-8.21

2.18
-2.97

0.031*
0.004*

- (H3a)
- (H3a)
+/- (H3c)
?

-26.56
22.24
14.25
41.83

-2.66
2.22
3.54
2.15

0.005*
0.028*
0.001*
0.033*

Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise.
* Significant p-values.
** All regression models presented in this table were significant at p < 0.05.

members are less inclined to assess management’s integrity. As such, these AC members’
role in carrying out this taks maybe be largely ceremonial.
Second, the association between gender (GENDER) and specific AC actions to
assess management’s integrity is significant and negative across nearly all AC actions
with the exception of monitoring the whistleblower hotline. This finding suggests that
female AC members take their responsibilities seriously and are very thorough in their
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efforts. Female AC members may be driven by a sense of fiduciary responsibility, or are
more risk averse to fraud and other opportunistic behavior (Man & Wong, 2013, p. 409).
A deeper examination of how female AC members approach their AC oversight duties
could potentially provide a deeper understanding of AC processes.
Third, AC members with personal ties to the CFO (PSCFO) take much the same
approach to assessing management’s integrity as they do toward assessing FFR risk by
primarily focusing on maintaining the whistleblower hotline (coeffcient = 22.24, p =
0.028). These AC members also assess whether management is defensive (coefficient =
10.78, p = 0.031), but this AC action is an observation that may not be perceived by
management as a challenge. Whether these AC members act quietly in order to maintain
their own status on the board, or to protect the CFO with whom they are associated,
might be a topic of interest to future researchers.
Fourth, I find that greater board independence (BODPCTIND) is positive and
significantly (p < 0.05) associated with AC members observing management’s body
language and openness/transparency, and monitoring the whistleblower hotline. These
findings suggest that more independent boards not only observe management, but
actively assess management’s integrity via the whistleblower hotline. Previous studies of
relationship ties (e.g., Hwang and Kim, 2009, 2012) suggest that CEOs appoint their
friends to the board of directors to circumvent SOX independence rules. The finding here
suggests that board independence is still an important indicator of AC fraud oversight
even if corrosive personal and professional ties between AC members and CEO are
present.
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Finally, I find that AC members with personal ties to other AC members
(PSOAC) are less likely to assess management’s body language (coefficient = -10.79, p =
0.061); AC members with personal ties to other independent directors (PSOID) are less
likely to observe how management reacts in pressure situations (coefficient =
-8.53, p = 0.095); and AC members with professional ties to other independent directors
(PTOID) are more likely to monitor the whistleblower hotline (coefficient = 14.25, p =
0.001). These findings are consistent with the significant relationships presented in Table
6, Panel B and Panel D, with the exception of personal ties to other AC members
(PSOAC). PSOAC was not signicantly associated with AC actions to assess
management’s integrity and the finding that this variable is only associated with
observing management’s body language suggests that the implications of the finding may
be limited.
Overall, the differences between the findings presented in the alternative analyses
of hypotheses H3a, H3b, and H3c and those found in previous archival studies may be
attibuted to the difficulty of the task of assessing FFR risk. AC fraud oversight is a
difficult task, and one that many AC members appear to struggle with (Beasley et al.
2009). As such, AC members may rely on certain relationship ties to gain additional
expertise and knowledge to carry out this task. AC members may not have to rely on
these same relationship ties to carry out less demanding oversight tasks. Thus, certain
relationship ties may be significant for fraud oversight, but not for other tasks associated
with accounting outcomes.
This view is supported by the previous academic literature that posits that
directors’ concern for their status is driven by their sense of accountability (Jensen,
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2006). Thus, AC members may develop different strategies for assessing FFR risk
depending on AC members’ perceptions of the strength of their own abilities (selfinsight) and the abilities of other corporate governance actors (inter-rater reliability) in
order to perceive that they are accountable, and to maintain their status on the board.
Such concerns are likely warranted. The CAQ (2013) documented that other corporate
governance actors have expectations that AC members will have sufficient financial
literacy, expertise, and knowledge of industry and business processes and be capable of
asking probing questions of management. As such, AC members may be cognizant of
these expectations and thus utilize their relationship ties in a manner that is unique in the
AC fraud oversight setting.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, I use survey data to examine the association between AC members’
personal and professional ties and (a) AC members’ reliance on the CEO/CFO to assess
fraud risk, and (b) AC members’ reliance on their own efforts to assess fraud risk. The
results from a sample of 136 AC members from mid-sized U.S. public companies
indicate no association between AC members’ personal or professional relationship ties
to management or other corporate governance actors, and AC members’ reliance on these
actors to assess fraud risk. However, I do find links between the AC’s own actions to
assess fraud risk and (a) personal ties to the CEO/CFO and professional ties to other
corporate governance actors, and (b) certain control variables including board of director
independence, AC size, and respondent gender. The overall findings both confirm and
challenge the findings of recent archival studies that have considered different forms of
relationship ties (e.g. Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2012; Chidbambaran et al., 2012; Cohen
et al., 2012a).
Specifically, I find that AC members with personal ties to the CEO and other
independent directors, and professional ties to the CEO and the external audit partner, are
less likely to engage in actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. On the
other hand, I find that AC members with personal ties to the CFO and professional ties to
other independent directors and the head of internal audit, are more likely to engage in
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AC actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. Further, I find that female
AC members are more likely to report and engage in activities to assess management’s
integrity. I also find that AC size and board independence are positively associated with
AC actions to assess FFR risk and/or management’s integrity. In addition, the results
provide insights about how AC members delegate their fraud oversight duties, and reveal
that AC members generally perceive that management, and internal and external auditors,
are more responsible for assessing fraud risk than the AC, or other independent directors.
The study’s findings have important implications for researchers, practitioners,
and policymakers. From a research perspective, first, this study supports and extends
previous research by Beasley et al. (2009) by confirming that AC members often lack
consensus about how to assess fraud risk and showing how relationship ties and
governance variables are associated with variations in specific AC actions to assess fraud
risk.
Second, this study both supports and challenges previous findings in the emerging
line of research that considers the different forms of relationship ties (e.g. Bruynseels &
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidbambaran et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2012a). The findings confirm
that most AC personal ties have a corrosive influence on AC actions, but suggest that
professional ties can be corrosive, as well. In addition, the study finds that certain
personal ties can actually enhance AC oversight. These findings suggest that some AC
members with personal or professional ties to the CEO may serve in largely ceremonial
roles, or serve as passive directors obtaining their information through management,
consistent with institutional and managerial hegemony theory. These AC members may
reciprocate to the CEO for their appointment to the board or be motivated by other
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reasons. As such, these AC members may perceive that they are primarily accountable to
the CEO, and thus, they are less inclined to be both monitors of, and advice givers to,
management, which is not consistent with the concept of a “collaborative board” (e.g.,
Westphal, 1999). On the other hand, AC members with personal ties to the CFO may
enhance AC oversight which supports Westphal’s (1999, p. 7) finding that “a lack of
social independence can increase board involvement and firm performance”. However,
the finding does not support a previous research finding that director-CFO ties are
negatively associated with earnings management (e.g., Krishnan et al., 2011). But,
fraudulent financial reporting represents an extreme case of earnings management (e.g.,
Kalbers, 2009). As such, the two studies may not be fully comparable. Thus, further
research differentiating CEO and CFO personal and professional ties, and AC actions, or
corporate governance outcomes, may be warranted. In addition, future research focusing
on the motivations of AC members with personal ties to the CFO might provide
additional insight about how these AC members carry out their duties.
Third, the results provide an important finding that female AC members are more
likely to engage in actions to assess management’s integrity. This finding is consistent
with a line of research finding that female directors are more risk averse to fraud and
opportunistic earnings management (Man & Wong, 2013). As such, further research
more deeply examining how female AC members approach fraud oversight might
provide additional insights about the finding of this study.
From a practitioner perspective, the study has several important ramifications.
First, this study confirms the findings of several other studies (e.g., Bruynseels &
Cardinaels, 2012; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Dey & Liu, 2011; Fracassi & Tate, 2011;

140
Hwang & Kim, 2009, 2012; Krishnan et al., 2011) that personal relationship ties to the
CEO are associated with weaker corporate governance, but also suggests that
professional ties can be corrosive as well. Thus, public corporations should consider
asking nominees for board service to disclose any personal or professional relationship
ties to management that go beyond the formal board independence (SOX) requirements.
Second, this finding underscores the importance of minimizing CEO influence over the
board nominating process (e.g., Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) as there is continuing evidence
that CEOs influence this process (e.g., Clune et al., 2013). Third, public corporations may
want to more actively identify qualified females for AC service to bring a different and
potentially more skeptical perspective to the AC, and the board as a whole. Finally, the
results of this study suggest that AC members have widely varying views of fraud risk
responsibility and reasons for relying on other corporate governance actors. This also
holds true for other corporate governance actors (e.g., CAQ, 2013). These findings
underscore the need to encourage open communications among the actors in the
corporate governance mosaic and to clearly define each corporate actor’s role in
assessing fraud risk.
From a policy viewpoint, regulators should take some comfort knowing that board
independence is positively associated with FFR risk oversight. However, as research in
this area advances, regulators may wish to consider requiring directors to disclose
personal and professional ties, or the lack thereof. Such disclosures would not be
cumbersome to implement and would provide additional transparency not only to
external investors, but other corporate governance actors, as well.
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This study, like all studies, is subject to limitations. First, there was some “noise”
in the measurements of personal and professional ties, but I collected written descriptions
of the ties so as to fully understand each tie. A few respondents (n = 6) misinterpreted
survey definitions of personal and professional ties and recorded their responses in the
wrong place in the survey. As such, I analyzed their textual descriptions of the ties to
recode their responses to reflect the correct type of relationship tie.19 Some judgement
was required, but the descriptions in all the responses were very clear, and overall, this
was not a pervasive issue within the data. Second, fewer AC members than expected
reported personal or professional ties to management or other corporate governance
actors. Other recent qualitative corporate governance studies have documented that many
AC members (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009) and board directors (e.g., Clune et al., 2013) had
existing personal or professional ties to management or other board directors before
joining the board, and prior ties are a strong indicator of current ties (Stevenson & Radin,
2009). I expected such ties to carry over to current AC service. Participants may have
been reluctant to divulge what they might consider to be sensitive information, or they
may have perceived that documenting each relationship tie would be too time consuming.
Third, the results may not be generalizable to all industries. Previous research (e.g.,
Beasley et al., 1999, 2000, 2010) indicated that certain industries are more prone to
incidences of FFR. As such, AC composition may be associated with agency concerns on
the part of external stakeholders and thus, influence the types of relationship ties between
the AC and management. The industry distribution of the respondents’ AC firms (Table
19

For each model presented in Table 6, Panels A-D, I performed additional statistical analysis by (a)
adding a “recoded response” variable to the model (= 1 if the response was recoded, else = 0), and (b)
dropping the recoded responses. The “recoded response” variable was insignificant in all cases. I also found
no changes in the significant relationships reported in each table with the recoded observations deleted.
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1, Panel C) was broad, but this does not preclude the possibility that the results are not
generalizable to all industries.
The ramifications of fraudulent financial reporting can potentially be devastating,
and the AC plays a key role in safeguarding investors’ interests. This study attempts to
identify relationship links between AC members and other corporate governance actors to
better understand how those links affect actual AC actions and to better understand how
perceptions of reliance and responsibility play a role in how AC members assess fraud
risk. Future research diving deeper into these issues could provide an even more complete
understanding of the “black box” of AC practices.
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APPENDIX A

Dana R. Hermanson
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise
dhermans@kennesaw.edu
770.423.6077

June 24, 2013
<<Title>> <<First Name>> <<Middle Name>> <<Last Name>>
<<Position>>
<<Company>>
<<Bus Street 1>>
<<Bus Street 2>>
<<City>>, <<State>> <<Zip>>
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>:
As you know, the role of audit committee members is quite complex and often challenging. My
doctoral student, Robert Wilbanks, is working on his dissertation, in which he is seeking to better
understand audit committee members’ judgments. Dr. Vineeta Sharma (Kennesaw State
University) and I are overseeing Robert’s research, and we are both experienced accounting
researchers. Robert is an experienced CPA and CFO with experience interacting with board
members (see http://www.linkedin.com/in/robwilbanks).
You are among a select group of audit committee members we are contacting to ask for assistance
with Robert’s dissertation research. Your participation is very important to the success of the
project and to gain a better understanding of the issues and challenges that audit committee
members confront in practice. We certainly hope you will contribute a few minutes of your time
to help us in this area.
We ask that you read the enclosed questionnaire and respond to all of the questions that follow
using the directions provided in the questionnaire. This is not a test, and there are no “right” or
“wrong” answers. We are interested in your candid views. Your responses are guaranteed
anonymity. No effort will be made to link you to your responses, and all data will be reported in
the aggregate only. The project has been approved by our Institutional Review Board.
Completion of the case should take approximately 15-25 minutes. If you have any questions or
would like to receive a summary of the results, please either email Robert at
robertwilbanksksu@gmail.com or me at dhermans@kennesaw.edu. Thank you very much for
your support of this research.
Sincerely,

Dana R. Hermanson
Enclosures: Questionnaire, Return Envelope
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Dana R. Hermanson
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise
dhermans@kennesaw.edu
770.423.6077

SECOND REQUEST - July 18, 2013
<<Title>> <<First Name>> <<Middle Name>> <<Last Name>>
<<Position>>
<<Company>>
<<Bus Street 1>>
<<Bus Street 2>>
<<City>>, <<State>> <<Zip>>
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>:
If you responded to our previous mailing in June 2013, thank you very much for your help, and please
disregard this letter. If you did not respond, we ask that you please consider assisting us with this
important research by taking approximately 15-25 minutes to complete the enclosed case. We will
conclude the data collection by August 8, 2013.
As you know, the role of audit committee members is quite complex and often challenging. My doctoral
student, Robert Wilbanks, is working on his dissertation, in which he is seeking to better understand audit
committee members’ judgments. Dr. Vineeta Sharma (Kennesaw State University) and I are overseeing
Robert’s research, and we are both experienced accounting researchers. Robert is an experienced CPA and
CFO with experience interacting with board members (see http://www.linkedin.com /in/ robwilbanks).
You are among a select group of audit committee members we are contacting to ask for assistance with
Robert’s dissertation research. Your participation is very important to the success of the project and to gain
a better understanding of the issues and challenges that audit committee members confront in practice. We
certainly hope you will contribute a few minutes of your time to help us in this area.
We ask that you read the enclosed questionnaire and respond to all of the questions that follow using the
directions provided in the questionnaire. This is not a test, and there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. We
are interested in your candid views. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to
link you to your responses, and all data will be reported in the aggregate only. The project has been
approved by our Institutional Review Board.
Completion of the case should take approximately 15-25 minutes. If you have any questions or would like
to receive a summary of the results, please either email Robert at robertwilbanksksu@gmail.com or me at
dhermans@kennesaw.edu. Thank you very much for your support of this research.
Sincerely,

Dana R. Hermanson
Enclosures: Questionnaire, Return Envelope
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APPENDIX B

RESEARCH STUDY:
Audit Committee Member Judgments
This study is part of my research requirement to earn my Doctorate in Business
Administration (DBA) at Kennesaw State University. This purpose of the study is
intended to help improve our understanding of the challenges faced by audit committees
today.
Your position and expertise make your opinions and evaluations very important to this
study. The study consists of a questionnaire regarding your service on the largest public
company on whose audit committee you have served for at least one year. The estimated
time for completion is approximately 15-25 minutes.
Your participation in the study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw your consent
(or skip a question) at any time without penalty. Additionally, your individual results will
be anonymous (all data will be reported in the aggregate only). There are no known risks
anticipated because of taking part in this study. You must be at least 18 years of age to
participate in this study.
If you have any questions about the study you can contact me using the information
below. Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried
out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems
regarding these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board,
Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain Road, #0112, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591,
(678) 797-2268.
Thank you in advance for your time and assistance. Your response is greatly appreciated.

Robert M. Wilbanks Jr., CPA
robertwilbanksksu@gmail.com
(423) 280-9211
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INSTRUCTIONS
1. The pages that follow contain a questionnaire.
2. Please complete the materials in the order given without looking ahead through
the pages. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in
a way that reflects your honest opinions and judgments. To ensure a usable
response, please complete all of the questions. You will have an opportunity at the
end of the questionnaire to provide any clarifications or comments you would like to
make.
3. You are anonymous during this study. No effort will be made to link you to your
responses on the following pages, and all data will be reported for the aggregate
sample only.

RESEARCHER
Robert Wilbanks, CPA
Tennessee Technological University
Doctoral Student – Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University
robertwilbanksksu@gmail.com
(423) 280-9211

Dissertation Committee
Dana Hermanson, Ph.D. (Chair)
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair &
Professor
Coles College of Business
Kennesaw State University
dhermans@kennesaw.edu
(770) 423-6077

Vineeta D. Sharma, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Coles College of Business
Kennesaw State University
vsharma5@kennesaw.edu
(770) 794-7626
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I. Assessing Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Please respond by considering the largest public company on whose audit committee you
have served for at least one year. Please answer all of the questions in this survey with
respect to ONLY that company. Please do not name the company, and I will make no effort
to identify the company.
For purposes of this study, the term “fraudulent financial reporting” represents the
intentional material misstatement of financial statements or financial disclosures or the
perpetration of an illegal act that has a material direct effect on the financial statements or
financial disclosures.
A. Reliance When Assessing Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR)
When assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting in this company, to what
extent do you rely upon each party listed below? (Indicate your answers with a slash
on the horizontal lines below):
No
Total
Reliance
Reliance
1. Chief Executive Officer

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

2. Chief Financial Officer

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

3. Other audit committee members

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

4. Yourself

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

5. Other independent directors
(not on the audit committee)

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

6. The head of internal audit

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

7. The external audit partner in charge
of this engagement
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
For the parties above on whom you rely heavily, what is your reason for this
reliance?
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B. Perceptions of Responsibility for Assessing Risk of Fraudulent Financial
Reporting (FFR)
What is your perception of the responsibility of each party listed below for
assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting in this company? (Indicate your
answers with a slash on the lines below):
No
Responsibility

Total
Responsibility

1. Chief Executive Officer

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

2. Chief Financial Officer

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

3. Other audit committee members

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

4. Yourself

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

5. Other independent directors
(not on the audit committee)

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

6. The head of internal audit

|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|

7. The external audit partner in charge
of this engagement
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
For the parties above with high responsibility, what is your reason for assigning
such responsibility?
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II. Audit Committee Actions to Assess Risk of FFR
Please rate the extent to which the audit committee of this company engages in its
own actions to assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. This audit committee
(indicate your answers with a slash on the lines below):
1. Closely analyzes reserves and other financial statement areas where fraud could
occur.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
2. Assesses the character of management.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
3. Has regular interactions with management.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
4. Actively promotes the company’s whistleblower hotline.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
5. Actively searches for fraud risks.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
6. Reviews officers’ expenses (annually) to assess financial statement fraud risks.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
7. Please describe any other means that the audit committee of this company uses to
assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting.
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III. Audit Committee Actions to Assess/Monitor Management Integrity
Please rate the extent to which the audit committee of this company assesses and
monitors management’s integrity. This audit committee (indicate your answers
with a slash on the lines below):
1. Assesses management’s body language.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
2. Observes management’s transparency/openness.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
3. Observes how management reacts in pressure situations.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
4. Observes whether management is defensive.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
5. Monitors the whistleblower hotline.
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Not at All
A Great Deal
6. Please describe any other means that the audit committee of this company uses to
assess and monitor management’s integrity.
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IV. Professional Ties
Please respond using the same company for your frame of reference that you used on the
previous pages - the largest public company on whose audit committee you have served for
at least one year. You will not name the company, and I will make no effort to identify the
company.
Professional ties
“Professional ties” refer to instances where you and another individual have interacted in
a business capacity in a meaningful way, separate from your service on this company’s
board and audit committee. Such interactions may include:







You serve(d) together on another company’s board.
You serve(d) together on a not-for-profit board.
You worked together at another company or organization (including cases where
one party was an executive and the other was a board member).
You had a supplier-customer relationship, or a service provider-client relationship
(external auditor, outside counsel, consultant, etc.).
You are a former employee of this company.
You knew each other well through professional organizations.

Do you have any professional ties to the following parties (other than your service on
this company’s board)?
1. The CEO
Yes, I have professional ties to this person.
No, I do not have professional ties to this person.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie
(indicate your answer with a slash on the line below):
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
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2. The CFO
Yes, I have professional ties to this person.
No, I do not have professional ties to this person.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie:
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
3. Other audit committee members
Yes, I have professional ties to other audit committee members.
No, I do not have professional ties to other audit committee members.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of your strongest tie to another audit committee
member:
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
4. Other independent directors (not on the audit committee)
Yes, I have professional ties to other independent directors
(not on the audit committee).
No, I do not have professional ties to other independent directors
(not on the audit committee).
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of your strongest tie to an independent director
(not on the audit committee):
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
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5. The head of internal audit
Yes, I have professional ties to this person.
No, I do not have professional ties to this person.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie:
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
6. The external audit partner in charge of this engagement
Yes, I have professional ties to this person.
No, I do not have professional ties to this person.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie:
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
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V. Personal Ties
Please respond using the same company for your frame of reference that you used on the
previous pages - the largest public company on whose audit committee you have served for
at least one year. You will not name the company, and I will make no effort to identify the
company.
Personal ties
“Personal ties” refer to instances where you and another individual have or have had nonbusiness affiliations or interactions. Such affiliations or interactions may include:









You were college classmates or active together in an alumni group.
You are/were members of the same golf or social club, religious organization, or
charitable organization.
You are long-term personal friends.
Your families are friends (e.g., children play together or attend school together).
You are related.
You live(d) in the same neighborhood.
You both served in the military.
You have any other types of common personal ties similar to those listed above.

Do you have any personal ties to the following parties?
1. The CEO
Yes, I have personal ties to this person.
No, I do not have personal ties to this person.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie
(indicate your answer with a slash on the line below):
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
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2. The CFO
Yes, I have personal ties to this person.
No, I do not have personal ties to this person.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie:
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
3. Other audit committee members
Yes, I have personal ties to other audit committee members.
No, I do not have personal ties to other audit committee members.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of your strongest tie to another audit committee
member:
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
4. Other independent directors (not on the audit committee)
Yes, I have personal ties to other independent directors
(not on the audit committee).
No, I do not have personal ties to other independent directors
(not on the audit committee).
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of your strongest tie to an independent director
(not on the audit committee):
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
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5. The head of internal audit
Yes, I have personal ties to this person.
No, I do not have personal ties to this person.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie:
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
6. The external audit partner in charge of this engagement
Yes, I have personal ties to this person.
No, I do not have personal ties to this person.
If yes, please briefly describe:

If yes, please rate your perception of the strength of this tie:
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|
Very Weak Tie
Very Strong Tie
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VI. Demographic/Audit Committee/Governance Questions
Please respond to the following questions. These will be used only to analyze the results,
not to identify any participant.
A. Demographic Questions
1. What is your gender?
Male
Female
2. What is your age? __________
3. Please indicate which of the following applies to you (choose one).
Corporate director, employed full-time by another organization
Corporate director, not employed full-time
4. Please provide your current job title if employed full-time: __________________
5. Please indicate below any professional certifications you have (choose all that
apply).
Certified Financial Manager (CFM)
Certified Management Accountant (CMA)
Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA)
Other ____________________
6. Please indicate below any professional experience in finance or accounting you
have (choose all that apply).
Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
Public accounting
General management
Accounting professor
Controller
Financial / accounting regulator
Other ____________________
7. How many total years of financial or accounting experience do you have?______
8. Please indicate your highest educational degree.
Bachelor’s degree
Masters degree
JD
PhD/DBA
Other ____________________
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B. Company Characteristics
1. Please indicate the approximate annual revenues (in millions) of the company on
whose audit committee you serve (the focal company in this survey) (choose
one).
Less than $10 million
$10 million to $50 million
$51 million to $100 million
$101 million to $200 million
$201 million to $300 million
$301 million to $400 million
$401 million to $500 million
$501 million to $1 billion
Over $1 billion
2. Please indicate the industry group of the company on whose audit committee
you serve (the focal company in this survey) (choose one).
Communication/Media
Energy/Utilities
Finance/Banking
Government/Education
Healthcare/Pharmaceuticals
Insurance
Manufacturing
Real Estate
Retail Trade
Service Organization
Technology
Telecommunications
Transportation/Logistics
Wholesale Trade
Other ________________
3. Is this company audited by one of the “Big 4” accounting firms?
Yes
No
4. Is this company’s internal audit function primarily “in-house” or outsourced?
(Choose one)
In-house
Outsourced
Both in-house and outsourced (co-sourced)
No internal audit function
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5. To whom does the internal audit function report in this company? (Choose one)
Primarily to the audit committee
Primarily to management
About equally to the audit committee and management
Not applicable
C. Audit Committee Member Service
1. Are you formally designated as an “audit committee financial expert” for this
company?
Yes
No
2. Are you the audit committee chair for this company?
Yes
No
3. Do you have industry expertise in the same industry as that of this company?
Yes
No
4. How many years have you served on the board of this company? __________
5. How many years have you served on the audit committee of this company?____
D. Audit Committee Composition and Meeting Processes
1. How many members serve on the audit committee of this company? __________
2. How many members of the audit committee are designated as “audit committee
financial experts”? __________
3. How many years has the chair of the audit committee served as chair?__________
4. How many formal audit committee meetings (face-to-face, video conferencing, or
telephone) are held each year? __________
E. Other Audit Committee Experience
1. On how many public company audit committees do you currently serve
(including this company)? __________
2. How many public company audit committees have you served on during your
career (including this company)? __________
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3. For how many years have you served on at least one public company audit
committee? __________
4. Have you ever served on an audit committee (public or private) at the time the
company experienced fraudulent financial reporting?
Yes
No
F. Governance Characteristics
1. How many directors serve on the full board of this company? __________
2. How many independent directors serve on the full board of this company?_____
3. Is the CEO also the chairman of the board of this company?
Yes
No
4. Is the CEO also the founder of this company?
Yes
No
5. Was the current CEO in place when you were appointed to the board?
Yes
No
6. How many years has the CEO of this company been in office? __________
7. How many years has the CFO of this company been in office? __________
Please provide any additional comments about the issues examined in this survey.

Thank you very much for completing the survey. If you would like a summary of
the study’s results, please email the researcher.

